

FIRST THINGS

JUDAISM OR JEWISHNESS

Elliott Abrams

DEBRIEFING THE PHILOSOPHERS

J. Bottum

RAPTURE & RENEWAL IN LATIN AMERICA

Pedro C. Moreno

CATHOLICISM AND THE BIBLE AN INTERVIEW

Begetting and Cloning

Gilbert Meilaender

In the Case of Bruno Bettelheim

Molly Finn

ALSO: Rancho Santa Fe and the Culture of Death

James Nuechterlein on Race • Michael R. Linton

Michael W. McConnell • Kevin M. Doyle • William F. Buckley, Jr.

A. J. Bacevich • Laurance Wieder • M. S. Leach




Richard John Neuhaus

The Public Square

A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

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FIRST THINGS

JUNE/JULY 1997 • Number 74

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Editor-in-Chief: *Richard John Neuhaus*
Editor: *James Nuechterlein*
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Publisher: *Institute on Religion and Public Life*
Publishing Service: *Publishing Management Associates*

FIRST THINGS: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life (ISSN #1047-5141) is published monthly (except for combined issues June/July and August/September) for \$29 per year by the Institute on Religion and Public Life, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY and additional mailing office. POSTMASTER: send address changes to FIRST THINGS: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. FT, Denville, NJ 07834. **Editorial Offices:** The Institute on Religion and Public Life, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10010. **Editorial Phone:** (212) 627-1985. **Advertising Offices:** 129 Phelps Avenue, Suite 312, Rockford, IL 61108. **Advertising Phone:** (815) 398-8569. **Subscription Department:** P.O. Box 3000, Dept. FT, Denville, NJ 07834. 1-800-783-4903. Unsolicited material cannot be returned unless accompanied by sufficient return postage. Newsstand distribution by Eastern News Distributors, Inc., 2020 Superior Street, Sandusky, OH 44870. Copyright © 1997 by the Institute on Religion and Public Life. All rights reserved. Produced in the USA.

FIRST THINGS

FIRST THINGS is published by Religion and Public Life, an inter-religious, nonpartisan research and education institute whose purpose is to advance a religiously informed public philosophy for the ordering of society. RPL also sponsors scholars conferences, consultations, research projects, public educational events, and a fellows program.

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Bad History, Bad Logic

Carol Iannone's piece on *Inherit the Wind* (February) was long overdue. Besides being false to history, the film version takes liberties with logic. This speech delivered by the Darrow/Drummond character in the film is a classic instance of the argument from the slippery slope:

Can't you understand that if you take a law like evolution and you make it a crime to teach it in the public schools, tomorrow you can make it a crime to teach it in the private schools? And tomorrow you can make it a crime to read about it? And soon you may ban books and newspapers? And then you may turn Catholic against Protestant, and Protestant against Protestant, and try to foist your own religion upon the mind of man? If you can do the one, you can do the other.

This may count as the longest string of non sequiturs ever assembled in peacetime (or at least presented on the American screen).

Gan Matthews
Norman, OK

The Pope and Evolution

Thank you for your documentation of Pope John Paul II's "Theories of Evolution" address (March). It is most refreshing to have the Pope's actual statement rather than the media spin-doctoring that followed the Pope's address.

While the Pope is correct in stating that "the theory of evolution is more than a hypothesis," the word "evolution" has so many different meanings that the Pope's statement can become a source of confusion and misunderstanding. Evolution is a fact when referring to minor variations in the colors of moths and the sizes of finch beaks (microevolution); a theory when referring to the inference that all organisms have been linked in the past by common ancestors (common

descent); and a grand metaphysical scheme when it claims that the entire living world is the product of blind natural forces.

Unfortunately, the grand metaphysical meaning is the one being promoted under the guise of science in the biology classroom. The National Association of Biology Teachers define evolution as "an unsupervised, impersonal, unpredictable, and natural process." The popular tenth-grade text *Biology*, by K. Miller and J. Levine (Prentice Hall, 1993), informs students that "evolution works without either plan or purpose," and that evolution "is random and undirected." Such statements are not justified on scientific grounds and illustrate that evolution is not taught as science, but as Darwinian philosophy, whose purpose is to replace the otherwise obvious design of organisms. All theists and scientists should unite in correcting this abuse in the science classroom.

John Wiester
American Scientific Affiliation
Science Education Commission
Buellton, CA

I have been somewhat puzzled by the amount of ink used concerning John Paul's comments on evolution. Few Catholics have been concerned that the Universe is some ten billion years old and that life has been evolving on Earth for some few billion years. The issue of religious concern, of course, is the origin of man.

Like much of the modern intellectual landscape, the problem of religion and evolution can be traced to the Reformation. Luther stated that all revelation necessary for salvation had to be found in Scripture. Catholics, of course, believe that the Church teaches that which is necessary for salvation.

The unnecessary polarization between biology and religion was caused by the polemics of early Darwin supporters. They gleefully taught that since science "proved" the Bible wrong then the Christian faith was in vain. As one would expect, pious Christians rejected this formu-

lation and the concept of evolution.

William M. Selenke
Cincinnati, OH

I read with interest the address given by John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. It is refreshing to hear a member of the community of faith discuss a matter from the world of science with such insight. The division that has existed between the two communities has contributed to the alienation of many honorable people. More importantly, it has created in individuals a painful bifurcation of loyalties at their very core. Perhaps such a discussion will assure all that honest insights are honorable and may be part of a greater truth.

David P. Henrie, M.D.
Delta, UT

One does not need to be "more Catholic than the Pope" to be disappointed in Pope John Paul's address on evolution. The Pope's key statement that "new knowledge leads to the recognition of the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis" reflects the guilt complex cast by the Galileo episode upon the Catholic psyche. This timidity begets a naive trust in scientists' freedom from bias in their discoveries and in their interpretations of findings. Alas, recent decades show increasing examples of data manipulation or fraudulent reporting in medical and scientific journals.

The Pope's dictum, "A theory's validity depends on whether or not it can be verified," is the absolute truth. The recent discoveries in genetics and molecular biology are dismantling the theory of evolution instead of confirming it. Despite recent neo-Darwinian attempts at revision and invention, evolution is farther from factual proof today than in 1859 when Darwin popularized it.

It is difficult for Catholics without study of the literature on both sides to appreciate what a battle for mind (and soul) rages over this issue. Nor do they perceive *why* the theory of naturalistic, atheistic evolution—the only genuine kind—is a menace to the Faith. Modern exegetes who demythologize Genesis encourage

this complacency. . . .

The Church for centuries never acknowledged any truth in evolution, as Father Peter Fehlner recounts in the Roman journal *Christ to the World* Vol. XXXIII, 1988, Nos. 1-3. Evolutionist Teilhard de Chardin succeeded in muddying the waters. But is Pope John Paul teetering on the brink? . . .

Catholics may have joined the publicized ridicule of "creation science," but their Protestant brethren have done their homework in demonstrating how untenable evolution really is. Their public seminars, college campus debates, and videos are convincing stuff. These activities are done by qualified scientists, many of them converts from the evolution brotherhood. . . .

William L. Drake, Jr., M.D.
St. Louis, MO

The Truth About Homosexuality

Elizabeth Moberly ("Homosexuality and Truth," March) criticizes Father John Harvey's book *The Truth About Homosexuality* for saying the homosexual orientation itself is objectively disordered, because this blurs the distinction between conditions and behavior. But Dr. Moberly fails to realize that tendencies that lead to disordered or evil acts must for that reason themselves be judged as harmful and disordered in that person. It is well recognized, for example, that habits are good or bad according to the kinds of acts, good or bad, they incite and facilitate. Though not sinful themselves unless freely chosen, such tendencies mislead and ease their possessor into acts that are immoral. These tendencies, such as orientation, must be judged harmful, detrimental, to the person having them; that is, such an orientation itself is objectively disordered in that person. . . .

Jerome F. Treacy, S.J.
Clarkston, MI

It concerns me that Elizabeth Moberly's article implies that gay activists have no respect for the truth. She does not desire to be called bigoted,

but does not hesitate to imply that gay activists are basically dishonest.

Two of her major arguments have been totally disproven by the use of *nonclinical* samples of homosexuals. Starting with Evelyn Hooker's pioneering study published in the *Journal of Projective Techniques* in 1956, there have been numerous studies of homosexuals from nonclinical samples showing homosexuals can be just as well-adjusted as heterosexuals. Likewise, the belief that homosexuality results from pathological parenting is derived from clinical samples. Bell and Weinberg, in their landmark study at the Kinsey Institute, basically disproved all of Dr. Moberly's theories of homosexual origin. Pathological parenting is the cause of neuroticism, not homosexuality.

There have been numerous follow-up studies of the effectiveness of psychotherapy in changing homosexual orientation which show that one's basic inward orientation is completely unchangeable. Irving Bieber admitted to me, and "ex-gay" leaders have admitted to others, that while "ex-gays" may come to *practice* heterosexuality, their inner orientations do not change. I can learn to write with my left hand, but my basic orientation is still right-handed.

It is not conclusively proven that homosexuality is genetically determined. However, as the great sex researcher John Money says, even if homosexuality is learned, it would be permanently learned, just as our native language is permanently learned. Neither homosexual desire nor native language can be unlearned.

The gay activist agenda, as well as the American Psychiatric Association decision in 1973 removing homosexuality from the list of psychiatric disorders, are decidedly more consistent with sound scientific evidence than are Dr. Moberly's views.

Dan Wagle
Decatur, GA

A fundamental problem with Elizabeth Moberly's essay lies in the difficulty of defining what it means to be "homosexual." The physical ability

to experience sexual pleasure with partners of either gender is a reality for a biologically normal human being. Whether or not one will act on that capacity or even experience homosexual desires is primarily a matter of culture. In ancient Sparta, virtually all males engaged in sex with other men, and heterosexual activity was looked on with such distaste that women would dress as boys for their wedding night. Surely Dr. Moberly is not ready to suggest that all Spartan men were mentally ill.

If the twin studies that Dr. Moberly cites undercut the idea of homosexual behavior as genetic in origin, they also seem to refute her thesis that a propensity to engage in homosexual activity necessarily originates in some serious familial dysfunction. Identical twins raised in the same family would not be expected to experience extreme traumatic differences in nurture. . . .

In American society, particularly among the upper classes, people are frequently open about homosexuality as a choice. Witness the increasing popularity of being "gay for the duration," or of the idea of being "sexually fluid." Certainly some homosexual behavior is compulsive and may indicate emotional illness, but this is also true of compulsive adultery or compulsive pornography use among heterosexuals.

A more realistic view of homosexuality lies in recognizing it as a general human possibility not fundamentally different from other forms of sexual activity. This need not imply that it is socially desirable, just that it does not reflect an intrinsically alien status or orientation.

Judy Tefft
Idaho Falls, ID

Elizabeth Moberly's article left much to be desired in the truth department. Several of the key assertions were not supported by solid evidence. She claims, for example, that the decision of the board of the American Psychiatric Association in 1973 to change the classification of homosexuality was a direct result of pressure by the National Gay Task Force and not of scientific findings. This unsupport-

ed statement is an insult to the integrity of the APA and the intelligence of FIRST THINGS readers. Why would a respected and strong professional organization such as the APA give in to such pressure?

Dr. Moberly also asserts that the findings of John Boswell in his book *Same-Sex Unions in Pre-Modern Europe* have been dismissed by "serious historians" and that "neither accuracy nor logic is much the point of [the] book." Having read Boswell's book, I found the evidence in his extensive footnotes most impressive and certainly not to be dismissed so cavalierly, even if the work—like many historical writings—is flawed.

Most contrary to truth, however, may be Dr. Moberly's unsupported assertion that "the disruption of the father-son bond is what results in homosexuality." This is an astoundingly sweeping statement. Many homosexual men (she never mentions women) assert that their relationship with their fathers involved a strong and supportive bond and that they cannot recall any childhood trauma following which they realized their homosexuality. While it is true that the causes of homosexuality are not yet fully clear, there are probably a variety of them, and the possibility still exists that one of them may be genetic. Dr. Moberly's dismissals notwithstanding. . . .

Richard J. Zimmerman
Honolulu, HI

Elizabeth Moberly replies:

The relation between the homosexual condition and homosexual behavior referred to by Father Treacy is crucially important, but perhaps not adequately understood. Developmentally, a male homosexual is like a young boy who is still looking for his father's love. There is nothing deviant or pathological about a boy needing his father's love. It is a normal developmental need. However, this need was never intended to be fulfilled *sexually*. That is the crucial distinction.

If a young boy's father is absent or emotionally unavailable or hostile, that boy's need for masculine bonding and affirmation will remain

unfulfilled. When this need carries over into adult life, it becomes eroticized, and the man now seeks homosexual relationships in order to fulfill this unmet childhood need. Alternately, a male therapist can help to resolve the pain and emptiness of the past, and to fulfill unmet needs in healthy, nonsexual ways.

The homosexual *condition* is essentially the boy's unmet need for his father's love. This need is normal and valid, and is certainly not "objectively disordered." The tragedy of sin is that so often it distorts something that is inherently good.

In answer to Dan Wagle, I do not say that gay activists have no respect for the truth. However, I believe that they are often misinformed, and that they should be better informed.

I agree with Mr. Wagle that in many respects homosexuals are as well adjusted as heterosexuals. Homosexual people have made many valuable contributions to society, and we should not lose sight of that fact. However, homosexuals have been emotionally wounded in a way that heterosexuals have not. That is the crucial point, and it relates to a breakdown in early bonding with the parent of the same sex (*not* the parent of the opposite sex, as traditionally assumed). My own work in this area was originally developed from a *nonclinical* sample, though clinical data have repeatedly confirmed this understanding.

I further agree with Mr. Wagle that conventional psychotherapy for homosexuals was relatively ineffective. Some approaches—such as aversion therapy—were not merely ineffective but inhumane. During the years that I worked in homosexual ministry, I repeatedly denounced aversion therapy for homosexuals as both ineffective and unethical.

However, Mr. Wagle seems unaware that Irving Bieber does not have the last word in treatment paradigms for homosexuals. The recent attempt by certain professionals to resurrect a 1960s approach to homosexual therapy is misguided. There are no shortcuts to heterosexuality, and it is vital to base therapy on the understanding that same-sex love

is an inherent reparative drive. If Mr. Wagle himself does not wish to change, that is his decision. However, I challenge him to respect the right of other homosexuals to choose differently.

It is true, as Judy Tefft suggests, that identical twins raised in the same family may not usually experience "extreme traumatic differences in nurture." However, identical twins do necessarily face a special problem: Each twin needs to be able to identify himself (or herself) as a *unique individual*—in the close presence of another individual who is genetically identical. Thus, identical twins face a challenge that is not experienced by ordinary siblings, or even by fraternal twins.

In a family with children of different ages, the nurturing environment may be fairly similar, but this does not cover individual circumstances and reactions. For instance, if a parent dies or divorces, a younger child is likely to be more deeply traumatized by this than an older child. Even where the marital bond is intact, a child may react negatively if a parent is emotionally unavailable or hostile.

Where family structure is fragile, children may not have adequate opportunities for bonding and identification. Thus, in adult life, it is hardly surprising that men from such backgrounds should continue to seek masculine bonding and affirmation through homosexual encounters. However, therapy is far more effective than sex for meeting the needs of emotional woundedness.

In response to Richard J. Zimmerman, a detailed discussion of the political pressures behind the 1973 decision of the APA may be found in Dr. Charles Socarides' article "Sexual Politics and Scientific Logic: The Issue of Homosexuality," published in the *Journal of Psychohistory* (Winter 1992). Subsidiary materials may be found in *Homosexuality: A Symbolic Confusion* by Ruth Tiffany Barnhouse (Crossroad/Seabury, 1979) and *Homosexuality and the Politics of Truth* by Jeffrey Satinover (Baker, 1996).

The work of John Boswell may be interesting, but unfortunately it is

seriously flawed, because his central hypothesis is completely mistaken. The Eastern Orthodox "sacrament of brotherhood" was never intended to sanction gay marriage, and it is a distortion of theology, history, canon law, and liturgics to claim otherwise.

Disruption of the child's bond with the same-sex parent is what results in homosexuality. Thus, the father-son bond is crucial for the male homosexual, and the mother-daughter bond is crucial for the lesbian.

Finally, it is hardly surprising that some gay activists are reluctant to admit to difficulties in early bonding, since this would be "politically incorrect" for them. What has always amazed me is the large number of homosexual men (in therapy or not) who can readily identify difficulties with an absent or neglectful or hostile father. With others, the recognition may develop after further exploration of their family background. However, identifying trauma is not an end in itself. The good news is that a same-sex therapist can focus on same-sex developmental issues, in order to resolve issues with the father and to help the client build a more secure masculine identity. When therapy focuses on the affirmation and strengthening of gender identity, without any premature pressures towards heterosexual relating, then genuine change and growth are possible.

The Sources of Religious Freedom

I very much disagree with a major claim in John H. Garvey's "The Real Reason for Religious Freedom" (March). Garvey writes: "It is possible to imagine a society of skeptics insisting on a free exercise clause, but the idea is far-fetched."

I would like to ask him, or anyone who agrees with this, whether they actually know of anyone whom they would class as a "skeptic" (excluding those in thrall to some totalitarian political ideology) who would *not* insist on such a clause in our law?

I really doubt that you could come up with many "skeptics" opposed to the free exercise of religion, but you

could certainly find plenty of "true believers," such as the Muslims of Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, etc., who would be and are opposed to the free exercise of religion—other than their own, that is.

Support of "religious freedom," and of liberty of conscience more generally, does not arise from belief or nonbelief in any supreme being, or even in a nontheistic religion, such as Buddhism. It arises from the love of human liberty, and from a dislike for tyranny (whatever its rationale). . . .

Mr. Garvey goes on to say, "Sometimes religious believers and nonbelievers are treated alike, but sometimes the law protects only religious believers. . . . The only convincing explanation for such a rule is that the law thinks religion is a good thing."

The reason for this rule has nothing to do with whether "the law," or those who wrote it, think that "religion is a good thing." The reason is that they think—and "skeptics" like myself continue to believe, today—that *liberty*, including religious liberty, is a good thing. This will perforce involve special protections for the expression of "religious beliefs," thereby creating the legal asymmetry, which Mr. Garvey remarks on, between believers and nonbelievers.

The right of people to believe whatever they choose, or what their conscience demands of them, is merely the logical converse of the right to believe in nothing at all. They are the same freedom, and quite indivisible.

Edmund Weinmann
Huntington, NY

I was surprised to see John Garvey's article published in *FIRST THINGS* because it rests upon the anti-Catholic revisionist myth that seventeenth-century English Protestants were the greatest developers of religious freedom and toleration, largely in "protest against the Catholic Church's claim" to mediate between God and man. That assertion is wrong for two reasons. First, seventeenth-century Protestants never had the broad sympathy for "toleration" that Mr. Garvey assumes; rather, intolerance even of other Protestant

sects was the rule until intra-Protestant compromise became necessary in the face of two kings in a row who converted to Rome. Second, it continues the false Whig historiography that maligns the real progenitors of seventeenth-century English toleration, the Catholic kings, Charles II and James II.

English Protestants spent the first sixty years of the seventeenth century in an unrelenting struggle for control of the "English Church" that pitted Puritan against Laudite, Roundhead against Cavalier, Presbyterian against Independent, and everyone against the Quakers. It was only in 1660, after repeated proroguing of Parliament, civil war, regicide, and the Commonwealth Interregnum, that the Nonconformists reluctantly accepted continued rule of the "Church of England" by the king. Yet even then there was no toleration. When Charles proposed tolerance for both Nonconformists and Catholics in 1663, Parliament rejected the proposal out of hand. Instead, the Anglicans, led by Locke's patron Shaftesbury and employing agents provocateur like Titus Oates, spent the next twenty-five years persecuting Catholics (Oliver Plunkett was martyred in 1681) and trying to prevent Charles' openly Catholic brother James from succeeding to the throne.

Charles and James were the true proponents of toleration in seventeenth-century England, not Milton and Locke as Mr. Garvey wrongly supposes. One of their greatest supporters, in fact, was William Penn, whose Pennsylvania colony (chartered by Charles) was the only "tolerant" colony since Protestants displaced Maryland's tolerant Catholic proprietors in the aftermath of the English Civil War. Charles' efforts at toleration in England, though, were so viciously opposed in Parliament that Charles even concealed his own conversion to the Catholic religion until he lay on his deathbed in 1685. James, bluffer and more courageous than his brother, went forward with a Declaration of Indulgence, proclaiming toleration for Catholics and Nonconformists alike during his short three-year reign (1685-88), and

seemed to get away with it until his Catholic second wife gave birth to a Catholic male heir.

The birth of baby James was the efficient cause of the "Glorious Revolution of 1688," because it trumped his Protestant half-sister Mary's right of succession. The Anglican ascendancy recognized that if the baby reigned as James III, three Anglican Church "heads" in a row (and four out of the eight successors to Henry VIII) would have acknowledged papal primacy. The bankruptcy of "Anglicanism" would be manifest. So the Anglicans, supposedly king's men, threw loyalty aside and turned instead to treason and revolution and forced James II to flee to France.

Throughout the seventeenth century, the Protestants were interested in only so much tolerance as was necessary to forge a majority in Parliament. Milton never favored real toleration. Rather, in 1673, as part of the general effort to raise an alarm about Catholic sympathizers, Milton wrote a treatise with a telling name: "Of True Religion, Haeresie, Schism, and the Growth of Papacy." Likewise, Locke wrote the document Mr. Garvey cites, the Letter on Toleration, only after the Glorious Revolution. By then, the birth of baby James had forced the Anglicans to "save what they could" by offering toleration to their former enemies the Nonconformists, and thus blocking James' bid for their loyalty through the Declaration of Indulgence. Indeed, Locke accompanied William and Mary on their invasion of England that first produced her father James' overthrow and then that vile document, the English Bill of Rights, which declares: "It is inconsistent with the safety and welfare of this Protestant Kingdom to be governed by a popish prince, or by a king or queen, marrying a papist." So much for seventeenth-century English Protestant tolerance! . . .

David J. Ritchie
Watchung, NJ

John H. Garvey replies:

Edmund Weinmann maintains that human liberty is a good thing, and that we should protect religious liber-

ty because it is an instance of that larger freedom. The principal difficulty with this argument is that it is hard to defend the major premise. If there were a general right to human liberty I should be as free to practice law as I am to practice religion, or as free to drive a car as I am to speak. But we let the government license lawyers and drivers for the simple reason that we do not esteem those activities as highly as we do religion and speech. The real problem that an argument for religious liberty must solve is explaining what is special about religious liberty. That is what I have tried to do.

Mr. Weinmann observes that there have been, and are still, societies where people believe in God but where religious freedom is denied to those who don't practice the established religion. This is unfortunately true. It nevertheless does not, as I think Mr. Weinmann supposes, afford an empirical disproof of my argument. I do not assert that we would be better off if we ran the state along religious lines. Quite the contrary. I believe that religious people are better off if the state leaves them alone. I only say that we ought to take seriously the reasons that some (though alas not all) religious people have given for wanting to be left alone.

I am not sure that David J. Ritchie and I have any serious disagreement about the facts of life in seventeenth-century England. It is perfectly true that the Anglicans (including Shaftesbury) persecuted Catholics and tried to prevent James from taking the throne because of his faith. It is also true that they forced him off it, against their own patriotic principles, for religious reasons. I do not deny that Locke and Milton had their anti-Catholic prejudices. (These are evident in their writings.) I even concede that Charles II, and more persistently James II, made efforts in the direction of toleration (though it may be a mistake to describe Charles as a closet Catholic; I had thought he was reconciled to the Church only on his deathbed).

I have some quarrel with the tone of Mr. Ritchie's account of these

facts. It is more simple than life. Mr. Ritchie makes the period sound like a contest between Catholics and Protestants. He says too little about Protestant Dissenters, for whose support both Anglicans and Catholics were striving. And he clearly sees the struggle as one between good and bad guys: the English Bill of Rights is a "vile document," my account, which pays some tribute to Locke and Milton, resurrects an "anti-Catholic revisionist myth," James II was "bluff . . . and . . . courageous."

But I don't want to dwell on these differences. My chief defense is this. In the passages Mr. Ritchie most objects to I defend several ideas asserted by Protestant thinkers during this period (that coercion is religiously futile, that revelation is progressive). It is no condemnation of these ideas to say that Locke and Milton applied them too narrowly in the circumstances of their own lives. A century later Thomas Jefferson wrote in our Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal. It is no condemnation of this idea to observe that Jefferson did not apply it to his own slaves. (Nor would I describe our Constitution as a "vile document" though it does, alas, contain the fugitive slave clause, the three-fifths compromise, and protection of the international slave trade.)

What Jews Believe

There are surveys, and there are surveys. The symposium "What Do American Jews Believe?" in *Commentary* magazine, as described in "The Fragmented Faith of American Jews" (February), is nothing less than a joke.

Rabbi Clifford E. Librach says it is "not an entirely representative group"; this is surely a major understatement. Of the forty-seven contributors, fifteen are Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform rabbis—although not one rabbi from the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community, which has rapidly multiplied in the past several decades because of its high birthrate—twenty-five are professors of and writers on Judaism and/or officers of Jewish institutions, and

the rest include a professor of history, a lawyer, and a film critic. But where are the acclaimed Jewish authors, industrialists, scientists, and philosophers who have done so much to invigorate America today? Where are the Norman Mailers and Susan Sontags?

Those surveyed were very circumspect as to what they said. I understand that *Commentary* is read also by many non-Jews, and American Jews like to present a facade of common purpose despite their divisiveness. But when the intermarriage rate in the U.S. exceeds 50 percent, then the time for bromides is over.

Here are some of the critical issues Jews confront, issues never mentioned in the seventy-thousand-word symposium. Agnosticism and atheism are higher proportionately among educated and intellectual Jews than among their Christian counterparts. Many Jews are uncomfortable with the Hebrew Bible, particularly the harsh passages, and are attracted to New Testament teachings on love and to Buddhism. There has been a dramatic decline of the paramount Torah commandment of *Ahavat Yisrael* (loving a fellow Jew). The enchantment of Israel is fading among many mainstream Jews. Long gone are the exhilarating days after the Six-Day War of 1967. Now we behold an Israel shrinking in size and in vision, wanting to be the Singapore, not the Switzerland, of the Middle East. And then there is the fanaticism, xenophobia, and obscurantism of the ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic Jews—which perhaps is the reason none of them was invited to participate in the symposium.

Jacob Mendlovic
Toronto, Canada

Non-Orthodox Christians in Ukraine

I enjoyed Joseph R. Gregory's article, "Ukraine: Christians in Conflict" (March). It was both informative and well-written. It has a major flaw, however. My criticism is that Mr. Gregory focuses on the Church in the Ukrainian capitol of Kiev and projects it upon the whole of Ukraine.

He fails to mention an important part of the intra-Christian battle going on in western Ukraine involving a long-standing religious force so frightening to the Communists that they murdered its bishops, took its married priests' families hostage, and forced it at gunpoint to declare itself defunct in 1946: the Ukrainian Byzantine Catholic Church. This Church was forced to exist underground after that time, and it persevered despite persecution, torture, and death. Many of its faithful opted for the safe route and joined the Communist-backed Orthodox churches. The Ukrainian Byzantine Catholic Church resurfaced officially when the walls came tumbling down at the turn of the decade. Now, it, too, is struggling to recover not only the recognition it had for the 350 years prior to 1946, but, more importantly, its rightful property, which was seized by the Communists and turned over to the state and to the Orthodox churches.

Often derided by the Orthodox as "uniates," the Byzantine Catholic Church was that part of the Catholic Church established in Constantinople which was introduced to Ukraine by Saints Cyril and Methodius in A.D. 988. Technically speaking, Prince Volodymyr and Princess Olga were baptized Catholic. Sometime after the Eastern (or Byzantine) Schism with Rome in 1064, the Ukrainian Byzantine Church also broke away. This became what is today known as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In 1596, the Union of Brest joined the western portion of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to Rome and it thus became the Ukrainian Byzantine Catholic Church—to the bitter hostility of the Orthodox.

The Ukrainian Byzantine Catholic Church is a unique entity within the Catholic Church, because it is its own "Rite," and as a Rite, it exists as a nationalistic entity. Without its Ukrainian language and Ukrainian customs and traditions, it does not exist as "Ukrainian." Hence, its growth (or evangelistic outreach) is limited to its own country. This puts the Ukrainian Byzantine Catholic Church in as much competition for

the nation's faithful as the Orthodox churches. These now disparate churches originated historically as one church in Ukraine and are, in that sense, equals in their struggle for growth.

To do an article about Christianity in Ukraine properly, then, one cannot dismiss the Ukrainian Byzantine Catholic Church. To simply lose it in "the more than seventy religious sects" noted in the article betrays an ignorance that I would never expect from FIRST THINGS. If Mr. Gregory meant to do an article solely on the infighting among the Orthodox churches, the title of his article would have done better indicating something to that effect. If FIRST THINGS titled the article, now you know better.

W. George Dragan
Saylorsburg, PA

The Editors reply:

The title of the article was provided by the editors, not Mr. Gregory. We stand corrected.

In Defense of Catholic Charities

In his discussion of Catholic Charities (*While We're At It*, March), Richard John Neuhaus conflates two distinct points. In a pivotal sentence, he writes, "Catholic Charities and similar Protestant and Jewish organizations have become wedded to business as usual, which is mainly the business of receiving billions in public funds to be 'partner to government at all levels.'"

I do not write to object to Father Neuhaus' in-the-family challenge to Catholic Charities for "maintaining the status quo." The status quo of our society's social policy is unacceptable. It *ought to be* changed. If—for sake of argument—Catholic Charities is helping to maintain that status quo, it *should be* challenged. Fr. Neuhaus' comments on that point merit careful consideration.

I address here, however, the separate objection to government involvement in the arena of social justice, an objection that, as I understand it, promotes principle (conservative principle?) over people. In Fr.

Neuhaus' own geographic backyard, Catholic Charities in the diocese of Rockville Centre facilitates thousands of individual volunteers in approximately one hundred separate parish communities on Long Island in their work with tens of thousands of neighbors in need of jobs, medical care, legal aid, food, and other necessities. If this is not an ideal expression of the "communal association" that Fr. Neuhaus encourages, it is at least an attempt—and a good attempt—at reaching that goal.

What do these community volunteers do when working with an AIDS-infected neighbor? St. Peter's approach—"I have neither silver nor gold, but what I do have I give you"—worked because he backed it up with a miracle. In our work-a-day volunteer lives we need not only to expect miracles but also to take seriously the question from the letter of St. James: "If a brother or sister has nothing to wear and has no food for the day, and one of you says to them, 'Go in peace, keep warm, and eat well,' but you do not give them the necessities of the body, what good is it?" On Long Island, Catholic Charities also operates a *funded* AIDS day-care center. Plainly, it is not possible to recreate that service in every community in which a Catholic Charities volunteer works. A community volunteer who ignores the funded resource would fail to satisfy his or her biblical mandate to care for the sick.

Similar examples abound, but let me get more personal: I am a volunteer with Catholic Charities on Long Island, and a lawyer. For several years, I have worked with other lawyers on a Volunteer Lawyers Initiative, in which several hundred volunteer lawyers work directly with people in the hundred-or-so Long Island "communal associations" active within Catholic Charities. The initiative is good and will be made better through the ongoing efforts of many volunteers.

I would not be true to my perception of social justice, however, if I did not also admit that the Volunteer Lawyers Initiative is a drop in the bucket. If each of two hundred lawyers devotes fifty hours a year to

the Volunteer Lawyers Initiative, as a group they will contribute ten thousand hours a year. In the early 1990s, the New York State Bar Association studied the extent of pro bono legal services in New York and the extent of the need for such services. In several lengthy studies, it reported that New York lawyers devote approximately two *million* hours a year to volunteer work (broadly defined), and that this contribution barely scratches the surface of the need. Volunteer efforts are absolutely necessary, but they are not enough.

How a conscientious person wrestles with this dilemma remains a difficult personal decision. In good conscience and somewhat against my personal inclinations, I must conclude that government, properly understood, *can* be an effective partner in satisfying legitimate need and *must* be involved. I want my partner to be accountable (let's *not* maintain the status quo), but, without that partner, I cannot effectively do work that I know needs to be done.

In the interest of full disclosure, I report that I am also on the Board of Trustees of Catholic Charities in the Diocese of Rockville Centre. I am writing in my personal capacity and not as a representative of Catholic Charities.

Joseph Valentine
Munsey Park, NY

Better to Be Ignored

As a long-time reader of FT, I have often been disappointed at the lack of attention to affairs of my church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. However, I would rather you completely ignored us rather than publish an item like that in the *While We're At It* section of your February issue. I am referring to the piece, apparently picked up from an obscure on-line magazine, about a merger between the LDS Church, the Catholic Church, and Microsoft. It was one of the weakest attempts at satire I have ever seen. I'm not even sure which institution was being satirized. The thing that concerned me most was that you seemed to be publishing it with a straight face. Such a

piece can only make my church look ridiculous. I want your readers to know more about my church, but such flippant, puerile satire is the last thing we need.

Gordon Cummings
Concord, CA

Choosing What?

I congratulate Wendy D. Shalit for her excellent deconstruction of HBO's silly, pro-abortion propaganda film, *If These Walls Could Talk* ("A Tale of Three Pregnancies," March). Actress Demi Moore had the audacity to suggest that the film "lets people make up their own minds about abortion."

In discussing the film, actress Sissy Spacek added that "pro-choice is not pro-abortion." For some strange reason, this is always the end of the discussion. After assuring sympathetic journalists that they do not favor abortion, pro-choicers never explain why they find abortion unpleasant or morally problematic. . . .

Abortion (and now euthanasia) are

the only issues on which Americans, especially Catholics, can take a "pro-choice" position. Would Americans who claimed to be "pro-choice" on the death penalty, wearing fur, using animals for medical experiments, racial discrimination, owning assault weapons, drug abuse, prostitution, hunting baby humpback whales, and teen smoking be taken seriously by anyone? . . . I think that what pro-abortionists really want are a right to a clear conscience and a good night's sleep.

Dimitri A. Cavalli
Bronx, NY

An Unmerited Endorsement

Shame on Richard John Neuhaus for his ringing endorsement of Jo Ann Kay McNamara's *Sisters in Arms: Catholic Nuns Through Two Millennia* (While We're At It, April). McNamara's narrative is "ambitious and energetic," as he comments, but it is also informed by party-line feminist theory which casts all women as victims and males as misogynists.

McNamara tells us (rather presumptuously) in her introduction that "like Voltaire, I am a secular humanist"; it is this ideology that dictates her narrative, an ideology in direct conflict with that of the women themselves. McNamara's purpose is simple, and common, unfortunately, to most feminist history today: to provide yet another example of the injustices women have suffered at the hands of men and Christianity. The true purpose of the book is not to document the traditional leadership of women in the Church, as Father Neuhaus intimates, but rather to document their conflicts with the hierarchy. The title *Sisters in Arms* tells all: it is an ahistorical metaphor that McNamara concocted to set an antagonistic tone for her narrative. . . .

Patricia Ranft
Department of History
Central Michigan University
Mount Pleasant, MI

(Editors' note: See M. S. Leach's review of *Sisters in Arms* in this issue.)

Black Scrawl

The crimson lake that laps her cheek,
her scarlet kiss, her madder hair
once singed the virgin martyr page
but taper down at last to this:
Red language, words incarnadine;
black scrawl in sifted ash.

When I have fears that I may cease
to speak before my sullen sun
and garner dark at length in day,
then on the shore I stand at night
and hear the empty rollers break,
black wash against the stones.

Words weigh more than words can bear.
No props, no guys, no stays can save
this solid world from solid fall.
Too dense dead stuff; these words, this love:
the rouge on corpses, whited graves,
black shards of broken glass.

J. Bottum

THIS TIME

April in Black and White

James Nuechterlein

April was a month crowded with events in America's continuing muddled encounter with the dilemmas of race.

To begin with, as every sentient citizen of the Republic must by now be aware, April 15 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Jackie Robinson's taking the field for the Brooklyn Dodgers to end major league baseball's ban on black ballplayers. It was a grand celebration of a great occasion—and a great man and athlete—even if the prelude to it risked making the event itself an anticlimax. The usual media instinct for overplay meant that by the time the anniversary arrived we had heard in multiple versions every conceivable story related to Robinson and his career—most of them, appropriately enough, of the noble and uplifting variety.

Perhaps it was that nobility overload that led to my perverse enjoyment of two against-the-grain Robinson tales. The first was the revelation that Robinson, an aggressive bench jockey once he had established himself, led his teammates in ragging New York Yankee pitcher Allie Reynolds with disparaging references to Reynolds' American Indian heritage. The second concerned Robinson's complaint to his teammate Pee Wee Reese that opposing pitchers were throwing at him because he was black. "Jackie," Reese replied, "some of them are throwing at you because you're black, but some of them are throwing at you because they just don't like you." We do not diminish Robinson's legendary standing and achievement—we in fact anchor them more firmly in reality—by declining to view him through lenses covered in gauze.

Also on the sports front, I joined record numbers of Americans in spending much of the weekend prior to Robinson's anniversary watching the TV coverage of Tiger Woods' unprecedented domination of the Masters golf tournament. It was as overwhelming an example of individual superiority as I have witnessed not just in golf, but in sports, period. One imagined Michael Jordan dropping in on a high school pickup game. As golfing legend Bobby Jones said of the young Jack Nicklaus, "He plays a game with which I am not familiar."

It was instructive to observe the huge crowds lining the fairways and surrounding the greens in

Augusta, Georgia. That overwhelmingly white audience watched in rapt attention and with extraordinary enthusiasm as the young African-Asian phenom made his triumphal round of the course on the final day. One commentator noted that among Woods' Masters records was an unofficial one for "most standing ovations." Those white Southern middle-Americans obviously felt good about Woods' success—and felt good about feeling good about it. That's a complicated story, of course, but except for the irredeemably cynical, it puts the lie to the notion that most white Americans are afflicted with implacable hostility to displays of black achievement. Quite the contrary: they yearn for them, not least so that they can think better of themselves.

The good news on the sports beat had echoes elsewhere. A three-judge panel from the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Judge Thelton Henderson's injunction blocking the implementation of Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI). CCRI, passed by state voters by a comfortable margin last November, forbids race and sex preferences in state programs. Judge Henderson somehow decided that the denial of preferential treatment for women and minorities was constitutionally dubious and put the initiative on hold pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit panel made clear that it was Judge Henderson's ruling that was of dubious standing: "A system which permits one judge to block with the stroke of a pen what 4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional democracy." The issue will eventually make its way to the Supreme Court for final decision, but in the meantime it is reassuring to know that at least some judges understand the dangers of what someone has called the judicial usurpation of politics.

There was also good news from Texas. In March 1996 a federal appeals court struck down the affirmative action program of the University of Texas law school whereby each year some 15 percent of the school's openings were set aside for blacks and Hispanics, even though the vast majority of the admitted minority applicants had grades and scores inferior to whites whose applications were rejected. In March of this year an overzealous official of the U.S. Department of Education nonetheless threatened to cut off federal funds to the university if it did not continue to operate an affirmative action plan. The university thus faced the prospect of losing government funding unless it maintained illegal programs. That threat raised such a political uproar that in mid-April the Education Department had to reverse itself, and the university was left free to operate a race-blind admissions program.

But April also reminded us that the racial good news—recognition of black achievement and denial of discrimination based on race—remains

threatened by the policies and plans of the Clinton Administration. The President, as usual, means well on race. But also as usual, he does not mean coherently.

On the positive side, President Clinton participated in the April 15 ceremonies at Shea Stadium in New York honoring Robinson's memory. (Though he delivered a typically wooden and ill-crafted speech. Why, one wonders, can the Leader of the Free World not find himself a decent speechwriter?) Also, reports from the White House early in the month indicated that Clinton will apologize on behalf of the nation for the infamous Tuskegee experiment conducted by the U.S. Public Health Service that, while withholding both diagnosis and treatment, tracked through decades the health of black men unknowingly suffering from syphilis. It is among the most wretched chapters of our history, and an apology would be entirely appropriate.

It was also reported, however, that the President is leaning toward holding a White House conference on problems of racial prejudice. That is almost certainly a bad idea. The politics of the issue are such that the Administration would have to invite to the conference the usual gang of grievance-mongers and guilt-peddlers who have already done so much to damage race relations in America. As editor Michael Kelly remarked in the April 28 *New Republic*: "Oh, good. . . . A few acts of symbolic atonement, another spectacle of the flak-catchers mau-mauing themselves, some token employment for the same small group of racialists and race-specialists who always find token employment in these affairs, remarks by Jesse Jackson. That should repair *that* breach."

As Kelly went on to note, the best thing that Bill Clinton could do for racial justice in America is the one thing he most certainly will not do: end his support for race-based preferences in public life. The Administration has come down on the wrong side of

both the California and the Texas controversies. More than that, its supposedly moderate "mend it, don't end it" approach to affirmative action means, in practice, that it has never met an affirmative action program it didn't like.

The President has said that he does not favor preference for the unqualified over the qualified (though of course affirmative action programs typically favor not the *unqualified* but the *less* qualified—which might not sound so bad until you start thinking about the less-qualified brain surgeon or airline pilot, or about the unfairness to the *more* qualified in any category); he insists that he is opposed to "numerical quotas" (which of course he utterly differentiates from the "goals and timetables" that quietly produce what the Q-word decrees); and he doesn't favor preferential programs based "solely" on race or gender "without regard to merit" (as if any affirmative action program has ever advertised itself that way). As with partial-birth abortions, the President's evasive rhetoric on race bears little relation to the policy it obscures.

What Bill Clinton—in company with virtually all contemporary liberals—will not face is that affirmative action as currently practiced contradicts what America at its best is all about: equality of opportunity and equality before the law. It demands what the American Creed has always refused: allocation of social goods on the basis of accidents of birth.

April was, on balance, a good month for race relations in America—celebration of Jackie Robinson, admiration for Tiger Woods, rejection in California and Texas of racial discrimination in all forms. But shadowing the month were the well-intentioned confusions of a President who wants to go to the right place but has no good idea how to get there. F

Opinion

Smoke and Mirrors at the Crystal Cathedral

Michael R. Linton

Centurions ride through the audience on white Arabian horses, Pilate feeds his pet tiger while interrogating Jesus, and the Resurrection is accompanied by a light show and fireworks; let it never be said that Robert Schuller is intimidated by Disneyland just down the street. The “Glory of Easter” Passion Play at his Garden Grove Crystal Cathedral is an action-filled, dazzling-effects, cast of hundreds spectacle that even the custodians of Mickey could be proud of. Not only does it pack the house for the two weeks of its yearly run, but it reaches a national audience during Easter on Pay-Per-View cable television (and it’s available on video year-round from the Cathedral bookstore).

It’s quite a show. A monumental series of steps and platforms spreads across the auditorium’s front, transforming it to the markets, palaces, and holy sites of Jerusalem. Entering on a donkey, Jesus is greeted by biblical cries of “Hosanna” and extra-biblical dancing girls. He sparks a riot in the temple by overturning the tables of merchants, a very noisy affair punctuated by the squeals of an escaping pig. King Herod’s bacchanal (same dancing girls here as for Palm Sunday but with fewer veils) is lit by enough torches to strike fear into the heart of any fire marshal. Pontius Pilate is a vision of imperial splendor, and the women at the tomb are greeted by angels who “fly” forty feet above the audience. There’s a thunderstorm that rattles the rafters at the Crucifixion, an earthquake that shakes the foundation at the Resurrection, and smoke and blinding lights at the Ascension.

This hour and a half extravaganza is the work of Paul David Dunn, who wrote it, produces it, and directs it. Inventing “Vitellius,” a centurion who reports on Jesus to Pilate, Dunn unites a conflation of the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ final days and Resurrection into a convincing and moving drama. On a technical level, all of this is very well done indeed. Director Dunn moves his individual characters and crowds around Charles Linsanby’s huge set to great

effect, never allowing the action to drag while clearly suggesting changes in locale and time. The choreography, so often painfully embarrassing in Christian productions, is here fully competent and well danced (if a bit unimaginative). The music is a serviceable mixture of pop Christian ballads and background orchestrations of the Vaughan Williams-goes-to-Hollywood type, and the costumes are handsome and historically convincing (even if not always historically accurate). The lighting is imaginative and dramatically effective and the angels really do look like they fly—both of these real achievements considering that the designers don’t have a proscenium with which to work. And the acting is first rate. The major roles are cast with highly talented professionals while the minor roles are carried by competent local men and women. Even the production office is efficient with tickets, helpful with press releases, and warmly polite.

As I said, it’s quite a show. But is it Christian?

While to the general humanist, the story of Jesus’ martyrdom might be one more moving tale of innocence unjustly punished, to the Christian it is a particularly painful confrontation with Sin—personal and corporate. This is the story of the Atonement, of how God gave Himself for our sin. Christianity is based upon the belief that Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God, died for the sins of the world and was bodily raised again to life. It was as the means of the Atonement that John the Baptist introduced the Savior, and ever since it has been the way that the Church heralds him in worship and proclaims him in evangelism: “Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world.” No sin, no need for atonement. No atonement, no salvation. No salvation, no Christianity.

Traditionally, presentations of the Passion Story have been careful to stress the immediate relationship between the presenters of the story and its hearers. In liturgical readings, the congregation itself takes the role of the mob, forcing the congregants to recognize their culpability in the crucifixion. For his 1727 setting of the St. Matthew version of the story, Bach required what was probably the largest body of performers ever assembled north of the Alps (two orchestras, three choirs, and soloists) for didactic purposes; with performers ranged all around them, Bach’s listeners found that they were not mere observers of a moving story, but the cause of the tale, participants in it, and its beneficiaries. They were literally in the midst of it all.

Yet this is not the case with the Crystal Cathedral “Glory.” Here there is no congregation participating in the action, reflecting on their responsibility in the torture and death of the Savior of the world. There is only audience, thrilled, amused, and perhaps even

emotionally moved by the drama—but always distanced from it.

To enforce that distance, the Crystal Cathedral goes so far as to change the biblical text. While many of the Passion events are open to different interpretations, one of the things on which all the Gospel writers agree is the culpability of the mob in Jesus' death. The mob demanded it. They howled for it. But in the Crystal Cathedral version, the mob never even mentions crucifixion. Instead, when Pilate comes to them with his offer to release one prisoner in accordance with custom, the mob merely demands the release of the murderer Barabbas. Jesus is marched off to his execution while the mob watches—silently.

But even more remarkable than this dramatic change in the biblical account is the Crystal Cathedral's rewording of the Lord's Prayer. The Garden Grove Jesus teaches his audience:

Our Father in heaven,
We know your holy name.
We ask that your kingdom come,
May your will be done
On earth just as it is in heaven.
Forgive us those who have wronged us.
Lead us not into temptation
But deliver us from evil.
For yours is the kingdom, and the power, and
the glory forever;
And whatever you ask, believing in,
You will receive, and nothing will be impossi-
ble for you.

In Garden Grove, not only is the mob guiltless in Jesus' death, but the very notion of personal responsibility for doing wrong—sin—is swept away. "Forgive us our sins as we forgive those who sin against us" is replaced by the syntactically grotesque "forgive us those who have wronged us."

This brings us to the core of the problem presented by the "Glory of Easter." Schuller and his team are not to be condemned for the scale of their production. On the contrary they should be commended for technically doing it so well (if extravagance were a fault, we might as well condemn Bach and the townsfolk of Oberammergau too). The problem does not lie in the donkey, tiger, earthquake, and angels. It lies in the fact that by both dismissing the role of the observer's sin in Jesus' death and by removing the central role of the Atonement from the drama, the story becomes only one more tale of the suffering hero. Siegfried, King Arthur, John Henry—and Jesus of Nazareth. We are not participants in this story, compelled by it to self-examination and reflection upon the sinfulness of our own lives, a self-examination that leads to confession and repentance and the vow to live hereafter a more godly, righteous, and sober life.

In short, the Crystal Cathedral presents a passion that is Christian only in its contour, not its content. The broad outlines of the Gospel stories are maintained. This Jesus is kind and wise. He heals. He makes many people happy by loving them and telling them that they can have anything they want if they only believe. And he finally triumphs over a tragic end.

But so does Tinkerbell. This Jesus is little more than a cosmic pixie from Never-Never Land. He tells us to ask for bread, for safety, and promises us anything we want, "if we only believe." Fairy dust for everybody, and nothing is required—not that we forgive others, not that we acknowledge our own deep perversions and inextricable duplicities, not that we repent and take up a cross and follow him. Schuller's spectacle is hugely entertaining. And it may even be uplifting and "empowering." But it's not Christianity.

By offering the hope of healing and resurrection without shame and repentance, the Crystal Cathedral's Passion Play presents a fraudulent gospel, a kind of cheap grace tarted-up by high-tech smoke and mirrors. And while it is uncomfortable to call the "Glory of Easter" a simple fraud, it is even more uncomfortable to think that this work may represent the kind of Christianity that the folks at the Cathedral apparently prize: a Christianity that requires little more of its faithful than a sparkling grin and an optimistic outlook, a religion high on receipts but low in responsibilities. I hope this is not the case. But if it is, it speaks grimly of a people biblically illiterate and spiritually etiolated. But as I said, it's a great show.

MICHAEL R. LINTON is head of the Division of Music Theory and Composition at Middle Tennessee State University.

Breaking the Law, Bending the Law

Michael W. McConnell

Federal Judge John E. Sprizzo will never again be promoted or advanced, for he has committed an unpardonable act of courage in defense of conscience. On January 13, 1997, in the U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Judge Sprizzo acquitted an elderly bishop and a young priest of the crime of "quietly praying with rosary beads" in the driveway of an abortion clinic, in violation of a court injunction and the Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act.

His reasons? That these two offenders did not act with “bad purpose” and, even if they did, he would exercise a judicial version of jury nullification. Because their act was “purely passive”—meaning nonviolent—and “so minimally obstructive,” it justified “the exercise of the prerogative of leniency.” Because the parties waived a jury trial, the judge’s decision is equivalent to a jury verdict of acquittal, and cannot be appealed.

As a matter of law Judge Sprizzo was probably wrong. There can be little doubt that the two defendants, Bishop George E. Lynch and Brother Christopher Moscinski, violated the injunction and the Clinic Access law “willfully.” They knew exactly what they were doing and why they were doing it. And there is no precedent in our law for a judge to exercise the prerogative of jury nullification. Juries can acquit for any reason or no reason at all, and can use that power to acquit guilty parties out of sympathy for the defendant or opposition to the law. A judge, by contrast, must act within the bounds of the law by which he holds office. Every decision a judge makes must be grounded in law.

This case has the unusual twist that Judge Sprizzo himself had issued the underlying injunction. Usually that makes a judge especially inclined to punish infractions, which are not just “contempt of court” but contempt of *his* court. Lawyers for the defendants argued that a judge is entitled to overlook violations of his own injunction. Maybe that is right. But the argument seems to suggest that contempt sanctions are imposed for the purpose of vindicating the personal authority of the judge. To my mind, that contradicts the very idea of injunctions as law. If the underlying injunction is lawful, the judge’s duty to enforce it should not be affected by the fact that he is the author.

If this is so, Judge Sprizzo should not have acquitted the defendants. If he wished to exercise the prerogative of leniency (as, under the circumstances, he should), he should have entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a suspended sentence.

Yet one cannot help admiring the judge’s act. It will mark Judge Sprizzo for the rest of his career. He must have known that he would be excoriated by the newspapers and treated as a pariah by the “moderate” voices of his community for giving moral succor to “anti-abortion extremists.”

After reading Judge Sprizzo’s opinion, I was driven to reread Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s great *Letter from the Birmingham Jail*, addressed to the “moderate” clergy of his day. Dr. King, like Bishop Lynch and Brother Moscinski, had been enjoined by court order not to engage in a demonstration that, according to the authorities, would impede members of the public from access to lawful businesses and activities. King—like Lynch and Moscinski—believed that it was wrong to prevent citizens from

engaging in nonviolent direct action to protest injustice, and King—like Lynch and Moscinski—thought that the underlying law enforced by the injunction was unconstitutional.

King was prosecuted by the state of Alabama and convicted for violating the injunction. He was sentenced to five days in jail. The United States government, prosecuting Lynch and Moscinski, sought a punishment of up to six months’ imprisonment. Not even Bull Connor had asked for that. But in Lynch and Moscinski’s case, the judge refused to be a party to the effort to silence the protest. “Were a person to have violated a court order directing the return of a runaway slave when Dred Scott was the law,” the judge asked, “would a genuinely held belief that a slave was a human person and not an article of property be a matter the court could not consider in deciding whether that person was guilty of a criminal contempt charge?”

Perhaps most strikingly parallel was King’s conviction—shared by Lynch and Moscinski—that there is a profound difference between peaceful, nonviolent protest and violence. In King’s *Letter*, he contrasted his philosophy of nonviolence with the “force . . . of bitterness and hatred” of certain “black nationalist groups,” which “comes perilously close to advocating violence.”

Of course, King’s opponents did not see it that way. The lawyers for segregation who sought and obtained an injunction against King’s Birmingham protests cited the danger of “mob violence” and the violation of “numerous ordinances and statutes of the city of Birmingham.” It was they who blurred the distinction between violent and nonviolent protest, using the possibility of the former as an excuse for blocking the latter.

Nor do Lynch and Moscinski’s opponents see it that way. “It’s an off-the-wall, scary decision,” an abortion-rights lawyer told the *New York Times*. “It’s so close to the Atlanta bombings and practically on the anniversary of the Brookline attacks,” she said. “People will take it to the next level and then the next and they end up getting violent,” another abortion-rights advocate said.

If quietly praying the rosary in the driveway of an abortion clinic is “close” to bombings, then Dr. King’s nonviolent march was no less close to “mob violence.”

The legislative history of the Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act is filled with lurid examples of abortion-clinic violence, but there was no need for legislation against violence. Violence was already illegal. The innovation of the Clinic Access statute was to impose extreme sanctions—half a year in prison for a single offense—for peaceful, nonviolent acts of protest, without proof of injury to anyone, if they have the effect of “obstructing” access to the clinic. That can mean quietly praying on the steps.

The *New York Times* article on Judge Sprizzo's decision stated that the Clinic Access statute is "credited with the significant drop in violence at clinics." It does not point out that the statute is also credited with a significant drop in lawful, nonviolent protests. The penalties are so harsh, the terms so vague, and the coverage so sweeping that the statute frightens off lawful as well as unlawful protest. That presumably was its unstated purpose.

Dr. King reportedly agonized over the decision to violate the Birmingham injunction. He was committed to the rule of law (after all, he was demanding that southern officials comply with court injunctions mandating desegregation) and he did not wish the civil rights movement to be tarred with the brush of illegality. But in two previous protests, compliance with injunctions had doomed the movement to failure. No doubt, newspapers credited those injunctions with a significant drop in violence, but they also brought about a significant drop in effective protest.

In the most famous section of the *Letter*, Dr. King distinguished between "two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws." He went on to explain: "An individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law."

Perhaps that is what Judge Sprizzo meant when he held that Lynch and Moscinski lacked the "bad purpose" necessary to justify conviction for criminal contempt. In a sense, they—like King—were expressing the "highest respect" for the law: they assumed that the law is capable of reform. But King specified that the conscientious offender must be willing to accept the penalty. Acceptance of the penalty of imprisonment, King said, will "arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice."

It seems unlikely that imprisonment of Bishop Lynch and Brother Moscinski would arouse the conscience of our community over roughly one and a half million abortions each year. Unlike King, Lynch and Moscinski face the hostility of most newspapers and elite institutions, and their cause is regarded by the Supreme Court of the United States as an affront to its authority. They would probably languish, unnoticed, in prison.

But then, in 1963 Dr. King and his cause did not enjoy the support they have received in hindsight. While King was in the Birmingham jail, *Time* magazine and the *New York Times* editorialized against the demonstrations, and the Supreme Court's eventual decision upholding his imprisonment is told entirely from the point of view of the Birmingham authorities. If it had not been for Bull Connor's decision to turn water cannons and dogs loose on demonstrating children, it is possible that King's imprison-

ment, too, would have gone unnoticed.

Judge Sprizzo spared Lynch and Moscinski the indignity of jail. Unlike King, Lynch and Moscinski will not have the chance to write a *Letter from the Manhattan Jail*, calling their fellow clergy to task for their silence, and worse, on the practice of abortion. I am not sure the judge's acquittal was wise, and I am quite sure it was not lawful. It cannot be true that individuals may violate court orders with impunity whenever they sincerely believe those orders are morally wrong. And it would be utterly unacceptable to allow such violations only, but whenever, the judge happened to agree with the violator. Over a decade ago, a federal judge released two "peace" protestors who broke into a Honeywell defense plant, smashed the computer system, and poured blood over the wreckage of the computer. The judge called the vandals "friends of the people" and the victims "war-mongers." Those who think that decision was wrong must also have their doubts about Judge Sprizzo's ruling.

But there is one big difference between the cases. The perpetrators of the Honeywell break-in were prosecuted for their acts, not for their motives. The punishment sought by the prosecutor was no different from what it would have been if they had vandalized the Honeywell computers out of malicious mischief, or committed a similar act for different motives at a different kind of facility.

It is utterly incredible that Lynch and Moscinski might be sent to prison for six months for praying in a driveway. If they had been in that driveway for some other reason (a labor dispute, for example), or if they had committed the same sort of protest at another kind of business (a fur store, for example, or a CIA recruiting office), they would have gotten off with a slap on the wrist, had they been punished at all.

The Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act singles out a particular kind of protest for penalties unheard-of in the history of American political protest movements. Lynch and Moscinski were not tried for the actual harm they caused. As Judge Sprizzo noted, the "obstructive" effect of their quiet protest was "minimal." The prosecutor who sought to imprison Lynch and Moscinski was not asking for impartial justice, but for repression of political dissent.

Lynch and Moscinski should have been punished for the acts they committed. They should not have been spared because their cause was just. But they also should not be punished *more severely* because their cause is unpopular. They should have been charged with trespassing on private property, and given the same punishment that is meted out to others who commit that offense in that jurisdiction with comparable damage. I'd guess a fifty-dollar fine would be about right.

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Robert Graham, S.J.

Kevin M. Doyle

On February 10, 1997, Father Robert Graham, S.J., an indefatigable defender of Pope Pius XII against posthumous charges of indifference toward the wartime fate of European Jews, died in a California Jesuit community. He was eighty-four.

Several aspects of Graham's life are striking. He had not reached his eighteenth birthday when he entered the Jesuits, and he remained faithful to the Society of Jesus through all its rich changes. As Graham's nephew, Francis Smith, S.J., put it at the funeral mass, Graham "was not complicated; he chose a life and lived it." He held a doctorate in political science from the University of Geneva, but his writing remained accessible and free of academic jargon. At the request of Paul VI, he and three other Jesuits toiled in the Vatican's archives to cull wartime documents for publication. This exacting task, however, dulled neither Graham's invariably courtly manner nor his keen sense of humor. The son of a catcher for the 1906 Boston Red Sox, he felt no pull to the limelight. But notoriety found him nonetheless, when he was in his fifties.

In 1959 Graham's scholarly *Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane* was published by Princeton University Press. Five years later, *The Deputy*, a German play vilifying Pius as a callous bystander to the Holocaust, opened in New York to mixed reviews. Whatever its artistic and historical shortcomings, it very successfully placed the deceased Pope on trial. Graham, then at the Jesuit magazine *America*, emerged as a natural defender of Pius' reputation.

In that role, Graham proved wrong those cynics who insist one will inevitably come to resemble one's adversaries. For Robert Graham, an astute Vatican observer even during the war, ultimately watched for thirty years as Pius' reputation underwent assault the likes of which could never have been predicted. And yet not only fortitude but temperance marked Graham's response throughout.

There was a time Pius XII enjoyed near-universal acclaim for aiding European Jews through diplomatic initiatives, thinly veiled public pronouncements, and, very concretely, an unprecedented continent-wide network of sanctuary. In 1944, from its war emergency conference, the World Jewish Congress cabled thanks to the Holy See for its efforts on behalf of threatened Jews. In the fall of 1945, the WJC followed up with a financial token of

gratitude to the Vatican. In 1955, literally thousands of Jews made pilgrimage to the Vatican to pay thanks for wartime solicitudes; separately, the Israeli Philharmonic played the Papal Consistory Hall as a gesture of gratitude.

Upon Pius' death in 1958, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir declared: "He upheld the highest ideals of peace and compassion. . . . When fearful martyrdom came to our people in the decade of Nazi terror, the voice of the Pope was raised for the victims." New York City's synagogues also resounded with praise for "an example for all religious leaders" and "man at his highest."

Within a few years, however, the past began to change. Popular historical treatments began to resemble *The Deputy*. There was, for example, Guenter Lewy's 1964 *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*—a work on which Daniel Goldhagen relied heavily for his (mis)treatment of Catholicism in the best-selling *Hitler's Willing Executioners*. Lewy relegated to a single sentence and a brief elliptical footnote Pius' agreement to assist personally German conspirators against Hitler; he referred to the martyred White Rose without mention of the Munich resistance group's profoundly Catholic grounding; he carefully noted the Catholic Center Party's brief anti-Semitic campaign of 1875 but overlooked the April 1933 public protest by a Center Deputy who, based on the party's "tradition," rejected "all anti-Semitic efforts and measures"; he discussed at length the Church and Hitler's foreign policy but omitted reference to the Vatican's open scolding of Italy in 1938 for not thwarting the German troops who marched on Austria.

The prosecution kept on. During the 1970s, a New York City art exhibit featured "Nazi Butchers," depicting Pius alongside Hitler and Eichmann. The year 1980 saw publication of John Morley's *Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews During the Holocaust 1939-1943*, a book drawn heavily on Robert Graham's archival work, but dishonoring that work with acontextual analysis and the presumption of guilt. Some time later, Bruno Bettelheim, invited to comment on the American bishops' campaign against nuclear arms, asked "where the conference of bishops was when six million Jews were killed."

In the face of all this, year after year, Father Graham did his work with patient humility, confidence in the truth, and generosity of spirit. The facts served-up straight would, Graham believed, speak for themselves; no need to cast stones or impugn motives. Above all, Graham avoided casting the dispute surrounding Pius XII as a matter of Catholics versus Jews. He was too decent and knowledgeable for that. He fully appreciated the moral singularity of the Holocaust and, early on, admired Raphael Lemkin's efforts to make "genocide" part of the vocabulary of international law.

Five months before Fr. Graham's death, *America* ran a sober and balanced piece entitled "The Enigma of Pope Pius XII." Predictably, it precipitated a protracted storm of letters and answers to letters. Because *America* had been Robert Graham's home for many years, I was certain he would eventually weigh in.

One letter from a history professor deepened my certainty and also illustrated why a full and fair assessment of Pius and his Church presently eludes us all. The professor declared that Pius "refused to condemn the anti-Semitic activities of Vichy." What, I wondered, about Vatican Radio's broadcasts of, and commentaries on, Cardinal Saliege's stirring letter against the deportations? About papal nuncio Valeri's contemporaneously reported entreaties to Marshal Pétain? About the Vatican's diplomatic appeals on behalf of thousands of Jews interned in Vittel?

Pius "did not publicly protest when the Germans seized the Jews of Rome, though many priests and nuns helped Jews." Does the professor, I wondered, understand that at least four thousand Jews, a third of the city's Jewish population and more than twice the number deported by the Nazis, found shelter in Catholic Church buildings? Understand that, according to Martin Gilbert, refuge was offered on the Pope's personal orders? I wondered whether the professor knew of Pulitzer Prize-winner Anne O'Hare McCormick's August 1944 dispatch for the *New York Times* from Rome reporting that after liberation the Pope enjoyed an "enhanced" position because during the Nazi occupation he had made "hiding someone 'on the run' the thing to do" and gave Jews "first priority."

"Pius XII was pro-Nazi." Why then did the 1939 British press cheer, and the Nazi press jeer, Pius' election? What of Pius' first encyclical *Summi Pontificatus*? It expressed "heartfelt gratitude" toward, and entrusted to the Lord's protection, those non-Catholics united with the Church either "in love for the person of Christ or belief in God," insisted on "Equality of the Races," and attacked both "Deification of the State" and "corrupting paganism." Finally, it explicitly commiserated with newly invaded Poland. (It should come as no surprise that the French dropped it as propaganda on German troops.) Did not, I wondered, a *New York Times* editorial contend in 1941 that "the Pope put himself squarely against Hitlerism"?

Mostly, though, I wondered throughout what will Robert Graham have to say?

I did not know that, while *America* ran its letters, Fr. Graham had taken two falls. He lifted himself from the ground after the first and stumbled back to the Jesuit house where he was found collapsed inside the doorway. From the falls came complications which, despite some recovery, eventually got the best of him.

Had Fr. Graham responded, however, I know he would have been forgiving toward the errant professor. He would have been forgiving just as he was forgiving of all those who, owing to academic fashion, false ecumenical etiquette, or sheer sloth, too often left an old Jesuit alone in honorable battle.

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Judaism or Jewishness

Elliott Abrams

Jewish life in America began, at least for the vast majority of Jewish families, in the decision of European Jews to leave their parents, their synagogues, and their homes to go to America. That decision was part of a process their descendants now continue: the confrontation between Jews and life in the modern age. Their decision to come to America brought them the challenges that Jews today have inherited: how, and indeed whether, to live as Jews in a society that is overwhelmingly Christian and increasingly secular; what parts of Judaism to cling to, and what parts to abandon; and whether the community would define itself as Jewish by faith or ethnic inheritance.

The earliest Jewish settlers in America were Sephardim, descendants of Jews who had been expelled from Spain in 1492 and had fled to places such as the Ottoman Empire, Holland, and Brazil. They arrived in Dutch and British colonial America, driven to emigrate there by the same forces that propelled other early settlers. In America they soon lived not as poor immigrants in separate neighborhoods, but as respected and often prosperous, influential citizens. And they not only mixed with but very often assimilated into the Christian gentry, who accepted them as fellow members of the upper reaches of society. In the South in the early 1800s, according to historian Frederic Cople Jaher, "marriage with prominent gentile clans was extensive." In the North, says Leonard Dinnerstein, it was the same story: "Every Jew who settled and remained in colonial Connecticut before the Revolution married a Christian. Similarly, large numbers of Jews in New York and Philadelphia married, raised their children in the community's dominant faith, and sometimes became

Christian themselves."

What was to be the place of Jews in America, as independence approached? These early communities eagerly supported the Revolutionary ideals of individual rights and freedom of conscience, which American statesmen learned from the Enlightenment. Viewing themselves not as a community apart but as Americans of Jewish faith, they fought for full citizenship rights and the disestablishment of Christianity as a state religion. At the national level, they shared the victory when the First Amendment to the Constitution was adopted, prohibiting an establishment of religion and guaranteeing them, and all others, the free exercise of their faith. The Jews did not seek to separate religion and society, nor did they argue that the government could not support religion in general. Rather, they demanded that it be absolutely neutral *among* religions. And the Constitution was a great advance toward this goal.

At the state level, however, Jews continued to suffer from disabilities that must have reminded these Sephardim of their experiences in less enlightened regions of Christendom. The constitutions of nine of the thirteen original states contained a reference to Christianity, and four allowed tax assessments for church support. Under the early constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland, only Protestants could hold public office. In fact, not until the Civil War was full political equality for American Jews achieved.

The public agenda of American Jews was, then, the demand for equality, and they defined the religious liberty guaranteed in the Constitution as meaning nothing less. They pressed not for a secular state or society, but for treatment of Judaism no less favorable than that accorded Christianity. This would be an historic achievement and a sharp break with the past experience of Jew and Christian alike. The strategy of the Jewish community for gaining a

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secure place in the new United States, then, may be described as insisting on government neutrality among religions. But soon, when many new immigrants from Germany arrived, this strategy began to seem inadequate.

The emancipation of Europe's Jews began in Europe itself—in the aftermath of the French Revolution and in the swirl of ideas and actions we call the Enlightenment. For Jews, the Enlightenment, the *Haskalah*, meant throwing off the patterns of life and thought with which they had bound themselves for centuries. It meant a new way of dealing with Christian neighbors and a new relationship with the government, which in many places began to grant Jews more rights as citizens. The first step had been to leave the Jewish settlements and head for the heart of Europe's great cities. This was a physical action for some, coming from shtetls and small towns, and a psychological change for others, who emerged from urban ghettos.

In small towns, in rabbinical courts, and in cities renowned for Jewish learning, Jews in Europe had lived for centuries next to, yet apart from, their Christian neighbors. The Jewish community had not only its own religion, but its own Yiddish language, its own economy, its own system of justice. It had never been entirely cut off from Christian society, and Jews had sold their merchandise to Christians and bought from them the products of the land Jews were forbidden to own. But the Jewish community had enveloped its members and Judaism set the pattern of their days. Its autonomy and its inner peace were broken by the violence of Christian neighbors and Christian princes, seeking taxes and, on occasion, blood.

But in the nineteenth century Jews began to join the social and political, and more of the economic, activities of the people among whom they lived. From the Jewish community emerged philosophers and composers, businessmen and financiers, whose lives were played out not within the walls of a ghetto, but in the wider life of the country they inhabited.

The first waves of Jewish immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe arrived from Germany in the 1840s. There had been just a few thousand Sephardic Jews here in the early 1800s, but the German immigration increased their ranks to fifty thousand by 1850, and again to three times that number by 1860. They were escaping the disappointments of a Europe where, especially after the revolutionary hopes of 1848 were dashed, Jews still faced great danger and discrimination. They were also escaping their own pasts, leaving traditional communities governed by Orthodox authorities. It is not surprising that these enterprising and youthful arrivals were drawn from less, rather than more, religious elements of the German Jewish community.

In America, they sought what they could not fully

obtain back home: true civil equality for Jews, and a new, more modern kind of Judaism free from the control of Orthodoxy. How could this be achieved? The now enlarged community of American Jews, most originating in Germany, began to envision a new strategy: rather than stand apart as a visibly distinct group and demand government neutrality among religions, it would be wiser to Americanize and assimilate as quickly as possible and insist that government must not support religion at all. So they abandoned German for English and, as Melvin Urofsky notes, "deliberately downplayed any tendencies that might set them apart from their fellow Americans" in language, dress, and manners. Meanwhile, absolute separation of church and state, not benevolent government support of all religious groups, gradually became the community consensus on public policy.

Their argument for absolute separation was strong. The country they saw before them, and the memories they carried with them, made this seem the logical course to increasing numbers of Jews and their leaders. To begin with, they had experienced government support of established churches in Europe. They did not believe that government would actually remain neutral in any country where the vast majority of citizens were Christian. How would this be possible when many in the populace, the government, and the churches feared and hated Jews? Any government in a Christian country was certain to propound the "true faith," they believed, if it involved itself in religious matters at all. And if government support for religion must mean support for Christianity, the only way to stop it—to reduce the influence of Christianity on public life and on their lives—was to separate church from state.

This issue arose in disparate areas of life. While full political rights had been won by the time of the Civil War, other battles continued. Must Jews who closed their shops on Saturday close them on Sunday as well? Would there be Bible reading in public schools, and if so, whose Bible? Were Jewish children to be preached to from the New Testament each morning? The only practical answer seemed, again, to keep religious matters out of any contact with the government—and vice versa.

Second, this conclusion was further reinforced by the arrival, just as the German Jews were reaching America, of large numbers of Catholics from Ireland and Germany. Given the historic link between the Catholic Church and anti-Semitism in Europe, it was predictable that Jews would fear to see Catholicism strengthened in America. Far better, again, to ensure that government would do nothing to assist the Church.

Third, Jews who wanted to see reforms of their own faith in Germany had often had to contend with official support for the Orthodox rabbinate. Separa-

tion of church and state meant that the government would leave them to themselves to sort out Jewish community affairs. If the Orthodox authorities had no civil power over Jews, Jews would be free to be irreligious or to define new religious practices they felt more fitting for the modern world. So the popularity of Reform Judaism among the German immigrants also argued for keeping the state out of religious affairs altogether.

Finally, the German Jews arrived here when the goal of previous generations, government neutrality, was already enshrined in the Bill of Rights. They did not have to fight for toleration or legal rights, at least from the national government. They could raise their sights and ask for more: a society where religion played no public role. For, as they became more and more American in their ways, religion alone was what separated them from their fellow citizens. To minimize this divisive factor seemed the safest path.

Moreover, as Naomi Cohen, a leading historian of American Jewry and professor of American Jewish History at the Jewish Theological Seminary, has suggested, as the German Jewish community weakened—in faith, in ritual observance, and in cohesiveness—this very weakness led it to hope that the new strategy could substitute for the security Jews no longer obtained from membership in a tightly knit and to some extent self-governing group. Jews were coming to believe that their community might be weaker internally, yet safer nonetheless, if the separation between church and state were strengthened while that between Christian and Jew disappeared.

Besides, the Jewish community of the early 1900s was now filled with immigrants who, whatever their level of ritual observance, spoke Yiddish, lived among themselves, and were Orthodox at least in their religious training and education. What is more, community solidarity was reinforced by pressure from without, by anti-Semitism. The lynching of Leo Frank by a Georgia mob in 1915 reminded Jews that, even in America, anti-Semitism could bring violence and death.

Given the extremely high levels of prejudice and anti-Semitism prevalent then, the foreignness of the newly arrived Jews, and their intense desire to become part of American society, the risk of assimilation evoked far less concern than the challenge of achieving full participation in this new society.

By the early twentieth century, the Jewish community was rapidly being swelled by yet a new immigration: in the decades between 1880 and the First World War, millions of poor Jews from Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe began to reach New York and other East Coast ports. By the end of World War I, four million Jews lived in America. While their arrival transformed much in American Jewish life, it only reinforced the view that a secular American society was the safest one for Jews.

For most American Jews, the story begins here—with the arrival, three or four generations back, of a relative from Eastern Europe. Like the German Jews, these newcomers were escaping not only government oppression, but sometimes family and religious authority as well. For a young Jewish man or woman, the Tsar was a distant tyrant; there were often others closer at hand. The vast majority came from religiously observant, indeed Orthodox, families. Here, in America, their Orthodoxy crumbled.

From a religious point of view, the transition from a shtetl to life in an American city was devastating. In his famous book about the immigrant experience, *The Rise of David Levinsky*, Abraham Cahan's hero explains that "If you are a Jew of the type to which I belonged when I came to New York and you attempt to bend your religion to the spirit of your new surroundings, it breaks. It falls to pieces. The very clothes I wore and the very food I ate had a fatal effect on my religious habits."

My own maternal grandfather arrived here just before the First World War, from the town of Tlumatch in Galicia—then belonging to Austria-Hungary, now part of Ukraine. He and my grandmother had an entirely Orthodox upbringing, and to the day they died their household remained strictly kosher. But when employers required that he work on the Sabbath, he complied. The synagogue, and religious law, took second place to the need to feed five children. A chain smoker until his death, he was soon smoking on the Sabbath, too, and by the time I knew him he confined his visits to the synagogue to the High Holidays.

The society operated to Christian rhythms: Christmas and Easter were work and school holidays, not Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Sabbath closing laws shut stores on Sunday, not Saturday. The food, as David Levinsky said, violated Jewish dietary laws, not those of Christians. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a famous European rabbi declared (in Yiddish, of course) that America, which so many Jews call the promised land, was in fact a "trefe land," an unkosher country. Abraham Cahan knew what the rabbi meant. For the Puritans, the New World had provided the opportunity to practice their religion more freely than had the Old, and they saw themselves as the successors to the ancient Hebrews striking out into the wilderness. For the descendants of those Hebrews, life in America, far from reinforcing their religious practices, eroded them.

In addition, the very individualism of the Enlightenment philosophers subverted the spirit of Jewish peoplehood. The free individual choice of which those thinkers wrote, and which was sanctified in the American Constitution, was absolutely contrary to the Jewish idea of covenant and commandment. Jewish law was about the collective, inherited obligation to God of an entire people. Could anything have been further from the modern notion that each indi-

vidual must freely choose his faith? And could anything have been more subversive of the idea that Jews were by birth bound to 613 commandments than a philosophy suggesting that men were free at birth from any religious obligations whatsoever?

But there is more: something special about Judaism that rendered Jews less able to cope with America than members of other old-world religions. Nathan Glazer, professor emeritus of sociology at Harvard and author of the classic study *American Judaism*, wisely described the problem:

Judaism is even more vulnerable to the unsettling influence of modernity than is Christianity. Judaism emphasizes acts, rituals, habits, a way of life. . . . Once one had found—as so many immigrants did—that it was more convenient to work on Saturdays or to shave or to abandon traditional dress, one had no body of doctrine to fall back upon that could explain what remained *really* important in Judaism—indeed, the question was whether *anything* was really more important than the rituals established by God's word. Under these circumstances, an entire way of life disintegrated.

Professor Glazer was suggesting not that there are no doctrines in Judaism, but that East European Jews had tended to concentrate on ritual far more than on doctrine. And the East European Jews who came to America—the grandparents and great-grandparents of most American Jews—were usually, to say it again, not the most devout people in their communities. Some came for economic opportunity, some to escape the draft, and many to escape oppression, but they did not come to pray. And when they did come to America for religious freedom, very often they were seeking the freedom to be irreligious.

In Europe they had performed the rituals, for there was parental and social pressure to do so, and it was easier to live as a Jew than to violate community norms. But in New York, the reverse was true. There was pressure to grab a (probably non-kosher) sandwich, to work on the Sabbath, to skip a prayer here and there. And as the ritual pillars began to collapse, they brought down with them the whole structure of faith for many new American Jews.

Finally, the American Jewish community cannot have been unaffected, in its religious behavior, by its own argument that a secular society was a safer one for Jews. If religious divisions within the society threatened Jews, how could it be helpful to stress them by ritual practices that set the Jew apart from his neighbor? In the mid-1880s, the East European poet J. L. Gordon, a champion of the *Haskalah*, told his community that the Enlightenment now allowed Jews to join civil society. The formula was to “Be a Jew in your tent and a ‘*mensh*’ [man] when you go out.” But Gordon did not foresee that those who

stopped being Jews in the street and on the job almost inevitably would stop being Jews in their tents as well. An end to rituals that interfered with the rhythms of American life might soon undercut faith as well, for who could wish to believe that he was shirking and doing wrong? Far easier, and more natural, to shirk not only the practice but the beliefs that required it. To enjoy the bounty of America fully, to mute the distinctiveness that had always brought danger to Jews, and to contribute to the building of a secular society where Enlightenment values would be safer, all seemed to lead away from traditional Judaism as it had been practiced for a thousand years.

Away from traditional Judaism, and into the melting pot. For nothing was more American than the steady diminution of old-world traditions among the new immigrant groups, and especially among their children. It was nearly unthinkable, and surely un-American, for any group to wall itself off, rejecting the fabulous opportunities of this new land because it preferred self-segregation and absolute fidelity to its past. True, the Amish and a few other sects did this and ultimately earned the admiration of the society at large for their resolute refusal to integrate. But these were rare exceptions, and the vast sea of immigrants—Jew and Christian alike—embraced the American ethos. Far from segregating themselves from America as the Amish did, the majority of Jews sought the “social invisibility” that alone would protect them and permit them to thrive here.

By the 1920s there were millions of Jews in America, and they constituted 3.7 percent of the population. Yet there is another way to see that number, and it is the way most Jews, and their leaders, saw it: America was still over 96 percent Christian. The leaders of the most important Jewish organizations wondered what public policies would best protect American Jews, and faced again the choices that had once been before their predecessors. They could insist that Judaism be given an equal place with Christianity in a deeply religious America, or seek a more secular America where religion's role was diminished.

They chose the latter path. Their choice is not in retrospect surprising—nor, even when viewed in the light of today's demographic crisis, was it necessarily wrong. They did not believe that even in America, even in the twentieth century, Christians would grant Judaism equal dignity. If there were no religious tests for public office by the late 1800s, American society remained pervasively Christian. Moreover, there were repeated efforts by Christian clergy and activist laymen to push through Congress the so-called “Christian state” amendment, which would push aside the neutrality mandated by the First Amendment and make America an officially Christian country. Judaism would be relegated to a per-

manently inferior position, and the ability of Jews to succeed in America would suffer enormous damage. How could an officially Christian nation ever be home to Jews? Jews strongly opposed and resisted the "Christian Staters" and even became suspicious of other causes dear to the Christian clergy, such as the temperance movement.

Most American Jewish leaders came to believe that security in America would be found by insisting that this country's Constitution be secular and that Jewish pressures to diminish the role of religion were based not on self-interest but on faith in law and the Constitution. For most of them, there must have seemed to be no alternative to this approach. For what else could they do? Accept permanent inferiority, or assault Christianity and hope to change its view of Jews? The first was morally unacceptable, and the second implausible and dangerous.

The universalism of the Enlightenment attracted Jews because it offered them a way out of the ghetto. The two great secular movements that won the support of European Jews after the Enlightenment—socialism and Zionism—had something of Jewish messianism in them. Zionism thought to save the Jews, and socialism to save all mankind, and on one question both agreed entirely: it was dangerous for Jews to live as a distinct minority in a Christian state. Dividing religion from state and society, and relegating it exclusively to the area of private life, had been seen by Jews in Europe as the beginning of their emancipation. America was no different from Europe in this respect, for here too a society where individuals could make their way without being segregated according to group origins would be better for Jews.

A more secular, more tolerant, more open society would be more just, benefit all minorities, and be truer to the nation's fundamental principles. Those principles were not specifically American but rather universal values such as liberty and equality—precisely the values of the Enlightenment. There was, according to this view, a complete identity among Enlightenment, American, and Jewish values.

To this mix was added a new version of the ancient Jewish respect for "the Law," as Jerold S. Auerbach explains in his brilliant work *Rabbis and Lawyers*. A reinterpretation of Judaism's commitment to the Law became a critical element of American Jewish adaptation to life in this country, he argues. In essence, Jewish immigrants became American Jews by redefining Judaism and submerging it in Americanism, itself newly defined by the Jewish lawyers who came to lead the community.

In the nineteenth century, rabbis had usually been the community's most influential leaders; but early in this century lawyers such as Louis Marshall, who served as president of the American Jewish Committee, and Louis Brandeis, the first Jew to serve on the

Supreme Court, took their place. "As they redefined Jewish legitimacy in American legal terms," Auerbach recounts, "they fused Torah and Constitution as the sacred texts of a Judeo-American legal tradition." A key conduit was America's Puritan heritage, which permitted connecting ancient Israel and America "to a common democratic tradition whose origins could be found in the Hebrew Bible." The Puritans looked back to ancient Israel, and the Jews used that reference to affirm their own new American identity. The "new synthesis" that Marshall and Brandeis developed between 1906 and 1916 was based on the importance of law and justice in both the American and the Jewish traditions. The result was "the identification of Judaism with Americanism. . . . The prophetic teachings of 'brotherhood and righteousness' . . . had become the modern liberal ideals of democracy and social justice."

As Brandeis put it, "the highest Jewish ideals are essentially American," for "America's fundamental law seeks to make real the brotherhood of man. That brotherhood became the Jews' fundamental law more than twenty-five hundred years ago."

Under the leadership of Marshall and Brandeis, Auerbach concludes, "the rule of law that governed American Jewish life came to depend upon the Constitution, not the Torah." This sacralization of the Constitution joined Judaism and Americanism, and the immigrant Jew was now able to embrace a synthesis that allowed him to be a patriotic American as well as an observant Jew—observant, that is, of the newly defined requirements and responsibilities of the Jew in America.

Safety through secularism, integration rather than separatism, and life under the new sacred Law of the Constitution rather than the old Law of the Torah became the American Jewish ideology, and the institutions of the community pursued it with zeal. By the 1960s the battle to disestablish Christianity as the nation's public religion had largely been won. Great public occasions required clergymen from all three denominations, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, and the inadmissibility of using state power to advance Christianity was well established. Still the Jewish community pressed on, as Naomi Cohen reports in her history of the American Jewish Committee: "Jewish insistence on the sanctity of separation persisted. . . . As a pluralistic society accepted Jewish assertiveness more readily, the Jewish minority sharpened its attack against any entering wedge, no matter how innocuous in itself, which might breach the wall of separation."

Over the decades, as East European Jews became dominant in American Jewish life, the major Jewish organizations changed from being creatures of the rich, assimilated German-Jewish elites who saw themselves as stewards of the community. But the ideology of these organizations, which was secularist and non-Orthodox, did not change as their leader-

ship passed from civic-minded laymen to a new generation of professionals. The members of this new group, like their more elitist predecessors, were highly secular in their own private lives and unenthusiastic about the role of religion in American society. As Cohen argues, "They spoke for a religious community, but . . . their actions in opposition to public religion reflected their own indifference if not hostility to religion itself."

Originally, for example, the Jewish defense organizations had fought to remove Christian prayers from the public schools on the grounds of discrimination against Jewish children. But when specifically Christian prayers were gone, these organizations carried on the fight, hoping to exclude any prayer (even voluntary and silent prayer), any observance of religious holidays, any benediction at graduation ceremonies, or any use of school facilities by religious groups. In one celebrated case, Jewish organizations sided with a school administration that permitted all voluntary student organizations, except a Bible club, to use school facilities after school let out. This, the Christian students argued, was discrimination against only one form of voluntary student activity. But the school administration resisted, and the major Jewish organizations supported it and sought to bar even this after-hours and unofficial religious activity. The principle they backed was absolutism in the separation of church and state, for fear that any link of religion to a public institution would eventually endanger American Jews.

Soon, however, that principle was extended from church and state to religion and society. Separation of church and state, as the late social critic Christopher Lasch put it, is "nowadays interpreted as prohibiting any public recognition of religion at all." While the Supreme Court has been rethinking these questions recently, the major Jewish organizations continue faithfully to promote the absolutist dogma.

This continuing effort is perfectly illustrated by the 1994 case involving the Kiryas Joel school district. Kiryas Joel is a town in New York State established in 1977 and populated by twelve thousand members of the Satmar sect of Hasidic Jews. The problem they faced when they established their private religious school system was the burden of educating emotionally and physically disabled children. When the sect's leaders concluded that they lacked the resources to educate these children, they tried to arrange for their education at the expense of the state, invoking a right common to all New Yorkers. The children were, for a time, educated in secular subjects by licensed public school teachers on premises within the town. Later, state authorities said this solution violated separation of church and state, and insisted that the disabled children be transported to public school premises outside the town. Claiming that the trip away from familiar surround-

ings upset the children, and that the other students who crossed their paths mocked their distinctive clothing and appearance, the parents convinced the state legislature to establish the town as a separate school district so that their handicapped children could be educated at a public school within it. The only schooling offered by this new school district was a secular special education program for handicapped children, and the teachers, therapists, and district superintendent were not Satmar Hasidim and did not reside in the town. Still, the state superintendent of schools brought suit, arguing that this new school district was set up solely to help the Hasidim and as such constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion.

As might be expected, the major Jewish organizations (with the exception of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, Agudath Israel of America, and the National Council of Young Israel—all Orthodox Groups) lined up uniformly against the Hasidim. An *amicus curiae* brief was filed by the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the National Council of Jewish Women, together with the American Civil Liberties Union, the Unitarian Universalist Association, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State; another brief was joined by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the American Jewish Congress, and the National Jewish Community Relations Councils with People for the American Way. Besides Orthodox Jews, the only organizations that sided with the Hasidim were the National Association of Evangelicals and the U.S. Catholic Conference. The deep religious faith of the Kiryas Joel Hasidim was for the major Jewish organizations outweighed by their fear that some conservative or fundamentalist Christian groups might conceivably benefit from a Kiryas Joel victory.

Thus separation of church and state was here taken another step, for now it appeared that any state action whose effect is to help parents keep their children faithful to their religious beliefs could be struck down as unconstitutional. The major Jewish groups all argued that to assist Orthodox Jews in making their children Orthodox was *by definition* unconstitutional. Several members of the Supreme Court agreed. New York's law went beyond constitutional bounds, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in his opinion, because it "provided official support to cement the attachment of young adherents to a particular faith" and in this sense "affirmatively supports a religious sect's interest in segregating itself and preventing its children from associating with their neighbors."

This language is a far cry from the ways in which the Court used to talk about religious obligations and the parental role. In the famous 1925 case of *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, the Court spoke of "the rights of parents to direct the rearing and education

of their children,” and in a 1944 case it added that “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include the preparation for obligations the state can neither hinder nor supply.” If these decisions do not speak to the issue of public aid to parochial schools, they do demonstrate how the Court’s attitude toward parents who seek to bind their children into obligatory religious commitments has changed from respect and even admiration to outright hostility. And in this journey the Court had the support of most American Jewish organizations.

Judaism, because it is an all-embracing way of life—intended to govern or at least influence one’s thoughts and behavior from waking until sleep, and from birth until death—cannot be entirely private, in that it affects one’s behavior in society. Nor is it entirely voluntary, for the Jew is born into a covenantal community with obligations to God.

But the view of the Jewish agencies—and to some extent of the Court majority, which decided against the Hasidim—is very distant from this understanding: It is that religion is not a way of life, but rather a private opinion. As Nathan Lewin, an Orthodox Jew who was the attorney for the Kiryas Joel Hasidim, noted, the Justices “do not see religion as an individual lifelong condition, like poverty or disability. They view it as a temporary personal preference—a possession that one may choose to keep or discard.” Far from being a network of obligatory actions that must be taken to follow God’s commandments, religion becomes just another “lifestyle choice.” Any adjustment to that personal preference, then, is an unconstitutional favoring of religion, and Justice David Souter called the Kiryas Joel law unconstitutional “religious favoritism.”

Far from demanding that the government grant some leeway to facilitate the practice of a demanding faith, in this case their own, the Jewish groups insisted that such an accommodation is not only unwise but unlawful. The elements of the Jewish community having the greatest difficulty keeping their children Jewish used the courts to attack the practice by which the elements having the greatest success keeping their children Jewish were doing so.

In 1995, the Supreme Court stepped back from the ever more absolute separationist position it seemed to be embracing in *Kiryas Joel*. In two cases, *Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette* and *Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia*, the Court refused to read an endorsement of religion into official actions treating religious activity no better and no worse than other forms of private conduct.

In these cases the Court took a clear step back from the extremes of separationism, provided a bit more space for religious views in the public square, and clarified a point it had previously made—that the

Establishment Clause does not require barring religious viewpoints from expression in neutral government programs. But the major Jewish organizations refused to take that step back. They fought the Court’s conclusions, once again joining with the absolute separatist groups submitting briefs.

To this day, the major non-Orthodox Jewish organizations reject any deviation from absolute separationism. They still see the expression of religious convictions as a danger to Jews. Whatever may be the nature of their commitment to Judaism, their faith in separationism is absolutely intact.

Thus the official views of the Jewish community in the 1992 Rhode Island benediction case, *Lee v. Weisman*, where the Supreme Court found that it was unconstitutional for a rabbi to read a prayer at a high school commencement. The case was brought by a nonreligious Jewish family, the Weismans, whose daughter Deborah was a graduating senior. A majority of five justices found that her objections to the prayer were enough to make it impermissible as a matter of government coercion. She might be made to feel uncomfortable by this prayer reading, and might feel peer pressure to stand during the prayer or in some other way show a belief in God that she did not have. This was the “coercion” that rendered the prayer unconstitutional. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, in the opinion of the Court, that “the undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the Invocation and Benediction.” This could not be allowed because “research in psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity.”

So the benediction was barred, because it was too much to ask Ms. Deborah Weisman to stand quietly or sit silently when others prayed. The support of Jewish organizations for her cause, and their jubilation at her victory, were the product of their assessment of American society and the Jewish place in it. The tradition of benedictions at great public events, from a presidential inauguration to a high school commencement, goes back to the founding of the Republic, but they found it an offensive and unconstitutional practice. In their arguments to the Supreme Court, they once again remained true to the strategy that has motivated them for decades. In other words, they continue to believe that a secular America is the only safe America for Jews and to oppose any practice that may force American Jews to acknowledge their religion in public, or permit Christians to do so. They continue to believe that these results are compelled by sacred Law, in this case the Constitution.

The foregoing cases provide striking evidence of what is actually a shift in the thinking of America’s

Jewish leaders. They see religion not as the guarantor of civic virtue, but as the source of civic strife—and of danger for Jews. From the original Jewish insistence that Judaism be treated with the respect accorded to other religions, and even beyond the subsequent belief that any form of government support for religion was barred by the Constitution and potentially harmful to American Jews, their position presently stands revealed not merely as fear of government support for religion but *fear of religion itself*.

How this came to be is a long and complicated story. One key element is the history of Christian anti-Semitism, which made Jews fearful of any display of Christian religiosity. A second element is the sense among Jews that Jewish religiosity and ritual observance would prove to be an insuperable barrier to assimilation and success in America. And a third is the sad fact that most of the American Jewish community has abandoned *Judaism the religion*. The old Judaic commandments to keep the Sabbath day, to observe the dietary laws, even to worship God regularly and to keep Him at the center of one's life, have given way.

It is not that American Jews or their leaders wished to abandon being Jewish. Rather, they adopted an elaborate system of substitute faiths that were supposed to keep people Jewish—from commitment to “prophetic Judaism” (read, left-wing politics), to Israel, to the memory of the Holocaust, to a generalized ethnic “Jewishness.” But the newest demographic data show that these substitute faiths are all failing. It is not possible to transmit this irreligious “Jewishness” successfully, as the Hebrew prayers have it, *l’dor vador*—from one generation to the next. Such “Jewishness” is a counterfeit faith, a passing phenomenon that will outlast the immigrants by only a few generations. There is within the American Jewish community an increasingly widespread conclusion that it is so, and with it a growing sense of crisis. The critical question facing the community today is whether it will acknowledge and act upon the disturbing truths that, as always in Jewish history, substitutes for Judaism are false idols; that following them is a path to ruin; and that Judaism—centered on the worship of God and fulfillment of His commandments—must be returned to the center of Jewish life. ^[1]

I Am No Lazy Lover

I am no lazy lover
with sweeping grandeurs
of small talk. Words, you discover
are passing; love endures.

Proffered is no measured length
of the potential soul.
Rather, influence of strength,
corner-stone, cemented whole.

The senses know the form
and smile and eyes
of love, but the lover's norm
is to pierce through this disguise

to spirit which in all things
does love intensify
to ripened being. Each day that sings
our love is more July.

Sand below and stars above
give instancy of me.
Mine is no lazy love;
come taste my love and see.

Richard Novak, C.S.C.

Debriefing the Philosophers

J. Bottum

There are many schools of thought to which an American philosopher may belong, but there is still only one school of American philosophy. The last few Marxists may look to Frederic Jameson to lead them, while the last few followers of Heidegger may look to such writers as John Caputo. Richard Rorty, with his strange brew of old-fashioned American pragmatism and postmodern French deconstruction, has his share of followers, as does Alasdair MacIntyre with his recent work on Thomas Aquinas. Nussbaum, Kripke, Cavell, Sokolowski, Irwin, and McInerney—these are all names to conjure with in the various worlds of contemporary philosophical thought. But far above the jarring sects, there stand the true heirs of William James and John Dewey: the group of thinkers who practice that mixture of empiricism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, and liberal social theory which remains the one distinctively American school of philosophy. Ronald Dworkin, now Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, and Thomas Nagel of New York University, together with Robert Nozick and John Rawls of Harvard, form the core. And when Harvard's Thomas Scanlon and MIT's Judith Jarvis Thomson are added in, the roster of America's true philosophical establishment is nearly complete.

If for no other reason than the fact that these six thinkers are among the brightest lights of American philosophy, it is worth notice that they joined last fall to file an amicus brief in the two assisted-suicide cases pending before the Supreme Court: *Washington v. Gluckberg*, appealed from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and *Vacco v. Quill*, appealed from the Second Circuit. As Dworkin himself observes in the new introduction he wrote for the brief's publication in the March 27, 1997 issue of the *New York Review of Books*, there seems to be no other occasion on which "a group has intervened in

Supreme Court litigation solely as general moral philosophers." The sheer existence of a brief signed with these names proclaims that the opinion of America's most elevated intellectuals is exactly where one thought it would be: solidly in favor of declaring a constitutionally protected right to doctor-assisted suicide.

But there is another reason that what the *New York Review of Books* named "The Philosophers' Brief" deserves attention. No fights are as bitter, no distinctions are as strongly defended, as those that occur between members of the same school of thought. In his introduction, Dworkin is careful to admit that "we differ among ourselves about general issues of political philosophy and justice," while the brief itself acknowledges that the authors "differ on many issues of public morality and policy." Only an issue of extreme importance could compel them to put aside their professional philosophical differences—even while they claim the authority to speak on the issue precisely because they are professional philosophers.

The result had at least a chance to be one of the most significant documents in the history of American philosophy. The methods and assumptions on which the joined thinkers rely cannot be those that define this or that philosopher carefully distinguishing his own work from the work of others in his school, but the common methods and broad assumptions that define the entire school of thought. The document offered an opportunity to show, once and for all, the shared practice of America's contemporary philosophical establishment.

It does not manage to seize that opportunity. There is probably little importance to the legal and strategic incompetence of the Philosophers' Brief. Its attempt to pin assisted suicide to the abortion dicta of the 1992 *Casey v. Planned Parenthood* decision seems generally less successful than the original attempt by the Ninth Circuit, but that is not in itself a significant indictment of the brief's philosophical analysis.

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Neither is it philosophically significant that the philosophers spend too much effort exposing flaws in the analysis offered by the Clinton Administration (given that the Court, during oral argument on January 8, revealed it had never been impressed with the Administration's reasoning).

What is important, however, is that the Philosophers' Brief should also prove *philosophically* incompetent. Apart from a compressed argument denying any distinction between acting and refraining from acting (an argument presented as obvious to the trained philosophical mind), there is nothing in the Philosophers' Brief that requires its authors be philosophers. Indeed, with such sentences as "Death is, for each of us, among the most significant events of life," there is much in the brief that requires its authors *not* be philosophers. Those of us who have graded freshman ethics papers know such sentences well; we read them, and sigh, and wonder where to begin. By remarking that, for the dying person, death is not an *event* in any normal sense of the word? By observing that, even if death is taken as an event, the one thing it surely is not is an event *of life* (reminding these philosophers that their own Ludwig Wittgenstein has a famous discussion of this very point)? Or by pointing out that, even if death is taken as an event of life, it cannot be merely *among* the most significant events of life, but must rank *all* by itself?

There may exist philosophically sophisticated arguments for the position taken by the authors of the Philosophers' Brief. Seneca, Montaigne, David Hume, and others have written in defense of suicide (though their position becomes even more difficult when speaking of *assistance* in suicide). And if such thinkers are not, except perhaps for Hume, in the absolute first rank in the history of philosophy, they are nonetheless writers for the ages. But sophisticated arguments do not appear in the American philosophers' text. Perhaps the authors feared that the justices of the Supreme Court (and the readers of the *New York Review of Books*) would not understand the technicalities of a purely philosophical analysis, however distinctively American. Or perhaps the differences between these six thinkers are so profound that there is in fact no American school, and once they set aside their differences they found nothing genuinely philosophical remaining. But the more likely explanation is that, for the sake of advancing—and putting themselves among the leaders in advancing—what they believe to be a correct social and political opinion, America's most distinguished philosophers were willing to betray their discipline, their reputations, and their own brilliant philosophical minds.

We have seen this pattern before, of course, in the scurrying of American intellectuals to trade thinking well for thinking right—the thinking-right of everyone from the Communists in the 1930s to the femi-

nists in the 1970s. But precisely because we have seen it before, and know that for seventy years it has contributed enormously both to the American public's contempt for intellectuals and to intellectuals' contempt for the American public, we ought to be surprised to find the lesson so poorly learned. What had the promise to be a high-water mark of American philosophy turns out to be another low-water mark of the willingness of America's philosophers to cash in their reputations and credentials in order to join a social and political campaign.

In itself, the Philosophers' Brief is not a particularly bad compendium of the standard, middle-brow constitutional and legal arguments for assisted suicide as those arguments stood last fall. The twists and turns to which Ronald Dworkin puts them in his new introduction are proof that such arguments have become somewhat stale after the Court revealed during oral argument what lines it was interested in exploring. But the basic analysis is essentially the one that Judge Stephen Reinhardt used in his Ninth Circuit opinion. The *Casey* decision—cited six times in the five pages of the Philosophers' Brief—guarantees that "at the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Since death is, as the philosophers insist, "among the most significant events of life," people must not be forced "to end their lives in a way that appalls them, just because that is what some majority thinks proper."

In *Cruzan v. Missouri* (1990), the Supreme Court held that a patient could compel the withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment and drugs, even though death should result. *Cruzan* did not seem to disallow laws against assisted suicide, particularly such laws as New York's, based upon a Task Force Report that distinguished between withdrawing life support and providing lethal medication. Expanding upon the *Cruzan* decision, however, the Second Circuit in *Vacco v. Quill* dismissed the New York Task Force Report and argued that a right to have life-sustaining medication withdrawn entails a right to have life-destroying medication prescribed. Echoing the Second Circuit, the Philosophers' Brief asserts that *Cruzan* logically demands the legalization of assisted suicide. "Whether a doctor turns off a respirator in accordance with the patient's request or prescribes pills that a patient may take when he is ready to kill himself," the philosophers declare, "the doctor acts with the same intention: to help the patient die."

There are, they concede, risks of mistake in diagnosis and knowledge of the patient's will. These risks were the subject of the Solicitor General's briefs for the Clinton Administration, and the philosophers set themselves primarily to answer the Administration's analysis. Where the Solicitor General had what they acknowledge as a valid point—as in the risks of the Dutch practice of euthanizing newborns who could

not under any view be thought to have given consent—they insist that the problem can be addressed by careful regulation. But their general argument relies upon the denial of a distinction between withdrawing life support and prescribing death: whatever possibilities for error exist in prescribing death exist as well in withdrawing life support, and since such possibilities did not prevent the decision in *Cruzan*, they ought not prevent the affirmation of a right to assisted suicide.

Avoiding the excesses of Reinhardt in the Ninth Circuit (who dwelt graphically on the horrors of unhastenable death), the Philosophers' Brief uses emotional appeal at only a few key points in the text. Declaring full agreement with the right of other patients to fight death to the last possible moment, the brief concludes with a claim that it has defined the highest constitutional ground: ensuring the ability of all to die as they choose.

Judged as philosophical argument, nothing in the Philosophers' Brief rises to a level that requires a philosopher. When the brief gives its moving description of the anguish of patients "sedated near oblivion," we may have an idea of what is meant, and it may even be true. But a philosopher is the person we expect to look at such a description and wonder whether we have not confused the patient's own anguish with the anguish we feel looking at the patient. A philosopher is the person we expect to ask how we could ever know with certainty what a person "sedated near oblivion" actually feels. There is a certain rough plausibility to the proposition that a patient might wish to die if he could only stand somehow outside himself to see himself lying helpless and sedated, but it is a proposition that ought to give a philosopher the kind of serious pause the Philosophers' Brief never takes.

This resolute refusal to engage in philosophical analysis—by authors who claim the authority to speak because they are America's most distinguished philosophers—appears again and again in the Philosophers' Brief. Though it dismisses as philosophically naive ("based on a misunderstanding of the pertinent moral principles") the commonsense distinction between letting die and killing, the brief uses such commonsense phrases as "in the patient's best interest to die" without any nod toward their philosophically difficult character. (How, a philosopher ought to ask, can it ever be in anyone's best interest to cease to have interests?) In a way unworthy of trained thinkers, the brief elides the question of why life has value into the possibility that life has no value. And in a fairly straightforward begging of the question near the end of the text, the brief asserts that there exist patients "whose decisions for suicide plainly cannot be dismissed as irrational or foolish or premature," offering as a self-evident premise what was supposed to be proved as the conclusion.

Perhaps the most unphilosophical element, however, is the authors' constant description of life as something each person has a constitutional right to judge for himself as a whole—including the death which is "among the most significant events of life." Insofar as such a description has any philosophical coherence, it seems to require the further assumption of a point after death from which to view the whole life—a religious or philosophical assumption that the brief repeatedly asserts the Constitution prohibits the justices from making.

Even judged merely as constitutional and legal argument, most of the philosophers' points have already found their answer. Beginning with the declaration that respect for "the American constitutional tradition" demands a right to assisted suicide and ending with an appeal to "the spirit and letter of the Court's past decisions," the philosophers seem deaf to the irony of appealing to the four-year-old "tradition" of *Casey*, a case that has manifestly failed either to carry the American public in its wake or to obtain a settled set of consequences in American jurisprudence.

One proof that these philosophers have betrayed their professional expertise comes in their brief's many appeals to the abortion dicta of *Casey*, for the American philosophy practiced by the six authors of the Philosophers' Brief manifests in every other situation a deep suspicion of the kind of soft metaphysical claims about "the mystery of human life" made in the *Casey* decision. But even as a strategy of argument for a liberal sensibility that has already obtained legalized abortion and wants assisted suicide, the appeal to *Casey* is dangerous. The Court, during oral argument, seemed extremely reluctant to declare a right to assisted suicide. Precisely to the extent to which the Philosophers' Brief—and the Ninth Circuit, with somewhat more force—succeeds in persuading a reluctant Court that *Casey* logically demands assisted suicide, they put their oft-cited "mystery of human life" passage at risk of reversal or serious reinterpretation.

The Clinton Administration seems to have realized this risk. The Solicitor General's arguments are concerned primarily to preserve *Casey*'s guarantee of abortion no matter what decision the Court comes to in the two pending assisted-suicide cases. But the Court revealed that the arguments it was interested in exploring were not those given by the Solicitor General, and the extended reply the Philosophers' Brief makes to the Administration proves to have been wasted. The Solicitor General argues that mistakes in ascertaining the will of the patient are unavoidable, and thus the state has a sufficient interest to override what is conceded to be a liberty interest of the patient. The Court needed little teaching from the philosophers to demolish this line of reasoning. In oral argument Chief Justice William Rehnquist

called “rather a conundrum” the notion that the state could both concede and prohibit a liberty, and Justice Antonin Scalia observed that the Court could as well say that “there’s a liberty interest in murdering people” as a way of upholding laws banning murder.

The stronger arguments against legalized assisted suicide—or at least the stronger arguments the Court revealed that it was interested in hearing—are a pair of “slippery slope” arguments that gained force from their exposition in briefs filed by opponents to assisted suicide. The first involves a slippage in jurisprudential logic, and the second involves a slippage in practical protections for the weak and poor.

The logical slippage that concerned the Court is the difficulty in maintaining any distinction once the Second Circuit’s dismissal of the New York State Task Force has been granted. If withdrawing life-support cannot be distinguished from giving the patient the means for death, then the bright line has apparently been broken: no legal grounds seem to exist for distinguishing assisted suicide from euthanasia, the terminally ill from the chronically ill, and the physically ill from the merely depressed.

The practical slippage that concerned the Court is the difficulty in ensuring that patients will not be pressured into suicide as a way of ending their expensive medical care. Though the philosophers dismiss the Solicitor General’s comments about the difficulties of ascertaining the independent will of the patient—at one point putting the word “pressure” in quotation marks to indicate the impossibility of anyone ever arriving at a decision unswayed by the opinions and advice of others—the particular dangers to the weak and the poor received little attention from either the Clinton Administration or the philosophers.

It was to address these stronger arguments that Ronald Dworkin wrote his introduction in the *New York Review of Books*. For the opponents of assisted suicide, perhaps the most interesting feature of Dworkin’s new essay comes near the end, when he virtually concedes that, given the clues spectators heard during oral argument, the case for assisted suicide is lost. He concludes with a plea that the Court *not* decide the cases, arguing that postponement “would be the most statesmanlike way in which the Court could make the wrong decision.” “In the meantime,” he adds, “the public would have had an opportunity to participate more fully in the argument about principle; and, when circumstances make it possible, wide public discussion is a desirable and democratic preliminary to a final Supreme Court adjudication.” The sentence deserves framing: In its casual assumption that democratic discourse is merely a desirable “preliminary”—“when circumstances make it possible”—to a Supreme Court ruling, this must take its place among the most bla-

tant declarations of judicial rule of America.

There is, however, something even more interesting in the introductory essay. Compelled to answer stronger arguments than the Solicitor General was able to make in his determination to preserve the *Casey* abortion license, Dworkin is forced, by the lack of any real philosophical foundation in the Philosophers’ Brief, to present a series of astonishingly weak responses. The argument of a slippage in jurisprudential logic remains, I think, capable of answer: Even if pro-life forces lose the battle on assisted suicide, they are not going to concede that euthanasia logically follows. But Dworkin’s own answer to this legal slippery slope is merely that a willingness of the courts to hear virtually every disputed case would suffice to stop any decay of principle. It is unclear how this might be an answer to the claim that granting assisted suicide would eventually leave the courts unable to make any distinctions at all, since the danger of legal slippage exists precisely in the constant appeal to judicial review. Insofar as Dworkin admits a line the courts may draw to prevent, say, depressed teenagers from demanding assistance in committing suicide, he thinks it involves asking whether judges can imagine the would-be suicide ever being grateful that someone prevented him from killing himself. But this too seems custom-made to induce the legal slippage it purports to halt, creating opportunities for anyone in an adverse situation—bankruptcy, life imprisonment, permanent injury—to claim a rational basis for doctor-assisted suicide.

The argument gets worse when he examines the risk to the weak and poor. Though regulations might be put in place to prevent it, Dworkin observes, “many people fear that such regulation could not be adequately enforced, and that particularly vulnerable patients—poor patients dying in overcrowded hospitals that had scarce resources, for example—might be pressured or hustled into a decision for death.” He cites several studies on the current practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide, particularly a 1996 Washington State study that claims that 26 percent of doctors are already granting 24 percent of patient requests for lethal prescriptions, despite the laws currently prohibiting it. And he argues, “The evidence suggests . . . that such [poor] patients might be better rather than less well protected if assisted suicide were legalized with appropriate safeguards. More of them could then benefit from relief that is already available—illegally—to . . . many middle-class people.” Far from quelling fear of a slippery slope, this argument actually affirms it: We needn’t worry that the legalization of assisted suicide will put the poor at risk of premature death, because it will in fact bring them a set of benefits they currently lack, first among which is premature death. Even the factual premise of the argument is not evident. The “For example” with which he introduces the studies of lethal prescription is at best mistaken

and at worst deceitful, for such studies in general—and the Washington State study in particular—make no mention of the economic class of the patients requesting death.

Dworkin, however, makes a second argument against the risk to the poor, picking up a suggestion by the Coalition of Hospice Professionals in another amicus brief: “Removing legal bans on suicide assistance will enhance the opportunity for advanced hospice care for all patients because regulation of physician-assisted suicide would mandate that all palliative measures be exhausted as a condition precedent to assisted suicide.” Since most of the appeals to emotion made in arguments for assisted suicide—including those in Dworkin’s essay, a more graphic piece than the original Philosophers’ Brief—rely on the inefficiency of pain-controlling medication, this line of reasoning offers little comfort to those who worry about the poor. But even without such appeals, it takes a simply contradictory position on regulation: regulation that is routinely violated before legalized assisted suicide will never be violated after legalization. If mere regulation is sufficient to mandate proper palliative measures, we presumably do not need assisted suicide to achieve them; if regulation is not sufficient, then the legalization of assisted suicide makes the consequences of that insufficiency fatal.

The fundamental question raised by the publica-

tion of the Philosophers’ Brief remains how America’s most distinguished philosophers could make in public what they must surely know are such poor arguments. In his introduction, Dworkin seizes upon the one genuinely philosophical element in the original brief, the theory that the doctor’s intention is the morally significant component of a medical action. Applying it to the claim made in oral argument that a patient who demands the removal of life support is not committing suicide, he rephrases the theory with a negative example: “Some doctors, who stop life support only because the patient demands, do not aim at death. But neither do doctors who prescribe lethal pills only for the same reason, and hope that the patient does not take them.” Only someone whose desire to arrive at a particular result has utterly trapped his own thinking could so completely surrender any sense of what the word “prescribe” really means in the relation between a doctor and patient.

But Dworkin *is* in many ways a trapped man, trapped by the ambition that led him to join Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, and Thomson in betraying themselves and the enterprise of American philosophy. It may be very human to want to change the world rather than simply explain it, to hunger to be influential players rather than mere thinkers. But it is, as the Philosophers’ Brief reminds us once again, an unhappy ambition for philosophers. ^[F1]

The Prodigals

I hope to kill the fatted calf somehow,
Before its youth is gone, and in its stead
There stands a lean and empty-uddered cow
From whom all festiveness has fled;
Before its innocence, naiveté,
Has, from neglect, been changed to dull, morose,
Unfeeling gloom that holds all joy at bay,
And with its bones it pierces skin drawn close.

I hope to pile the groaning board up high,
And importune the prodigals to eat,
Ignore the Elder Brother standing by,
And give themselves completely to the meat.
But what if prodigals exist no more,
And all are Elder Brothers at the door?

Charles Gordon Rex

Rapture and Renewal in Latin America

Pedro C. Moreno

At a recent crusade in Argentina, Alberto Mottes, the Billy Graham of Latin America, thundered to the crowd, "Before we go to be with the Lord, our eyes will see the greatest evangelistic harvest in all the history of Christianity. We are living the greatest days in the history of the Church."

Though Mottes himself is a Baptist, the harvest he was speaking of seems mostly to be a Pentecostal one. The general growth of Latin America's Evangelical population has been phenomenal. At the beginning of the 1980s, there were about 18.6 million Evangelicals in Latin America. Now there are close to sixty million, with eight thousand Latin American converts to evangelicalism every day, according to the Latin American Catholic Bishops Conference. Evangelicals make up 7 to 35 percent of the population in some Latin American countries—becoming, in Guatemala, Brazil, and Nicaragua, more numerous than practicing Catholics. But this growth has taken place primarily among Pentecostals. Recent statistics show that Pentecostals account for two out of every three Evangelicals in Latin America, and, according to one estimate, nearly 40 percent of the world's Pentecostals live in Latin America.

Latin America in the last decade and a half has made great strides in consolidating political democracy and economic growth. Except for Cuba, all Latin nations now have democratically elected governments, and several of them, including Argentina and Bolivia, have undergone profound structural reforms. Chile is already considered an economic "tiger." The region, however, still operates in several self-destructive ways. State officials both act and are seen to act as virtual kings and lords, while monopolies are still strong in the economic, political, social, and even religious realms (with an established and,

in some cases, official church). Tax evasion, exacerbated by governmental corruption and mismanagement of public funds, has crippled democratic reform and weakened the accountability of public officials. A career in government is still seen primarily as a way to amass a fortune.

Though its people are warm and generous, Latin America is also a continent marked by great social paradoxes. A land of deep religiosity, but little morality (i.e., institutionalized lying and socially accepted adultery); saturated with "macho" types, but not enough responsible men; with a ruling class ethnically "mestiza" (mix of Indian and European), but, out of prejudice, considering itself "white"; where the law is seldom openly challenged, but frequently disobeyed or ignored.

Against this political and social backdrop, a Latin American version of "The Great Awakening" seems to be taking place. One needn't even believe in God to recognize that the historical phenomenon of a spiritual awakening remains by its nature an unpredictable event. But the question nonetheless remains why, of all the forms of Protestant and Catholic Christianity capable of leading such a revival, Pentecostalism is the one to which Latin America seems to have turned.

A typical Latin American Pentecostal service takes place in a large, poorly decorated meeting hall, with a full-blown band leading the singing, shouting, whistling, clapping, and dancing. As the service begins, the congregants become deeply immersed, their eyes closed, some crying, others singing at the top of their voice or "speaking in tongues," and still others lifting faces and hands toward heaven. The music goes on and on, building from soft strains to a fast, arresting rhythm that after nearly two hours reaches a deafening climax—and suddenly drops back again to quiet strains.

With the entrance of the pastor, the whole congre-

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gation shouts and claps, while he begins to preach a simple message of salvation through Jesus: You must convert now, while there is still time. No more drinking, cheating, and lying. The Lord is coming, soon. The music softly restarts while the pastor asks all who want to “accept the Lord” to come forward. As the leaders pray, the people start falling down—“slain in the Spirit,” the outward expression of the Holy Spirit come into their lives.

There is no clear beginning of the service, and usually no clear end. Some because they have found what they prayed for, and others out of sheer exhaustion, begin to drift from the hall, and the service comes to an end. Nothing short of the final Rapture for which they pray will keep them from coming back next week, with friends and family in tow.

Latin Americans, accustomed to economic and political roller-coasters, seem to be at home with the new Pentecostal spiritual roller-coaster. Father Franz Damen, Catholic priest and missionary to Bolivia, argues that Pentecostalism in Latin America has joined itself with the popular culture, assuming the language and even some of the religious practices (vows, pilgrimages, symbols) of the people, along with folk music and dance. The emphasis on such practices as nonmedical healing has also appealed to indigenous traditions. Further facilitating the growth of Pentecostal churches is the fact that 99 percent of their leaders are native Latin Americans. Pentecostalism, declares Mortimer Arias, a prominent Uruguayan Methodist bishop, is “the most indigenous and popular Protestant modality that Latin America has produced.”

More important than the elements with which Latin Americans are familiar, however, may be the elements with which they are not. The personalized dedication on the part of the leadership and flexible structure break from the Catholic and even Protestant divisions between clergy and laity. The Pentecostal acceptance of women in leadership, in some cases even at the pastoral level (typically two-thirds of the congregations are women), adds to its popularity. Though most members of Pentecostal churches are poor and uneducated, an increase of middle and upper class members has brought the social classes together in a way unfamiliar to Latin American people. Similarly, the services bring together racial castes—descendants of the Native Americans, the European colonists, and the African slaves—in ways rare in some of the more prejudiced Latin countries. White and black, mestizo and Indian, educated and illiterate may be found holding hands and even kissing each other (a very unlikely occurrence in a highly prejudiced society).

Pentecostals are generally credited with providing a sense of community to the masses migrating from the countryside to the cities and with preaching a message that concentrates on the power of God not only to comfort spiritually but also to help material-

ly. The British sociologist David Martin has studied the impact of Pentecostalism in *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America*, arguing that the Pentecostals have created “free spaces” where a new ethos can develop. Former prostitutes, drunkards, and adulterers freely testify to their conversions. Finding a sense of purpose in their new beliefs, many have developed abilities within the church (leadership, organization, public speaking, etc.) that have improved their daily work and helped them rise economically. Pentecostal men are found to be more sensitive and dedicated to their families. More of their family income is spent on children’s education, while a recent poll of two thousand Brazilians found that they “see themselves as more optimistic and hard working than in the past” as a result of their conversion.

The significance of all this, according to *Forbes* magazine, goes beyond theology. “The old . . . order, based upon a rigid hierarchy and social immobility, has broken down. A new social atmosphere, one more flexible and more compatible with capitalism and democracy, is emerging.” The Pentecostals find themselves not only questioning existing religious structures (both Catholic and Protestant), but also giving expression to a deep-rooted discontent with existing social and economic conditions—the discontent the Communists were certain existed throughout Latin America, though their revolution failed to spread. This religious dissidence is furthering modernization in Latin America, taking advantage of the new pluralism and democracy the collapse of the Communist threat allowed to develop in political and economic realms.

One might conclude that the “Pentecostalization” of Latin America promises a bright and prosperous future. Undeniably, several Pentecostal churches and leaders, offering a positive and integrated view of faith and the world, have had an impact felt in all areas of life. About whether the explosive growth of Pentecostalism will bring forth the long awaited and much needed economic and social transformation of Latin America, however, serious doubts and uncertainties remain.

Timothy Goodman, for example, has questioned the often assumed correlation of the rise of evangelicalism in Latin America with cultural development. A former fellow with the American Enterprise Institute, Goodman suggests, in fact, that if there is ever substantial economic improvement in Latin America, it will be not because of Evangelicals, but in spite of them. His conclusions may be too pessimistic, but it is nonetheless true that further Pentecostal contribution to social change is being hindered by Latin American Pentecostals themselves, in three ways: with a line drawn too sharply between the religious and the secular, with an unnecessary rejection of reason in favor of emotion, and with a theological

overemphasis on the "call to ministry" and the end of the world.

The pietistic notion that divides the religious from the secular and assigns more importance to the spirit realm over the material world has a long history. In Latin America, this pietistic view has created what I, though a Latin American Pentecostal myself, can only call a religious paranoia—by which I mean that church members place great importance solely on "religious" matters at the expense of every other activity or aspect of life. Church takes precedence over family, work, and social life. Many believe, for instance, that they perform "spiritual things" only while reading their Bibles, attending church, or praying. Everything else—studying, working, sleeping, eating—is just "secular" or "worldly." Only that music is "spiritual" or "Christian" which explicitly refers to the Bible or to Jesus.

Even money spent on charity and the family may be thought to have no spiritual basis unless explicitly given to the member's church, and there has emerged in Latin American Pentecostalism a vast overemphasis on tithing. One pastor recently declared, "10 percent of his or her income is the least a church member can give to God." Expenditures on children's education, food, business, housing, and any other legitimate expense are not perceived as being given to God.

Caio Fabio, president of the Evangelical Association of Brazil, wonders if the Latin American revival is one "in the manner of God" or if it is a revival "à la Latinoamericana." If the latter is the case, Fabio predicts, "it will die in the illusion of a superficial or inoperative evangelical joy." Fabio concludes that "we may simply become the majority in a country of immoral and miserable people, without anything changing substantially in our continent." The pattern of Pentecostals despising or at least minimizing their studies or professions and the value of their work has caused an ecclesiastical atrophy and a lack of growth beyond church activities. It has also diminished other areas of life, such as education, business, and especially politics (seen largely as Satan's domain).

The excesses of secular rationalism, with its heavy reliance on the mind and disregard for Scripture, may be ultimately to blame for Pentecostals' distrust of reason, intellectuals, doctrines, and ideologies. But sole reliance on emotion forms no adequate response. The insistence on faith-healing and becoming prosperous through prayer has led many Pentecostals to believe that the "miraculous" is the rule, and the "natural" is secondary. Personal responsibility disappears when all character flaws and sins are blamed on demons from whom one needs to be "delivered." This kind of emotionalism borders on simple superstition when used as a substitute not merely for secular rationalism, but for rationality as well.

Some months ago, a Pentecostal missionary in

Bolivia was surprised when I asked him why the curriculum for his new Ministerial Training Center did not include courses on church history. "We are training Christians to evangelize the people now," he declared. "We do not need to study church history." In the attack on rationalism, all intellectual endeavor has been abandoned together with the study of systematic theology and church history, placing even the Bible in a secondary role after "experiencing and being anointed by the Holy Spirit." In Latin American Pentecostal circles, it is common to hear such phrases as, "It doesn't matter if you know the Bible well, the important thing is to be filled by the Holy Spirit, and be led by Him." Indiscriminate acceptance of extra-biblical "revelations" and prophecies is also common.

Pentecostal preaching rightly concentrates on the message of salvation through Jesus Christ. And yet while salvation is the fundamental message of Christianity, it can create an escapist mentality if it is not matched with an awareness of our responsibilities here on earth. The emphasis on salvation—when coupled with the belief that the Second Coming is only months away or that the Rapture is immediately approaching—has caused many Pentecostals to adopt a short-term perspective on life. Why bother participating in politics, economics, or engineering? Historical events, even the celebration of Christmas, are disregarded because "Christ has been born in our hearts." If there is no future, why bother with the past? Why dedicate ourselves to such mundane pursuits as law, psychology, or even worse, philosophy?

One Pentecostal pastor, learning about my legal work on behalf of religious liberty and human life, remarked, "That is good, and I hope one day God will use you in His work." Well-known Latin American evangelists repeat over and over that they would not "lower themselves" to become presidents of a republic. The emphasis on the end of the world has added a sense of urgency to evangelism, which at least partially accounts for the rapid Pentecostal growth in Latin America—particularly when joined to the comfort it gives the poor and downtrodden in the midst of dismal economic conditions. But a constant emphasis on the end of the world can also sap the will of believers to work to improve their lot, and it may even provide a sense of vengeance at the injustices of this world.

To complicate matters, the persistent message from the pulpit stresses the importance of being "called" by God to the "full-time ministry" or "five-fold ministry." The only people who are really doing God's work and pleasing Him are evangelists, pastors, teachers, prophets, and apostles. Such non-ministers as carpenters, housewives, doctors, and politicians, when they become Pentecostals, risk being second-class citizens in the Kingdom of God. Since they are not measuring up to what God wants from them, their only hope is one day to become ministers.

In the meantime, and if they want to at least partially redeem their professional skills or trades, they must use them “as a tool” for evangelism. Studies, professions, and trades are good only to the extent that they allow the preaching of the gospel in secular places.

The great and ongoing religious revival in Latin America gives Pentecostals (and Evangelicals in general) an unparalleled opportunity to transform the continent in all areas of life. But this enormous spiritual energy could be spent in individual and religious self-gratification if it is not directed properly towards society. The leaders of Pentecostalism in Latin America have good intentions, much zeal for God, and a passion for evangelism. They must consider carefully, however, the fact that they may be helping to breed a generation of frustrated and mediocre students and professionals. “It does not matter that I had poor results in this academic period, as long as I led some people to the Lord” becomes the resulting attitude among Pentecostal students.

There are examples of Pentecostal leaders who have begun to address these problems. Over the last few years, El Verbo, a large Pentecostal church in Guatemala, has been training leaders to see every area of life as part of God’s Kingdom, with the Bible not dividing the religious from the secular, but ordaining that everything done be done for the Lord. Many of its members have become involved in politics—including General Efraín Ríos Montt, a former president of the republic. Some time ago I had the satisfaction of witnessing the weekly meeting of Pentecostal pastors in La Paz, Bolivia incorporating a Presbyterian pastor to train them in systematic theology. Pastor Rodolfo Sáenz Salas, until recently president of the Assemblies of God Church in Costa Rica, declared, “We need to convert our work into service to God. The quality of our work, whatever it is, will reflect what we are as people.”

There have been other positive initiatives in the educational and political realms. A dozen evangelical universities have been established, concentrating largely on religious studies. Several political parties led by Pentecostals have sprung up recently, and one Pentecostal president, Jorge Serrano, was democratically elected for a term in Guatemala. A few Pente-

costals have also taken a higher profile in the military, the financial world, and the social realm.

This kind of participation, however, is a delicate plant. It can bring about serious and bitter intra-faith divisions (there are four Evangelical political parties in Guatemala, three in Colombia). And it can even have a self-defeating result. President Serrano’s fall in Guatemala in 1993 and a botched Evangelical insertion into Peruvian politics with President Alberto Fujimori have given renewed strength to the “politics is of the devil” mentality.

Pentecostals alone will not be able to have a transforming impact. It is essential that Pentecostals work together with all Latin American Christians. The union of Pentecostal energy with other Protestants’ theological training, knowledge of church history, and emphasis on character building would make any social effort all the more effective—particularly when it seeks as well the active participation of God-fearing Catholics.

We Pentecostals must remember that God usually works through His creation, and the times He chooses to intervene miraculously are exceptional and should not be taken as a substitute for our clearly ordained duties and responsibilities. (In fact, the frequent disappointment that results when miraculous expectations are not met is one of the main causes for the abandonment of the faith.) Similarly, while proper encouragement should be given to members considering ecclesiastical ministry, the same kind of encouragement should be given to all members as they exercise their daily occupations. There is also need to balance the preaching of the imminent coming of Christ or the Rapture with an understanding that Christ in fact might delay.

Timothy Goodman’s questioning of the real contribution of evangelicalism to economic and social development is understandable. There is no automatic correlation of evangelical growth with economic and social advancement. At the least, it will require that we Pentecostals see all areas of society, not just the church, as part of God’s Kingdom; that our emotions be balanced and enriched by reason; that we see ourselves as ministers of God in all that we do; and that while anticipating Christ’s prompt return, we are prepared for the long run. ^{ET}

Catholicism and the Bible: An Interview with Albert Vanhoye

Peter Williamson

Father Albert Vanhoye recently began his second five-year term as Secretary of the Pontifical Biblical Commission. In this interview with Catholic writer and lay theologian Peter Williamson, given in Rome on January 14, 1997, Vanhoye reflects upon key issues in Catholic interpretation of Scripture.

—The Editors.

The major accomplishment of your first term of service was the publication by the Biblical Commission of "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church" in 1993, with the English version appearing in 1994. How was that document received?

In general it has been very favorably received. I have been gratified to see multiple editions appear in various languages, often accompanied by useful introductions, responses, or commentary, such as Father Joseph Fitzmyer's ample and careful commentary, which appears in one of the English editions.

Reviews have also been quite positive. A Protestant reviewer wrote that the document could not have been "more timely" and that "Protestants should identify profoundly with the appeal of the Pontifical Biblical Commission boldly to reaffirm the Church's hermeneutical prerogatives." A Jewish scholar wrote that it is "a document of great value to both Catholic and non-Catholic interpreters of the Bible" and a "remarkably open and learned report." Of course, critical opinions have also been expressed. One Protestant reviewer wrote that this document was too traditional and too committed to obedience to the magisterium. Yet on the whole the document has enjoyed a very favorable reception.

What was the Pope's response?

The Pope was very interested in the preparation

of "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church." He took the penultimate draft with him when he traveled to Africa in December 1992. He read it carefully and made a few observations which were communicated to me. When the Holy Father formally received the document from the Biblical Commission in an audience before the Cardinals and Diplomatic Corps, he expressed a very positive personal evaluation. He praised its "spirit of openness . . . its balance and moderation" and stressed his agreement with the Commission that "the biblical word is at work speaking universally in time and space to all humanity."

A few years ago, Cardinal Ratzinger, who is the President of the Biblical Commission, expressed some severe criticisms of contemporary biblical scholarship. Was he very active in the development of the document?

In New York in 1988 Cardinal Ratzinger spoke at a conference on the topic of "Biblical Interpretation in Crisis." In that talk he strongly criticized form criticism as practiced by Rudolf Bultmann and Martin Dibelius, and he argued that form criticism had been built upon philosophical positions contrary to the faith of the Church. But it was not the Cardinal who suggested the topic of the Commission's document. Cardinal Ratzinger was always present in our discussions except when he had a conflicting commitment, but he was admirably discreet, not insisting on his criticism. We were completely free to discuss our perspectives on the historical-critical method. We responded to his concerns by indicating that, in its essence, the historical-critical method is not tied to the a priori assumptions of Bultmann and Dibelius, and that it is necessary to employ this method in a manner that liberates it from any a priori assumption that would be contrary to the faith of the Church.

There is a widespread perception that contemporary Scripture scholarship has become an exclusively historical or literary discipline, with little concern for the meaning of the Bible for believers today. Is this a real problem or only a mistaken perception?

It is a real problem, not a mistaken perception. In the legitimate desire to be scientific there is a tendency among scholars to study the Bible without paying attention to its religious message, seeking only to clarify, for instance, the historical context or the stages of the formation of a text. But the Bible is a collection of religious writings. If one does not explain the religious meaning of a biblical writing, one has not explained the text adequately. Of course the nature of this religious content varies, and in certain historical books, for example, it may not be obvious. Nevertheless, the religious meaning of the Bible is always present, and it is the indispensable task of exegesis to discover and communicate it.

The Commission also insisted that the Bible must be explained in its unity, with attention to the relations between the various books of the Bible. The unity of the Bible is animated by a strong and marvelous religious impulse that is capable of inspiring every believer. Finally, the Commission was concerned to show how exegesis must influence every dimension of the Church's life and how attention must be paid to actualizing the biblical message.

One of the themes of the document that provoked intense interest by some commentators was the section on Actualization, which is a new term in Church documents on Scripture. What is the significance of the term?

To actualize Scripture means to bring the word of God into the present. The word of God as we find it written in the Bible stands at a certain distance in time from our daily life, from our culture, from our concerns, etc. But the Bible as the word of God is intended to reach every human person in his concrete present existence. So actualization means to make present and accessible to people today the meaning of the word of God written in the Bible.

The task of scientific exegesis itself is not to actualize the text, but to prepare for actualization. Actualization is a pastoral task. But scientific exegesis must keep in view the ultimate goal of actualization in order to be faithful to the orientation implicit in the written word of God. Actualization transfers the word of God from its ancient context to the present context. This is not easy, and the document explains how it should be done, seeking first the meaning of the words in their original contexts, and, after the historical meaning is understood, to find the points that can be actualized in the life of the believer and of the Christian community.

Despite its openness to other approaches, the Commission's document strongly reaffirms the importance of the historical-critical method. Why is the historical meaning of the text so important?

The historical meaning of the text is important precisely because God has manifested himself in history. The Bible is not a collection of philosophical or theological treatises, nor does it present us with a set of eternal truths expressed in propositions. Instead, more than anything else, the Bible recounts the initiative of God to enter into relationship with human beings in our history. For this reason it is necessary to pay attention to the historical circumstances of the word of God and to use our knowledge of the historical context to illuminate it. Only if we make this effort can we accurately transfer the word of God into contemporary life.

Some scholars such as Harvard's Jon D. Levenson [see FIRST THINGS, August/September 1994—eds.] have disagreed with the Commission that it is possible to embrace the historical-critical method and maintain an interpretation of the Bible that is consistent with a doctrinal tradition.

According to Levenson, the lingua franca of the scientific exegetical community "has long been historicism and naturalism, that is, philosophical positions averse to the monotheistic traditions and biased toward secularity." He suggests that "if the transcendent dimension of the text is to be upheld without suppressing the human, historical dimension" it is necessary to abandon that lingua franca of historicism and naturalism. This suggestion agrees with the Biblical Commission document. Levenson goes on to urge that means be found to pursue "biblical scholarship on public grounds, that is, on grounds that are pluralistic," and he states that on this issue "the Commission offers no help." As a matter of fact, the members of the Commission were not able to discuss that point. We only insisted on the proper context in which every page of the Bible must be read. It is a context of religious faith—whether the Jewish tradition of the Hebrew Bible, or the Christian tradition of reading the Old Testament and New Testament together.

Some exegetes have sought to escape the limitations of an exclusively historical reading of the text by reference to the tradition of the "spiritual sense." Others have contested this approach, considering it eisegesis [reading into a text], and have insisted on the priority of the literal sense understood as the meaning intended by the human author.

There is a temptation to escape the limitations of an exclusively historical reading by resorting to a "spiritual sense" that has no relationship to a histori-

cal reading of the text. To yield to this temptation would be eisegesis and would not be sound interpretation. The Biblical Commission insisted upon the relation between the spiritual and literal senses. We emphasized several times in the document that the meaning of a biblical text is not closed, and that instead, in many cases, the meaning of a text is like a direction which is given, and in that direction it is possible to go further and further. This dynamic character of biblical texts is evident from the "re-reading" of many texts within the Bible itself. So, the spiritual sense proceeds in the direction given by the literal sense of the text, but without stopping at the first level of meaning.

For example, Old Testament texts assume a deeper meaning in view of the paschal event. The death and resurrection of Jesus have established a radically new historical context which sheds fresh light upon the ancient texts and causes them to undergo a change in meaning. The spiritual sense is the meaning of the Bible, especially the Old Testament, when it is read in the context of the paschal mystery. This is a real context, not an imaginative romantic context. While every text has an original meaning, when it appears in this new real context its open-endedness becomes apparent. The remedy to the tendency to limit the meaning of the Bible to an exclusively historical reading is not to abandon the historical meaning but to be conscious of the openness of the text.

The Commission seems to agree with canonical criticism that the final form of the text read in light of the entire Canon of Scripture and in light of the believing community is what really matters. This would seem to diminish the importance of source criticism except insofar as it sheds light on the meaning of the final text.

I agree entirely. I would be happy to see the attention given to source criticism decrease. Some exegetes give the impression that for them exegesis consists only in distinguishing different sources behind a biblical text. They multiply sources, sometimes finding as many as ten strata in the composition of a text. This sort of work can be useful but is not sufficient. It can be useful because it gives a more lively consciousness of the historical elaboration of the biblical texts. But we must admit that what we say about sources and strata are only hypotheses. Another scholar who studies the same text will distinguish other sources, different strata. It is always necessary in the end to return to the final text and the Canon, which is the real thing. Scholarly studies are genuinely useful for the faith and life of the Church only insofar as they illuminate the problems of the final text.

The document offers a more theological description of the role of an exegete than many expected, arguing,

for example, that those who would provide an exegesis should "explain the Christological, canonical, and ecclesial meanings of the biblical texts." Might this emphasis on the theological dimension warrant some adjustment in the training of Catholic exegetes to equip them to integrate theological perspectives?

Yes, this sentence is important and points in that direction. The Commission took this position because it took seriously the difficulty mentioned in the introduction of the document, namely, that there exists a type of exegesis that remains the exclusive domain of a small number of specialists, and that lacks a vital or fruitful relationship with the people of God. For this reason the Commission insisted on an orientation that must be consistent: all the steps in exegetical work must aim at understanding more deeply the religious meaning of the biblical text, since this is its principal meaning. If an exegete does his work well, he prepares the way for actualizing the text, because he brings to light the true meaning of the text, yielding a more profound and complete understanding of the word of God, communicated centuries ago, but always capable of inspiring and shaping the lives of men and women.

Exegetes need to explain the Christological meaning of the biblical text because in the faith of the Church, the Bible—the whole Bible—speaks about Christ and every text of the Bible finds its definitive meaning in its relationship with Christ. In turn, the canonical meaning protects against an interpretation that is too restricted or that grants too little attention to essential values. The canonical sense also can correct possible distortions, because in the Bible we find complementary truths expressed. Some texts seem contradictory, but when we reflect more closely we see that they are not contradictory, but rather are expressions from two diverse points of view that are both necessary for the apprehension of the truth.

An example would be the justification apart from works in St. Paul and the justification with works in St. James. This, in appearance, is a contradiction. But if we look at the texts more closely we see there is no contradiction, since St. James speaks of justification by works of faith. On this point Paul is in complete agreement with James, even if he does not express himself the same way. For St. Paul, the faith that counts is the faith that works through love. This example illustrates apparent contradictions in the Bible that can stimulate theological reflection and are important because they help us avoid perspectives that might otherwise be one-sided.

Beginning from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, which affirms "the impossibility of interpreting any text without starting from a 'pre-understanding' of one type or another," the Commission declares that Catholic exegesis "deliberately

places itself within the living tradition of the Church, whose first concern is fidelity to the revelation attested by the Bible." How is this kind of a priori commitment consistent with scientific objectivity in exegesis?

It is the kind of a priori commitment that is necessary because it is impossible to understand the text without some kind of pre-comprehension. To understand a sentence said in English it is necessary to know the meaning of the English words. To understand a text it is necessary to have some idea of the concepts expressed in the text. So, when the Commission says that the historical-critical method may be practiced without any a priori assumption, we meant that the method is not necessarily tied to the particular assumptions of the Bultmann school that reduce the content of Scripture to an anthropological message. But we do not deny that some position is necessary to be able to understand the text, and we emphasize that the most appropriate pre-understanding is one that stands in continuity with the biblical text, namely, the pre-understanding of the living tradition of the Church. If we attempt to read the Bible with materialistic presuppositions as our pre-understanding, we exclude in advance its primary message.

Of course, there is the danger of reading into the Bible opinions or positions that are developments of the tradition and do not exactly reflect the meaning of the text. The document expressed a concern to defend exegesis against this danger of attributing to the text developments that occurred subsequently in the tradition. This is a danger to which precritical exegesis frequently succumbed. It was common to read into the text later conciliar definitions. But today this is not a common problem, although there may always be the tendency to read into the text present theological positions instead of distinguishing the various stages in the handing on of revelation.

How do the principles of "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church" apply to Catholics who teach or publish in non-Catholic academic settings or in other ways do exegesis that requires a non-confessional starting point? One thinks of Father John Meier's The Marginal Jew, which attempts to affirm only the facts about the historical Jesus with which a Catholic, Protestant, Jew, and agnostic could agree. Should one distinguish Church exegesis from academic exegesis?

Some distinctions are necessary. One cannot express one's faith in secular academic settings with the same liberty that one can before a Catholic audience. But, in the end, there is not a difference. The Catholic scholar must approach his work with the utmost scientific rigor, seeking to know what the Bible says, what its various authors intended to communicate, and to

explain the texts accurately and thoroughly.

The distinction that I would make would be between exegesis, properly speaking, and the use of biblical texts for historical purposes. In my opinion, *The Marginal Jew* is not an exegetical work but a work of historical research. Fr. Meier adopts as his method finding data in biblical texts and other historical sources, then analyzing and assembling the facts in a way that would be convincing to a Catholic, Protestant, Jew, and agnostic regarding their historicity. This may overlap with what exegesis does, but its main result is to produce a history that conforms to the current requirements of historical science.

Exegesis, on the other hand, seeks to illumine the total content of the text, not just which details are historical or nonhistorical. Exegesis emphasizes the content of faith, divine revelation, and the invitation to a renewed existence that is at the heart of the biblical text. The larger picture that the biblical text seeks to communicate concerns a religious message and not historical facticity. Naturally, for the essential facts, such as the crucifixion of Jesus, the texts render testimony that is very strong, and they intend precisely to affirm the facticity of this event. Similarly, the texts clearly affirm the facticity of the Resurrection on the basis of testimony. But for many other details—one sees, for example, the minor differences among the Gospels—historicity is not really the important thing. The important thing is the overall picture and the message it communicates.

Some have interpreted "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church" as a vigorous defense of the historical-critical method by its leading exponents.

It is true that there was a concern, especially on the part of some members of the Biblical Commission, to defend the historical-critical method against excessively radical criticisms that were denying its validity. It is therefore not surprising that in some passages of the document one can see this posture of defense.

The Commission, however, also wished to open up perspectives, to enlarge the horizons of exegesis, and was therefore unwilling that the historical-critical method have a monopoly in the interpretation of the Bible. So we summarized various methods and approaches currently being practiced, wishing to show that these can yield insights and make a contribution that the historical-critical method could not achieve by itself. So the various methods and approaches are complementary. Indeed, the document as a whole "redimensions" the position and function of the historical-critical method, affirming its value, but denying its sufficiency.

Father Avery Dulles has noted that in quoting Dei Verbum (para. 11) the Biblical Commission omitted key phrases affirming the inerrancy of Scripture,

including the line "everything that the inspired authors or sacred writers assert must be held to be asserted by the Holy Spirit." He wonders whether the Biblical Commission is "deliberately backing away from even a moderate and nuanced doctrine of biblical inerrancy."

The Biblical Commission decided not to study the theology of inspiration. It states this at the beginning of the document. To do so would have been to enter into another field of study—very demanding in its own right—for which we are less well prepared. It belongs to systematic theology to seek to clarify the concept of inspiration in its diverse modalities. Similarly, we did not wish to enter into a discussion regarding the precise meaning of inerrancy. If we did not cite the entire paragraph of *Dei Verbum* it was solely because it sufficed to cite a few words to make the point and it was not necessary to quote the entire passage. It would be a useful task to review the doctrines of inspiration and inerrancy in light of the progress of biblical sciences in order to define with greater precision issues that are obviously of fundamental importance for the Christian reading of the Bible.

The Scripture scholars who participate in the Jesus Seminar claim that objective historical study of the texts leads them to deny the reliability of the Gospel accounts of Jesus, and particularly, of His Resurrection. How should Catholic scholars respond to this challenge?

In my opinion this is an example of historical research that is far from exegesis, operating according to principles that are agnostic or opposed to Christian faith. It therefore leads to negations founded not on the texts but on a priori positions. Naturally it is possible to analyze the accounts of the appearances of Christ after the Resurrection and to show that they are not perfectly consistent. But the Resurrection is affirmed very forcefully on the basis of testimony. What is important is not the details of the accounts, but the strength of the testimony taken as a whole. On this point, we have one of the oldest texts of the New Testament, 1 Corinthians 15:1-8, which gives a list of witnesses to the Resurrection. Furthermore, all the other texts also attest to the Resurrection of Jesus. So it is only with presuppositions and a method that is "naturalistic and historicist," to use Levenson's words, that one can derive from the biblical texts negations that directly contradict essential affirmations of all of the New Testament. That this is history, in any acceptable sense, I sincerely doubt.

Can you say something about the role of the Holy Spirit in our reading and interpreting the Bible?

I would say that the Spirit's part is to put us into

personal and living contact with God by means of the written word. A scholar who simply analyzes the text might discover its meaning but lack the contact with God that renders the biblical word truly present, truly efficacious. But the Holy Spirit opens our eyes to see the deeper meaning, the religious message, that is found in the text. At the same time the Spirit causes us to realize that this message is personally directed to us who read or who hear the word read, and that it has to do not so much with the past as with the present, with the meaning of our existence today.

The Holy Spirit also communicates the ecclesial meaning of the text, that is, the Spirit makes us realize that this biblical text forms part of a continuing dialog between Christ and His Church, and we are involved in that dialog. This makes an enormous difference. The text ceases to be an object, but becomes a living mediation that deepens and sheds light on our relationship with God, which even communicates to us the power of doing what the text proposes. In this way the Bible becomes something truly alive and life-giving.

What is the next topic the Biblical Commission will consider?

For the next five-year period we will be reflecting on the relationship between the Old Testament and the New Testament, particularly as it bears on the relationship between Jews and Christians. This is an immense topic, and we cannot treat all its dimensions in five years of annual week-long meetings, so we will have to limit our task. It is always timely to make Christians more aware that our New Testament is rooted in the Old Testament, and that the life of the Church is rooted in the life of the people of Israel. In addition, it seems a good time to give some orientations, to make clear that the texts of the New Testament must not be used to further anti-Semitism. On the contrary, the New Testament can provide a basis for promoting positive relationships between Jews and Christians.

In Tertio Millennio Adveniente, the Holy Father has encouraged the Church to answer the call of Dei Verbum to make Scripture "the soul of theology and the inspiration of the whole of Christian living." How do we respond to the Pope's exhortation?

For exegetes the first task is to remember that Scripture is the soul of theology. With this awareness, one cannot limit one's study of the biblical word to research that is exclusively historical or literary. It is necessary to get to the heart of the matter, to express the religious meaning of the text. If exegesis does not do this, theology cannot take Scripture as the soul of theology, since there would exist no proportion or affinity between the results of exegesis and

the task of theological systematization.

For theologians the task is to give to the biblical texts the fundamental place owed them, and to stay current with exegetical research in its principal findings. Theologians already do this. One no longer finds theological exposition that takes only a few texts of the Bible out of context to prove a theological thesis. Theologians are aware that the Bible is a historical revelation, that each text must be studied in its specific context along with attention to its place in Scripture as a whole.

In order to make Scripture “the inspiration of the whole of Christian living,” it seems to me that the highest priority must be what has traditionally been called *lectio divina*, an attentive reading of the biblical texts accompanied by reflection, meditation,

prayer, and contemplation. A few years ago Cardinal Martini showed how attractive and powerful this practice can be when he introduced it in the cathedral of Milan, filled time and again with young people who gathered for these encounters. During a long vigil the Cardinal would read the word, allow time for meditation, and then reflect on the text before the assembly. Songs and prayers were interspersed throughout the evening. In this way all the audience was helped to taste the word of God, to understand it, to relish it, and above all, to let it enter their hearts so that it might transform their daily lives. *Lectio divina* can be done individually, in small groups, or in large gatherings, and it seems to me one of the principal means of making Scripture “the inspiration of the whole of Christian living.” F

Fiat Rex

There being neither bangled dancers
swirling cloth-of-gold and green
nor golden peacocks set in trees
above the marble garden ponds,
we are assured we are no king.

O, but were I king I would command
my flautists out upon the porch
and golden bowls of tamarinds
and pomegranate seeds in ice
set down within my reach.

Or I would welcome envoys from the east
with feasting and a holiday,
rise to declare our love for peace
and whisper orders to proceed.
It's well I do not rule this place

for I would teach the crowded lands
that peace is war in shepherd's dress.
And I would lead great armies south,
and at the Ganges cry aloud
for other worlds that I might win.

How many died that day in Itaban?
I can't remember but my sword
was black with blood and we won through.
I saw a jackal gnaw a hand
and ordered all the bodies burned.

Now I grow cold and get no heat
from charcoal fires in the spring.
What did it gain? My son is dead,
and men put paper in between
my word and deed, and speak of laws,

and I'm an old and heirless king.
I see them smile and look away.
I'll teach them that the old hand still—
I'll summon guards—Antíloches—
no, he's dead these ten years gone;

I do not know if guards will come.
Let Strake and Tolma make their plans
to take this kingdom when I'm done.
It is enough their fathers stood
beside me while we battled worlds.

I wonder if their ghosts still laugh
at how we broke the Hittites like a dam
and poured our armies on the east.
From the porch, the ivory flutes
ring echoes in the colonnades;

a golden bird's gold feathers trail
down to touch the marble pond.
It's good to sit here and recall,
an old king resting in the sun,
though all the swirling dancers know

we are no king at all.

J. Bottum

Begetting and Cloning

Gilbert Meilaender

(The following remarks were presented to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission on March 13, 1997.)

I have been invited, as I understand it, to speak today specifically as a Protestant theologian. I have tried to take that charge seriously, and I have chosen my concerns accordingly. I do not suppose, therefore, that the issues I address are the only issues to which you ought to give your attention. Thus, for example, I will not address the question of whether we could rightly conduct the first experiments in human cloning, given the likelihood that such experiments would not at first fully succeed. That is an important moral question, but I will not take it up. Nor do I suppose that I can represent Protestants generally. There is no such beast. Indeed, Protestants are specialists in the art of fragmentation. In my own tradition, which is Lutheran, we commonly understand ourselves as quite content to be Catholic except when, on certain questions, we are compelled to disagree. Other Protestants might think of themselves differently.

More important, however, is this point: Attempting to take my charge seriously, I will speak theologically—not just in the standard language of bioethics or public policy. I do not think of this, however, simply as an opportunity for the “Protestant interest group” to weigh in at your deliberations. On the contrary, this theological language has sought to uncover what is universal and human. It begins epistemologically from a particular place, but it opens up ontologically a vision of the human. The unease about human cloning that I will express is widely shared. I aim to get at some of the theological underpinnings of that unease in language that may seem unfamiliar or even unwelcome, but it is language

that is grounded in important Christian affirmations that seek to understand the child as our equal—one who is a gift and not a product. In any case, I will do you the honor of assuming that you are interested in hearing what those who speak such a language have to say, and I will also suppose that a faith which seeks understanding may sometimes find it.

Lacking an accepted teaching office within the church, Protestants had to find some way to provide authoritative moral guidance. They turned from the authority of the church as interpreter of Scripture to the biblical texts themselves. That characteristic Protestant move is not likely, of course, to provide any very immediate guidance on a subject such as human cloning. But it does teach something about the connection of marriage and parenthood. The creation story in the first chapter of Genesis depicts the creation of humankind as male and female, sexually differentiated and enjoined by God’s grace to sustain human life through procreation.

Hence, there is given in creation a connection between the differentiation of the sexes and the begetting of a child. We begin with that connection, making our way indirectly toward the subject of cloning. It is from the vantage point of this connection that our theological tradition has addressed two questions that are both profound and mysterious in their simplicity: What is the meaning of a child? And what is good for a child? These questions are, as you know, at the heart of many problems in our society today, and it is against the background of such questions that I want to reflect upon the significance of human cloning. What Protestants found in the Bible was a normative view: namely, that the sexual differentiation is ordered toward the creation of offspring, and children should be conceived within the marital union. By God’s grace the child is a gift who springs from the giving and receiving of love. Marriage and parenthood are connected—held together in a basic

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form of humanity.

To this depiction of the connection between sexual differentiation and child-bearing as normative, it is, as Anglican theologian Oliver O'Donovan has argued, possible to respond in different ways. We may welcome the connection and find in it humane wisdom to guide our conduct. We may resent it as a limit to our freedom and seek to transcend it. We did not need modern scientific breakthroughs to know that it is possible—and sometimes seemingly desirable—to sever the connection between marriage and begetting children. The possibility of human cloning is striking only because it breaks the connection so emphatically. It aims directly at the heart of the mystery that is a child. Part of the mystery here is that we will always be hard-pressed to explain why the connection of sexual differentiation and procreation should not be broken. Precisely to the degree that it is a basic form of humanity, it will be hard to give more fundamental reasons why the connection should be welcomed and honored when, in our freedom, we need not do so. But moral argument must begin somewhere. To see through everything is, as C. S. Lewis once put it, the same as not to see at all.

If we cannot argue to this starting point, however, we can argue from it. If we cannot entirely explain the mystery, we can explicate it. And the explication comes from two angles. Maintaining the connection between procreation and the sexual relationship of a man and woman is good both for that relationship and for children.

It is good, first, for the relation of the man and woman. No doubt the motives of those who beget children coitally are often mixed, and they may be uncertain about the full significance of what they do. But if they are willing to shape their intentions in accord with the norm I have outlined, they may be freed from self-absorption. The act of love is not simply a personal project undertaken to satisfy one's own needs, and procreation, as the fruit of coitus, reminds us of that. Even when the relation of a man and woman does not or cannot give rise to offspring, they can understand their embrace as more than their personal project in the world, as their participation in a form of life that carries its own inner meaning and has its telos established in the creation. The meaning of what we do then is not determined simply by our desire or will. As Oliver O'Donovan has noted, some understanding like this is needed if the sexual relation of a man and woman is to be more than "simply a profound form of play."

And when the sexual act becomes only a personal project, so does the child. No longer then is the bearing and rearing of children thought of as a task we should take up or as a return we make for the gift of life; instead, it is a project we undertake if it promises to meet our needs and desires. Those people—both learned commentators and ordinary folk—who in

recent days have described cloning as narcissistic or as replication of one's self see something important. Even if we grant that a clone, reared in different circumstances than its immediate ancestor, might turn out to be quite a different person in some respects, the point of that person's existence would be grounded in our will and desire.

Hence, retaining the tie that unites procreation with the sexual relation of a man and woman is also good for children. Even when a man and woman deeply desire a child, the act of love itself cannot take the child as its primary object. They must give themselves to each other, setting aside their projects, and the child becomes the natural fruition of their shared love—something quite different from a chosen project. The child is therefore always a gift—one like them who springs from their embrace, not a being whom they have made and whose destiny they should determine. This is light years away from the notion that we all have a right to have children—in whatever way we see fit, whenever it serves our purposes. Our children begin with a kind of genetic independence of us, their parents. They replicate neither their father nor their mother. That is a reminder of the independence that we must eventually grant to them and for which it is our duty to prepare them. To lose, even in principle, this sense of the child as a gift entrusted to us will not be good for children.

I will press this point still further by making one more theological move. When Christians tried to tell the story of Jesus as they found it in their Scriptures, they were driven to some rather complex formulations. They wanted to say that Jesus was truly one with that God whom he called Father, lest it should seem that what he had accomplished did not really overcome the gulf that separates us from God. Thus, while distinguishing the persons of Father and Son, they wanted to say that Jesus is truly God—of one being with the Father. And the language in which they did this (in the fourth-century Nicene Creed, one of the two most important creeds that antedate the division of the church in the West at the Reformation) is language which describes the Son of the Father as "begotten, not made." Oliver O'Donovan has noted that this distinction between making and begetting, crucial for Christians' understanding of God, carries considerable moral significance.

What the language of the Nicene Creed wanted to say was that the Son is God just as the Father is God. It was intended to assert an equality of being. And for that what was needed was a language other than the language of making. What we beget is like ourselves. What we make is not; it is the product of our free decision, and its destiny is ours to determine. Of course, on this Christian understanding human beings are not begotten in the absolute sense that the Son is said to be begotten of the Father. They are made—but made by God through human begetting.

Hence, although we are not God's equal, we are of equal dignity with each other. And we are not at each other's disposal. If it is, in fact, human begetting that expresses our equal dignity, we should not lightly set it aside in a manner as decisive as cloning.

I am well aware, of course, that other advances in what we are pleased to call reproductive technology have already strained the connection between the sexual relationship of a man and woman and the birth of a child. Clearly, procreation has to some extent become reproduction, making rather than doing. I am far from thinking that all this has been done well or wisely, and sometimes we may only come to understand the nature of the road we are on when we have already traveled fairly far along it. But whatever we say of that, surely human cloning would be a new and decisive turn on this road—far more emphatically a kind of production, far less a surrender to the mystery of the genetic lottery which is the mystery of the child who replicates neither father nor mother but incarnates their union, far more an understanding of the child as a product of human will.

I am also aware that we can all imagine circumstances in which we ourselves might—were the technology available—be tempted to turn to cloning. Parents who lose a young child in an accident and want to “replace” her. A seriously ill person in need of embryonic stem cells to repair damaged tissue. A person in need of organs for transplant. A person who is infertile and wants, in some sense, to reproduce. Once the child becomes a project or product, such temptations become almost irresistible. There is no end of good causes in the world, and they would sorely tempt us even if we did not live in a society for which the pursuit of health has become a god, justifying almost anything.

As theologian and bioethicist William F. May has often noted, we are preoccupied with death and the destructive powers of our world. But without in any way glorifying suffering or pretending that it is not

evil, Christians worship a God who wills to be with us in our dependence, teaching us “attentiveness before a good and nurturant God.” We learn therefore that what matters is how we live, not only how long—that we are responsible to do as much good as we can, but this means, as much as we can within the limits morality sets for us.

I am also aware, finally, that we might for now approve human cloning but only in restricted circumstances—as, for example, the cloning of preimplantation embryos (up to fourteen days) for experimental use. That would, of course, mean the creation solely for purposes of research of human embryos—human subjects who are not really best described as preimplantation embryos. They are unimplanted embryos—a locution that makes clear the extent to which their being and destiny are the product of human will alone. If we are genuinely baffled about how best to describe the moral status of that human subject who is the unimplanted embryo, we should not go forward in a way that peculiarly combines metaphysical bewilderment with practical certitude by approving even such limited cloning for experimental purposes.

Protestants are often pictured—erroneously in many respects—as stout defenders of human freedom. But whatever the accuracy of that depiction, they have not had in mind a freedom without limit, without even the limit that is God. They have not located the dignity of human beings in a self-modifying freedom that knows no limit and that need never respect a limit which it can, in principle, transgress. It is the meaning of the child—offspring of a man and woman, but a replication of neither; their offspring, but not their product whose meaning and destiny they might determine—that, I think, constitutes such a limit to our freedom to make and remake ourselves. In the face of that mystery I hope that your Commission will remember that “progress” is always an optional goal in which nothing of the sacred inheres. ^[F]

In the Case of Bruno Bettelheim

Molly Finn

THE CREATION OF DR. B: A BIOGRAPHY OF BRUNO BETTELHEIM. By RICHARD POLLAK. *Simon & Schuster*. 478 pp. \$28.

BETTELHEIM: A LIFE AND A LEGACY. By NINA SUTTON. *Basic Books*. 606 pp. \$35.

When Bruno Bettelheim committed suicide in 1990 at the age of 86 he had a towering and broadly based reputation: as a wise and humane child psychiatrist in whose Orthogenic School at the University of Chicago hundreds of severely disturbed children had been restored to normal life, as an expert on child-rearing in the Israeli kibbutzim, as a survivor of Buchenwald and Dachau whose writings had established him as an authority on life in the concentration camps, and as a specialist in the treatment of autistic children. Within weeks of his death, however, this reputation appeared to be in danger. Former students accused him in print of having created an atmosphere of terror in the famous school. Scholars accused him of plagiarism, and stories of falsified credentials and shoddy research emerged from several sources. The rise and decline of this remarkable reputation is now the subject of two major studies.

In a frank and moving prologue to his splendid biography, Richard Pollak gives an account of his one meeting with Bruno Bettelheim. In 1969 Pollak sought an interview with Bettelheim because he wanted to learn more about his brother Stephen, who had been a student at Bettelheim's famous home for emotionally troubled children. Stephen lived at the school from 1943 until his death in an accident in 1948.

During his encounter with Bettelheim, Pollak heard his father dismissed as a crude schlemiel, his mother vilified "with astonishing anger," described

as the cause of all his brother's problems and scorned as a "Jewish mother." He endured Bettelheim's categorical insistence that Stephen had committed suicide despite Pollak's assertion that he had been present and knew the death to have been an accident. He was stunned by the ferocity of Bettelheim's anger and antagonism and understood for the first time why his mother had complained that Bettelheim hated parents. He had always thought his mother's complaints hyperbolic; now he saw that she had understated Bettelheim's hostility. As a ground rule, Bettelheim demanded a promise that Pollak would not discuss the session with his parents, ensuring that Pollak could not compare notes with them or seek to verify or disprove any of his claims. Thus, in the course of this brief conversation, Pollak was confronted with several aspects of Bettelheim's character and personality that he would later learn much more about: secrecy and concealment, angry and cruel accusation, anti-Semitism, and lying.

Pollak went home from this interview and wrote a detailed account he has used almost thirty years later as an introduction to *The Creation of Dr. B.*, the biography he undertook shortly before Bettelheim's death when he began reading and rereading Bettelheim's books and discovered that Stephen's suicide was not the only thing about which Bettelheim had lied. Shortly after Pollak began his research, Bettelheim committed suicide. The storm of accusations following his death convinced Pollak that there was an interesting story beneath the surface, and before long he was embarked on a project of discovery that ultimately led to this definitive exposure of Bettelheim as a charlatan whose life was based on falsehood and self-aggrandizement.

Pollak says he hopes to keep his personal experience with Bettelheim "from unfairly darkening my portrait." I think his experience has, in fact, illuminated his perception and provides a sharp reminder that we must hold ourselves—and each other—

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accountable for our acts. My own experience provides, I hope, similar illumination. I am the mother of an autistic daughter and have considered Bettelheim a charlatan since *The Empty Fortress*, his celebrated study of autism, came out in 1967. I have nothing personal against Bettelheim, if it is not personal to resent being compared to a devouring witch, an infanticidal king, and an SS guard in a concentration camp, or to wonder what could be the basis of Bettelheim's statement that "the precipitating factor in infantile autism is the parent's wish that his child should not exist." Like most parents of autistic children, I cherish my daughter. Later in his life, in one of the last pieces he wrote on Nazism, Bettelheim was to make an even more extreme judgment. He quotes *Todesfuge*, Paul Celan's poem about the death camps, with its famous description of "black milk."

Black milk of dawn we drink it at dusk
we drink it at noon and at daybreak we drink it
at night

Black milk of dawn we drink you at night
We drink you at noon death is a master from
Germany.

Most critics have interpreted "black milk" as clouds of smoke issuing from the crematoria. But Bettelheim declares: "When one is forced to drink black milk from dawn to dusk, whether in the death camps of Nazi Germany or while lying in a possibly luxurious crib, but there subjected to the unconscious death wishes of what overtly may be a conscientious mother—in either situation a living soul has death for a master."

It was not hard for me to tell that the claims of success in treating autism that Bettelheim made for himself in *The Empty Fortress* were ludicrous. Almost any parent of an autistic child could tell that most of the "autistic" children he claimed to have treated were not autistic. Autistic children have highly recognizable characteristics, even though they may not always be easy to describe. Infantile autism was first recognized as a syndrome and named by Leo Kanner, a child psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins, in 1943. The main features identified in Kanner's description are a social impairment characterized by aloofness, lack of reciprocity, and absence of eye contact; an inability to use language effectively to communicate, including muteness, echolalia, odd intonations, reversal of pronouns, and inappropriate repetition of meaningless words; repetitious, stereotyped behavior such as rocking, hand flapping, or preoccupation with train schedules; an insistence on sameness, with strong resistance to changes in environment or routines.

Very few of the children Bettelheim treated displayed this syndrome. Indeed, the kind of metaphorical use of language he attributes to the children he described grows out of precisely the kind of symbolic

thinking autistic children are not capable of. Furthermore, he had no research design or trained observers and allowed no outsiders into the school. This did not prevent the Ford Foundation from making a large grant supporting Bettelheim's work over five years, nor did they question any of the false claims he made in the annual progress reports they required of him. *The Empty Fortress* was his final report. By the time it came out, Bernard Rimland, in his carefully researched and documented *Infantile Autism*, had begun to establish what has long been accepted in the medical and therapeutic communities: autism is a developmental disorder originating in genetic fault, brain injury, or brain disease. There is no evidence to support Bettelheim's claims that parental handling is ever a factor in the disorder.

Once you know that a person has lied, concealed information, and made false and malicious accusations about any important subject, it is hard not to allow that knowledge to influence any further acquaintance with him. This knowledge informed my reading of *The Creation of Dr. B* and also of *Bettelheim*, a biography by Nina Sutton published a few months earlier. Nina Sutton is not a disinterested party either. She is a fervent Freudian and an accomplished practitioner of the "it seemed," "it is easy to imagine," "appeared to be," "must have thought" school of biography. Like many who have defended Bettelheim over the years, she is so "understanding" that the question of truth becomes almost irrelevant.

Bettelheim repeatedly claimed that his unique insight into autism had its origin in his treatment of Patsy, an American child who lived with the Bettelheims in Vienna. In Pollak's words, Bettelheim later "multiplied her by two and diagnosed her as autistic," claiming to have lived with two autistic children as part of their treatment; later still he lived and worked with "some autistic children," creating an elaborate tale of therapeutic techniques he had used, the success of which led him to develop his theories about autism.

Some undisputed facts are clearly laid out by both biographers: Patsy lived in the Bettelheim household for seven years. She was not autistic. She was cared for exclusively by Bettelheim's wife Gina. Interviews with Patsy herself and many people who knew the Bettelheims and Patsy corroborate these facts. Pollak carefully investigates all the claims made about Patsy and allows them to contribute their weight to his developing case against Bettelheim's veracity. After outlining the same facts and allowing that they are based on the recollections of seven people, Sutton turns to speculation about the relationship Bettelheim "must have" had with Patsy, a child who "must have" intrigued him, and who "must have reminded him of the hours he himself had spent lying in his darkened room, his mind a blank." "The tapestry Bettelheim wove around the

story of Patsy became richer over time. . . . Bettelheim loved telling stories, and was unable to resist the temptation whenever he had an appreciative audience."

Bettelheim usually had an appreciative audience after he arrived in the United States in 1939, and he immediately took advantage of a unique opportunity to leave behind the failures and frustrations of his early life and construct an elaborate set of false credentials. He invented accomplishments, academic degrees, connections with people in high places, and professional training and experience that either had no basis in reality or else were gross exaggerations.

Nina Sutton's comment on this: "On May 11, 1939 . . . Bettelheim was forced to create a whole new life for himself. . . . It is worth reflecting on exactly why Bruno Bettelheim felt the need to rearrange his past." "His success appeared to be based," she writes, "not only on his talent and hard work but also on the revised version of his past *that he had allowed to take root* in the minds of his employers." (Emphasis added.)

Do all refugees, I wonder, have the right to indulge a "propensity for embroidering the truth," to "weave rich tapestries," "spin fine yarns," tell "fancy tales," make "poetic interpretations"? Sutton has written a very long, often tedious book, imbued with psychoanalytic "insights" that she uses to explain—or, more often, to explain away—Bettelheim's behavior. When she is not rushing to his defense, she is speculating about what goes on inside his head, or inside the heads of people who differ with him. She displays so little regard for the truth that her book is not worthy of serious consideration.

Pollak presents Bettelheim's false claims alongside a well-documented record of the facts of his background and training. Bettelheim did not mention the twelve years he spent working in the family lumber business. The fourteen years he claimed he spent at the University of Vienna, supposedly resulting in three Ph.D.'s *summa cum laude* were actually six years and a Ph.D. without honors in philosophical aesthetics. Further claims included studies with Arnold Schoenberg (no evidence), acquaintance with Sigmund Freud, and Freud's personal blessing on Bettelheim's analytic training (no evidence he ever met Freud), psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic training (a truncated analysis, no training), two books published (no books published), membership in an organization that studied the emotional problems of children and adolescents (no evidence).

His experiences in Buchenwald and Dachau, horrible though they no doubt were, also provided Bettelheim with grounds for further inventions, distortions, and exaggerations that formed the basis of his wide acceptance as an authority on the Holocaust and on the Jews' role in their own destruction. He boasted of having been imprisoned because he was a

member of the anti-Nazi resistance in Austria (no evidence). For all his claims of superiority to what he described as the general run of Jews who meekly submitted to being incarcerated by the Nazis, evidence shows that he offered no resistance when he was pushed into the railroad car. As anyone as well-connected as Bettelheim might have done, he managed to get money to bribe the guards and secure himself relatively safe and sheltered job assignments; a prominently placed American woman used her influence and ultimately got him released from the camps (he was later to claim that it was none other than Eleanor Roosevelt who secured his release).

In 1943 Bettelheim published "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," a psychological study of concentration camp inmate behavior and attitudes that shocked a world that knew little about the camps and was not likely to question Bettelheim's methods, theories, or conclusions. His claim to have lived in five barracks in ten and a half months and to have known personally fifteen hundred inmates, implausible as it may sound now, evidently convinced a stunned public that his evaluation was definitive. This article was reprinted in several of Bettelheim's books and served as the basis of his lifelong reputation as an expert on the camps. In Pollak's judgment, it is "full of questionable generalities, invented research, glib psychology, and a good deal of fiction."

Bettelheim never acknowledged or referred to the work of other survivors whose observations and conclusions differed from his own, and as the years went by he increasingly revealed himself as an angry anti-Semite. In a speech to Jewish students, Bettelheim posed the question "Anti-Semitism, whose fault is it?" and answered it himself. Pointing a finger at the audience, he shouted "Yours! . . . Because you don't assimilate, it is your fault. If you assimilated, there would be no anti-Semitism. Why don't you assimilate?" On a more theoretical level, Bettelheim wrote that to comprehend anti-Semitism "one must concentrate as much on the study of the Jew as on the study of the anti-Semite. The complementary character of their respective roles makes it apparent that the phenomenon is an interlocking of pathological interpersonal strivings."

As director of the Orthogenic School, Bettelheim apparently succeeded in creating a very appealing environment in which to care for the children entrusted to him. He took pains to fill the school building with works of art and to furnish the children's rooms comfortably and colorfully; they sat on well-designed chairs, ate from handsome china, and were given free run of what was, often for many years, their home. He enjoyed a worldwide reputation as a wise and gifted child psychiatrist who had unmatched success in treating and "restoring to full functioning" children with the most severe and intractable emotional disorders. Pollak's research

reveals that although some of the children were severely disturbed, many were not. A former teacher recalled Bettelheim telling one of his successors to make sure to admit children he knew were not too disturbed. "You need to develop some credibility in the community, and the way to do it is to show some success." Another associate said, "Bruno was always loose with his diagnoses; that's how he could make great success claims."

The staff was largely untrained and very young—a one-time counselor recalled, "I didn't know a thing about emotionally disturbed children. I think he hired us because he didn't want a staff with its own ideas, people who had been trained by someone else"—and Bettelheim terrorized them. Former staff members talked about his "instruction through terror" and his "Nazi-Socratic method."

Soon after Bettelheim's death, there was a stream of accusations by former students of emotional and physical brutality and sexual abuse. Pollak produces ample evidence for these accusations, many of them in the chilling words of the students who spent their childhoods "in terror of his footsteps in the dorms." Jacquelyn Sanders, an associate for many years and one of his successors as director of the school, told Pollak that Bettelheim "had indeed raised his hand against the children and sometimes had brought it down with frightening effect." Of the accusations of physical abuse that have created such a stir, Sanders wrote in the *Chicago Sun-Times*: "The people who are so surprised are the popular media and people who believe in fairy tales. People who knew him knew he could be a bastard. He could be charming, scintillating, extraordinarily [empathic], but also a goddamned bastard who could say horrible things." (There is, it should be noted, no consensus among former students and staff members, many of whom have said that their years in the school were helpful and that while Bettelheim could be demanding and harsh, his influence on them was more positive than not.)

Additional examples of Bettelheim's fraud and deceit abound. His "study" of child-rearing in the Israeli kibbutzim is no more rigorously researched and reported than his works on autism and the concentration camps. Significant portions of *The Uses of Enchantment* (1976) were plagiarized—although, again, one adds in fairness that it is an interesting and stimulating study that provides a window into how some of the insights of psychoanalysis can inform our thinking and imagination.

Pollak set himself the task of showing beyond a doubt that Bettelheim's towering stature was undeserved and that academics, educators, cultural critics, and a gullible press had suspended their critical faculties and allowed themselves to be duped by this gifted liar. To reduce Bettelheim's image to its proper dimensions demands a thoroughgoing, responsible, meticulously researched account of his

life and work. Pollak has brilliantly succeeded in providing just such an account.

There has been much speculation on how Bettelheim's stories could have been believed by so many people. Evidently he was a clever, persuasive, and charming man. He had the advantage of emerging from a nightmarish background, a fact that almost in itself made him a hero, to be protected and not challenged. It is ironic thatchutzpah, a quality Bettelheim's anti-Semitism surely would not have encouraged him to admire, is the quality in the man that is most responsible for his success in promoting himself and for his acceptance as an authority in several important fields.

This is surely not the first time audacity has propelled someone into a place or profession for which he is not qualified. But I cannot think of another case in which so many prominent people connived in the deception. Nowhere along the way did anyone publicly question, much less expose, Bettelheim's self-promoting claims. Had these claims served only to massage his ego or accelerate the development of his career, they would have done little harm. But Bettelheim used his growing reputation and authority to strike out at large groups of people, causing serious harm and anguish. He accused Jews of "ghetto thinking" that led them to submit passively to their own destruction in the Holocaust, painting himself at the same time as "a Jew who understood his adversary, who, unencumbered by ghetto thinking, had been able to stand up to and outsmart his keepers." His famous attacks on mothers, especially mothers of disturbed children and most particularly those with autistic children, were nourished by a culture pervaded by blind faith in a simplistic Freudianism and a wish to find easy answers.

It remains to hold those who sustained and promoted Bettelheim's reputation accountable for their carelessness and irresponsibility. There was an almost universal failure to look behind the facade, to ask even the simplest and most obvious questions that would uncover the shoddiness of the structure Bettelheim created. It is possible to believe that soon after the war the University of Chicago might have had some difficulty in readily verifying the information Bettelheim presented in his falsified curriculum vitae. But it is deplorable that the institution supported Bettelheim's work without ever setting up the oversight committee or board of visitors it usually appointed. The University of Chicago never held Bettelheim accountable for anything he did or claimed to do.

Similarly, the Ford Foundation never checked Bettelheim's credentials when he applied for a grant in 1955 to finance a research project on autistic children. They did send to the school two members of their advisory group on mental health, who reported that Bettelheim was a "charming and sagacious indi-

vidual with a great capacity of human understanding which must make him an outstanding therapist." The author of the report said he took Bettelheim's word that without intervention such as Bettelheim's, autistic children either died or ended up in mental institutions, though he stated one misgiving: he wished "there were a greater amount of scientific sophistication and rigor" among a staff he suspected was too subjective and influenced by Bettelheim to objectively test their own hypotheses. Nevertheless, the foundation gave Bettelheim more than half the grant he requested, amounting to \$1.3 million in 1996 dollars, for a school with forty children. The foundation accepted Bettelheim's progress reports, which became increasingly sketchy over the five years of the grant and should have revealed to any careful reader the shoddiness of his research.

And finally, newspaper, magazine, and television commentators seemingly inspired each other to ever greater and more extravagant praise in their effort to turn Bettelheim into a hero or a star. Robert Coles, who surely should, and could, have known better, reviewed *The Empty Fortress* for *The New Republic*, praising Bettelheim's "quiet heroism," describing the "intelligence, compassion, and above all, candor" illuminating his deeds. The review is wrapped in a romantic glow of admiration—one could almost say "adoration," certainly credulity. As a child psychiatrist who prides himself on his compassion, Coles owed himself and his audience a hard, cool look at the radiant package Bettelheim set before him. Because he did not take that look, Coles did a serious disservice to autistic children, their parents, and a general public that needed to be informed.

Peter Gay, reviewing *The Empty Fortress* for the *New Yorker*, referred to Bettelheim's "spectacular successes" and claimed that "Bettelheim's own theory of infantile autism is in all respects much superior to its rivals." How did Peter Gay know this? Because Bettelheim told him so. Not surprisingly, Gay went on to say that "It is, I think, perfectly proper to call Bettelheim and his associates heroes" and that Bettelheim "is remarkably free of egocentricity or aggression." As a leading disciple of Freud, Peter Gay was accepted as an expert on Bettelheim and autism.

A piece in *Commonweal* was entitled "The Holy Work of Bruno Bettelheim." Not satisfied with praising the successes Bettelheim claimed to have had in his work, psychologist William Ryan said of *The*

Empty Fortress, "It is a brilliant piece of work. But it is far more than a psychiatric monograph; it is at the same time a kind of textbook on the subject of humanness that everyone can read with great profit." And then Ryan expanded the message: "Bettelheim's lessons are useful for anyone concerned with humanity; they are absolutely essential for all concerned about the present crisis of poverty and inequality in America."

Reviewing *Surviving* in the *New York Review of Books*, Rosemary Dinnage singled out the essays dealing with the concentration camps: "Here Bettelheim speaks with absolute authority." Christopher Lehmann-Haupt of the *New York Times*, who had favorably reviewed *The Empty Fortress* when it came out, referred to *The Children of the Dream*, Bettelheim's book on child-rearing in the kibbutzim, as a "painstaking examination," and in the *Chicago Tribune* Hugh Nissenson called the book "a brilliant contribution." Paul Roazan, in the *New York Times Book Review*, called Bettelheim "one of Freud's genuine heirs of our time." Perhaps no one, he wrote, was more equipped to assess the effects of kibbutz society on personality formation than Bruno Bettelheim. These people accepted Bettelheim's claim to be an authority; generalists all, they clearly felt themselves qualified to judge material that might better have been examined by specialists.

As each of Bettelheim's books was published it met with similar adulation. While one scholarly community or another might raise serious questions about his work in specialized journals, the popular media continued to praise him in extravagant terms. Pollak convincingly documents a habit of hero worship that allowed the perpetuation of the Bettelheim myth.

Bettelheim's life came to a miserable end. With skill and sympathy, Pollak portrays the isolation and bitterness that engulfed him in his final years. Beset with numerous unpleasant and debilitating ailments, widowed, estranged from one of his children, and moving from one uncongenial dwelling to another, Bettelheim spoke constantly of suicide before finally killing himself. It is hard not to speculate about Bettelheim's thoughts as he reviewed his life. In *The Uses of Enchantment*, drawing the moral of a fairy tale, he wrote: "A voice used to tell lies leads us only to perdition. . . . But a voice used to repent, to admit our failures and state the truth, redeems us." Let us hope that, in the end, Bettelheim repented. ^[1]

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
One of those involved in the pressure campaign, reveals Barnes, was chief White House press spokesman Mike McCurry, who "made clear there would be consequences if ABC didn't go along." Fred Barnes comments:

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Books In Review

A Passionate Witness

WHITTAKER CHAMBERS: A BIOGRAPHY. By SAM TANENHAUS. *Random House*. 638 pp. \$35.

Reviewed by William F. Buckley, Jr.

I'D HARDLY WISH to disguise that I have known the author, who acknowledges this, as also that, like a dozen others, I helped him where I could, by giving him access to whatever materials relating to Chambers I had. And, in the text, the author records that Whittaker Chambers and I were close friends. Reviewer taboos can be carried to quite distracting lengths. "Do you know the author?" the *New York Times* will always ask before commissioning a review. Most recently, thinking to ask me to review the autobiography of Walter Cronkite, an editor asked, Did I know Walter Cronkite? Yes, I said: but who does not? (When the review appeared, it was signed by Tom Wicker.)

Not "everybody" knew Whittaker Chambers, of course. Though this book is mostly history, it succeeds also in recreation, with the result that many will now know Chambers. He died at age 60 in 1961. Sam Tanenhaus did not begin this study until the year the Berlin Wall came down, now securely in possession of the knowledge that when Chambers turned to the West, he had not in fact joined the losing side. One might be tempted to conclude that Tanenhaus is a slow writer. That illusion dissipates soon after entering the book, and by the time one is finished reading it, the wonder is that any one person could have completed such a work in a mere six years.

I say this with caution, because such tributes can intimidate prospective readers of a six-hun-

dred-page densely documented biography. Rather, they should bear in mind that Tanenhaus elected to spend one-tenth of his productive lifetime on Whittaker Chambers only after he convinced himself that Chambers is a figure of compelling interest. Why? Because he testified conclusively against Alger Hiss? Because he precipitated the ascendancy of Richard Nixon?

That story is hardly ignored. But Tanenhaus is engaged, and engages us, with a complex figure as profoundly interesting as any Dostoyevsky gave us. The story is told as imaginatively as a novelist might tell it, though the restraints of history

are scrupulously observed. The author's skill is such that his own presence is impalpable, even as we profit from his facility. He is masterful at compressed eloquence. No filigree, but lines that, in their honed directness, give the subtle satisfaction one gets from treatments done by sensitive hands.

THE BOOK OBSERVES the natural cleavages. The sections give us "Outcast (1901-1925)," "Bolshevik (1925-1932)," "Spy (1932-1938)," "Defector (1938-1939)," "Crusader (1939-1948)," "Witness I: The Hearings (August-December 1948)," "Witness II: The Trials (January 1949-January 1950),"



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
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WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. is *Editor-at-Large* of *National Review*.

and, finally, "Exile (1950-1961)."

Although the book can be fully enjoyed without consulting a single footnote, they are there to remind us of the mighty scaffolding, so painstakingly effected, of *Whittaker Chambers: A Biography*.

Let me give an example. In preparation for the Hiss trial, F.B.I. agents sought the cooperation of one John Sherman, who, Chambers had told them, had met with the Hisses in Baltimore on Soviet business. The agents knock on the door of his hotel room. "Combative and bitter, Sherman demanded the agents produce a warrant and then launched into an oration on the evils of capitalism."

The footnote on this item (footnotes appear at the end of the book). "3. WC[for Whittaker Chambers] deposition, March 25, 1949, p. 1299; FBI 65-1573-2328, Jan. 28, 1949; FBI 74-1333 3677, July 17, 1949; FBI 65-53508-96, Aug. 13, 1949; FBI 74-1333 3755, letter to director, Aug. 16, 1949; FBI NY 65-14920, pp. 312-13; FBI 3855, letter to director, Sept. 2, 1949; FBI teletype 74-1333-3862, Sept. 22, 1949. In March 1950, shortly after the second AH [Alger Hiss] trial concluded, Sherman was summoned by HUAC [The House Committee on Un-American Activities], but declined to answer any questions. He protested he was the victim of a 'frame-up' produced by a 'disordered mind' (presumably WC's). Sherman added, 'I would regard it as a privilege to have the acquaintance of Alger Hiss, but I am convinced that he would not know me from Adam': NYT [New York Times], March 2, 1950. WC later said he had introduced AH to Sherman under the alias Adam: W [Witness] p. 367."

Moreover, late-breaking events, notably the Venona papers, were caught by the author in time to be included. We learn that in the 1940s American counterintelligence officers had intercepted more than two thousand cables sent from U.S.-based Soviet agents to the home office in Moscow. One of these cables (they were sitting around somewhere in Washington during the Hiss trial) was from Anatoly Gromov, the NKVD *resident* in Washington, and

reported on a conversation with another Soviet handler, Ishkak Akhmerov, "the leading NKVD illegal" in the United States. "Akhmerov had recently interviewed a well-placed unnamed GRU agent within the State Department. The [agent] told Akhmerov he had attended the Yalta Conference and then flown on to Moscow, where he was thanked by Soviet diplomat Andre Vyshinsky for his devoted service."

Only four men would fit that harness. About the other three, no suspicion was ever raised by anybody. Moreover, the American agent (Hiss) told Akhmerov that he had been working for Soviet intelligence (as charged by Chambers) since 1935 and "for some years . . . has been the leader of a small group" of agents, "for the most part consisting of his [family] friends"—including, in Chambers' testimony, Alger's wife Priscilla, and brother Donald.

I am obliged to record that Tanenhaus' dislike and distrust of Senator McCarthy take him to what I deem unnecessary lengths. Professor Owen Lattimore's name was first mentioned, in context of the exploration of pro-Communist influences, by McCarthy. But it was Senator McCarran's committee that effectively exposed him as the influential and perjurious pro-Communist he clearly was. The author leaves the reader with the impression that Chambers was simply carried away by McCarthy's early singling out of loyalty risks, though Tanenhaus is convincing when citing the case of O. Edmund Clubb as a miscarriage of justice.

Tanenhaus correctly records that Chambers did not leave us with a systematic worldview of history, on the order of Marx, Spengler, or Toynbee:

His intellectual style was a hybrid of the autodidact's and the educated publicist's. He was a forager of texts, who read widely and collected memorable tag lines he employed as a form of illustrative shorthand, filling out his intuitions and adding them to the accumulat-

ed wisdom of his own experience. Much as he deplored "attempts to explain the Communist experience primarily in personal psychological terms," it was the one thing he really knew how to do. And he had . . . done it in *Witness*.

No systematic worldview can be decocted from *Witness* or from the accumulation of Chambers' writings. What he would have come up with if he had pursued his ambitious idea of two successor volumes to *Witness*, which his bad health precluded, we do not know. That he would have succeeded in creating a historical or philosophical monument merely by ironing out theoretical wrinkles, Tanenhaus doubts. Chambers' strength, his biographer persuasively concludes, was his passion and his art. These he passes along—unfortunately, without material that might further have documented his subject's skills. He was handicapped by the eccentric behavior of Whittaker Chambers' son, who, exercising his authority as executor of his father's estate, forbade the publication of substantial excerpts from Tanenhaus' enormous collection of Chambers' letters. Under the restraints that bound him by the inscrutably motivated objections of the estate, quotations are given to us mincingly: a posthumous burden on Chambers, who as a journalist and artist would have welcomed the fullest disclosure of his skills, concerns, and interests. As a human being always grateful for the labors of his admirers and appreciative critics, he'd have been hurt by this capricious act of ingratitude.

But there is more than enough to illustrate Chambers' skills in communicating his apocalyptic vision. Tanenhaus illuminatingly observes that Chambers' attraction to communism, and subsequently his repulsion for it, was not "as a system of ideas but as a 'great faith,' towering out of the rubble of modern atheism. Its 'simple vision of "Man without God" rivals Christianity's vision of God and man's relationship to God." Tanenhaus is himself "a secu-

lar liberal." But he feels the force of Chambers' spiritual art. And let us experience it.

There is more than enough, from Chambers' text and from letters already published, to testify to the poetic powers of the most eloquent American witness to the greatest trials of the century: in the great arena, the Communist claim for the world; in the arena here, the fight of Alger Hiss to defy reality and let live the webs of his great deception.

The Seed of the Church

THEIR BLOOD CRIES OUT: THE GROWING WORLDWIDE PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS. By PAUL MARSHALL with LELA GILBERT. Word. 304 pp. \$12.99.

Reviewed by A. J. Bacevich

THIS BOOK BEARS all the earmarks of being a loser. The title alone will induce a cringe from prospective readers for whom detachment and irony comprise the reigning hallmarks of sophistication. The imprint suggests a firm that specializes in devo-

A. J. BACEVICH is Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.

tional tracts. Were that not enough, the publishing house is located in Dallas, a city far better known for its professional football franchise than for intellectual ferment. People like me—fancying themselves to be religious but comfortably ensconced in the secular world—are loath to take books like *Their Blood Cries Out* seriously. But does the problem lie with the book? Or with people like me?

In fact, the authors of this very important volume tell a compelling story and they tell it extraordinarily well. The essence of that story is this: In an age notorious for the widespread abuse of human rights, the murder, torture, imprisonment, and victimization of Christians *because they are Christians* constitutes "the largest pattern of persecution in the world." Furthermore, due to apathy among believers and bias among the enlightened, this epidemic of persecution "is allowed to pass in a 'deafening silence.'"

Paul Marshall and Lela Gilbert amass an impressive body of evidence to substantiate their case, supplementing facts and figures with anecdotes that describe in harrowing detail the experiences of actual victims. In doing so, they assemble a compendium of anti-Christian oppression that is painstaking, comprehensive, and unsettling in its implications.

They begin their survey with the Islamic world. Careful to emphasize that Islam as such is not inherently hostile to Christianity, they nonetheless describe repression on a vast scale: in the Sudan, where in the past decade "Islamization through genocide" has caused the death of between 1.5 and 3 million Christians; in Iran, where Christians endure conditions of "religious apartheid"; in Saudi Arabia, a valued strategic partner of the United States, where "Christian worship is banned" and where it is "illegal to wear a cross or to utter a Christian prayer"; in Egypt, another stalwart U.S. ally, where "militant Islamic groups are targeting Christians for murder, assault, theft, and destruction of property"; in Algeria, where violent attacks on Catholic clergy have become routine; and in Pakistan, where blasphemy laws provide the rationale for "a reign of private terror against Christians."

Yet government-sanctioned intolerance for Christianity is by no means confined to the Islamic world. In the shabby surviving outposts of the former Communist world, official animus directed at Christians remains undiminished. In Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and especially in China, where today "there are more Christians attending regular church worship ser-

A NEW ECUMENISM?

"The truest Christian ecumenism is most likely to come from those who on the surface most strongly disagree."—FROM THE INTRODUCTION

Whatever their many (and sometimes lethal) differences over the centuries, Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox and Protestant evangelicals now find their core beliefs under fire throughout the world. Less and less able to afford the luxury of fighting each other, many in each of these great wings of Christianity are asking: How much do we hold in common?

The contributors to this volume believe they hold nothing less in common than the Great Tradition—such elemental truths as the Trinity and the divinity and humanity of Christ, as articulated in the ancient ecumenical creeds. While they point out basic areas of agreement between Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox, they also tough-mindedly explore the real points of tension that remain.


Essays by noted representatives of each tradition—including Richard John Neuhaus, Peter Kreeft, Bishop Kallistos Ware, J. I. Packer and Carl Braaten—probe what it would mean for Christians from different traditions to affirm together this Great Tradition.



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vices . . . than there are in all of Western Europe combined," government determination to avert the collapse of authoritarian structures inspires campaigns of terror and intimidation designed to suppress the resurgence of Christianity.

Elsewhere in Asia—in India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bhutan, Burma, and Cambodia—a

similar pattern holds. Even in less likely quarters—in Russia, central Europe, and Latin America, where the population identifies itself as Christian—nonconformists or adherents of minority denominations find themselves subjected to all manner of discrimination and abuse.

WHY DOES THIS pattern of anti-Chris-

tian abuse exist on such a large scale? It does so, according to Marshall and Gilbert, because political elites in many parts of the globe perceive Christianity to be a subversive force, endangering the status quo and threatening their hold on power.

Why does the irrefutable evidence of widespread persecution of Christians provoke such little response, especially from the United States? The authors cite two reasons. First, pulling no punches, they assign substantial blame to American Christians themselves: to mainline churches so clotted with post-colonial guilt and fashionable left-liberalism that they cannot bring themselves to call any non-Western nation to account, however odious its behavior; but also to evangelicals preoccupied with their quest for inner serenity and hence susceptible to a peculiarly self-absorbed and therapeutic variant of Christianity. "Worshipers in air-conditioned buildings, at ease in upholstered pews, eagerly receive the 'Good News'—but tend to interpret the news as instructions to do well for themselves."

Second, the authors blame the secularized elites who dominate political discourse. On Ivy League campuses, in big city newsrooms, in the conference rooms of the typical Washington think tank, the very notion of Christianity is redolent of things dead, white, European, and male. As a result, afflictions endured by Christians do not inspire the sympathetic attention routinely given to causes certified as progressive—this despite the fact that, as the authors note, three-fourths of the world's professing Christians are people of color residing in the Third World. When it comes to defending freedom of religion, one human right that does not figure prominently in designs for a postmodern utopia, elites are more likely to offer lip service than effective action.

The authors conclude with their own cry, for an end to indifference by churches, government, and the media. Given the historical record, only an optimist would expect many to heed that call. Still, this is a book

He said it . . .



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that demands to be read and pondered by those of us resting a touch too comfortably in our upholstered pews.

Unbelievable

HYMNS OF PRUDENTIUS: THE CATHEMERINON; OR, THE DAILY ROUND. Translated by DAVID R. SLAVITT. Johns Hopkins University Press. 80 pp. \$19.95.

Reviewed by Laurance Wieder

THE FOURTH-CENTURY Latin poet and father of the Church, Aurelius Prudentius Clemens, has always had an audience. Incorporated into the Catholic breviary, his hymns have enjoyed a respectful if sometimes uncomprehending audience for over fifteen centuries. He was widely read as a Christian poet well into the eighteenth century, and his work provided a model for many English poets engaged by religious themes. "Intrat pectora candidus pudica, / quae templi vice consecrata ridet / postquam conbiberint Deum medullis," he wrote in his "Hymn After Meat." ("In His purity He enters chaste hearts, which are consecrated as His temple, smiling brightly when they have drunk deep of God," as H. J. Thomson renders it in his Loeb Library translation.) John Milton echoes these lines in Book I of *Paradise Lost*, when he requests inspiration from "chiefly Thou O Spirit, that dost prefer / Before all other Temples th' upright heart and pure."

Somewhere along the line, however, Prudentius seems to have disappeared from the view of poets writing in English. There hasn't been an important translation of his work in many years, and I took up this new, rhymed version of Prudentius by David Slavitt—coeditor of *The Complete Roman Drama in Translation* and translator of Ovid, Virgil, Seneca, and the Psalms—wanting very much to like it. Here's how Slavitt, who describes himself as "a skeptical Jewish aesthete of the late

twentieth century," translates the same passage from the "Hymn After Meat":


Into the bosom's temple of
those
who keep his image
enshrined therein,
He enters, but departs
forthwith

should there be any taint of
sin. . . .

Prudentius may have his limitations as a poet, but what is the point of rendering his work in this faint English doggerel? Besides *The Daily Round*, which Slavitt has translated, Prudentius wrote a number of other poems, including *Psychomachia*, an

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
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allegorical epic about spiritual warfare. Though no one would mistake Prudentius for Virgil or Dante, his poems have their admirers, even among contemporary scholars. He was among the first poets to combine classical forms and Christian faith. He has flashes of intense visual imagination, as in his Sixth Hymn, where the Last Judgment is dreamed as a carefully composed fresco.


More sustained than his vision of judgment is his statement of Christian faith and doctrine in verse. Prudentius is, first and last, a believer: "With voice at least let my soul honor God, if with good deeds she cannot," he declares in his own preface. "With hymns let her link the days together, and no night pass without singing of her Lord. Let her fight against heresies, expound the Catholic faith, trample on the rites of the heathen, strike down thy idols, O Rome, devote song to the martyrs, and praise the apostles."

David Slavitt, his new translator, however, is a man declining to believe. Reading the Hymns of Prudentius "purely as a connoisseur, which, of course, involves my looking at them *as if*," Slavitt declares in his introduction that he can "pretend to a faith that even to a skeptic is comforting and nourishing." He's right, of course, that the willing suspension of disbelief is a necessary condition of literature. But suspension of disbelief is not the same as lack of conviction, which is the stuff of life to both the poetic and the religious imagination. Take away conviction and what remains is bare pretense.

As a translator of Latin hymns, Slavitt hopes "that purity of heart will somehow help" resolve the complex, paradoxical needs of "talent, intelligence, sophistication, and erudition," placed in the service of "honesty and innocence." His way is the way of poetry rather than of religion. It was not Prudentius' way, but that doesn't necessarily mean Slavitt is wrong. It does mean, however, that he must stand on his own "purity of heart." The only fair question to ask of Slavitt's version is, Just how faithful is the translator to his own *as if*?

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Seek God's justice and never despair of God's mercy. —Saint Benedict

Born of Common Hungers

Benedictine Women in Search of Connections

Essays by Mara Faulkner ♦ Photographs by Annette Brophy



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For the religious poet, poems are the practical embodiment of a spiritual life. Criticism can't come to grips with good poetry by talking only about the craft of the poetry; the poems themselves draw the critic into discussions of life and the world. The first limitations a poem betrays are technical, the poet's failure to master his craft. But in the

presence of technical mastery, the poem's limitations become personal, human, the poet's coming to the ends of his understanding of the living world. The quality and dimension of what he knows distinguishes the major poet from the minor one. Milton appears enormous by this light. William Shakespeare the person is unimaginable.

It was in exploring an oblique connection with John Milton that I first picked up Slavitt's translation of Prudentius' fourth hymn (which Slavitt calls "The Hymn After Meals"). His translation begins in a measure common to "When the Frost is on the Punkin" and "The Lobster Quadrille," as well as to numerous psalms and hymns by Christopher Smart:

Now that we have nourished
bodies,
let us likewise feed our souls
and set these mouths that chew
and swallow
to other, more important
goals.

It would have been shrewd to follow Smart's lead in englishing Prudentius' Catholic hymnal. However zealous he may have been, Christopher Smart understood what poetry had to do to escape literary confinement. Smart's right rhymes and regular meters proclaim the rightness of his heart and the regularity of his selfless fervor. For his part, David Slavitt keeps the beat for only sixteen lines. When he arrives at "the bosom's temple," Slavitt's God

enters, but departs forthwith
should there be any taint of
sin
to offend him. He has made
provision
for body and for spirit, too.
The moderation at the table
we practice will at once
renew
the soul's robustness and
sustain
the flesh, its vessel. Thus,
the Lord
kept Daniel in that den of lions
safe from their cruel jaws.

No sword
he had, but only faith: he
would not
bow to the idols of Babylon.
The lions nuzzle him, purr like
kittens,
lick his outstretched hand,
and fawn.

The poet betrays his own meter, for what? Meter only matters as an agency of meaning. When Falstaff says, "We have heard the chimes at midnight, Master Shallow," the twelve syllables of the line each sound a chime. When Milton begins his epic *Paradise Lost*, "Of Man's First Disobedience, and the Fruit," he violates the iambic pentameter—the sole rule of his blank verse—with the word "Disobedience" in the very first line. Such lines fuse the physical with the ethical and the aesthetic, and their measures and their meanings correspond.

Lack of religious commitment may not be a crime in a poet, but a poet has to believe in something for his poetry to gain assent, the willing suspension. Given the way he handles rhyme and meter, I don't think David Slavitt even believes in poetry. The urbane surface of his introductory prose can't hide the vacancy of his aesthetic pose. This agnosticism, where the poet systematically undermines his own forms, removes the cornerstone from every edifice he builds.

Take this sonnet's worth from the sixth hymn, the "Hymn Before Sleep":

The tasks of the day are
finished at last. To refresh
my tired limbs, I lay me down.
My brow

unfurrows, as my mind lets
troubles go
and I commence to float on
oblivion's current.
I think of the Lord's mercy,
providing so
for repair of our wearying,
wearisome bodies that
weren't

designed to soar as our minds
can do in flights

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not unlike angels' arabesques,
when we take
the heavenly view of dreams,
which is why our nights
can be far brighter than what
we know, awake,

as if the dome of the skies had
opened wide
and we, transfixed in the
unaccustomed glare,
could see the truth of our lives.
We are terrified
or else encouraged by what
we've confronted there.

This is simply unpersuasive, and nowhere near as good as the nursery rhyme prayer "Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep." Slavitt forces me to pay attention to him, rather than to Prudentius or to the Latin poet's matter. There is a pleasure in literary peek-a-bow, but devotional works just plain fail when the writer comes between the worshiper and the object of devotion. That's what makes the notion of "the Bible as Literature" trivializing. I even have a problem with "Literature as Literature": Reading *King Lear*, I don't think about Shakespeare; reading *Paradise Lost*, my eye is not on Milton, but the creation.

In "A Memorable Fancy," William Blake recorded a dinner conversation in which he asked the Old Testament prophet Isaiah, "Does a firm persuasion that a thing is so, make it so?" The prophet replied, "All poets believe that it does, and in ages of imagination this firm persuasion removed mountains; but many are not capable of a firm persuasion of anything." Prudentius was at least capable of a firm persuasion. Unfortunately, his new translator is not.

The Nuns' Story

SISTERS IN ARMS: CATHOLIC NUNS THROUGH TWO MILLENNIA. By JO ANN KAY McNAMARA. *Harvard University Press*. 751 pp. \$35.

Reviewed by M. S. Leach

THIS IS A BOOK to be reckoned with. After all the objections to the author's agenda and technique have

been registered, the fact remains that Jo Ann Kay McNamara, former nun and current history professor at Hunter College, has written the first definitive history of women religious. It is a history worth knowing.

As if to redress singlehandedly the real and perceived neglect of women's contributions to the Catholic Church, McNamara gives us an exhaustively researched, comprehensively presented, and splendidly written history, from clandestine Roman days to the present, of the women who were consecrated to the lay apostolate or the contemplative life. Although clearly writing from a feminist perspective, McNamara is, for the most part, an unexpected voice of reason. The scholar's moderation, intelligence, and own understanding of the spiritual life temper any unreasoned feminist rage.

What emanates from this detailed history, in fact, is a deep love of the consecrated and monastic life both on the part of the author and on the part of the many generations of women religious who fought to maintain and nurture a recognized place within the Church for those who, by choice, necessity, or family imperative, found themselves "brides of Christ."

But McNamara is a feminist, and where a feminist construct imposes itself is in the author's use of the concept of *syneisactism*—"men and women living together chastely without regard for gender differences"—as the standard against which all religious life is judged. When the religious or monastic life seems to achieve such genderless equality, as in ancient Rome and in the early Middle Ages before religious life was greatly institutionalized by the Church, the author is celebratory; this surely is what a spiritual community should be. When monastic life is not characterized by such cooperation and equality, it is often portrayed as oppressive, legalistic, and even brutal.

According to McNamara, it was

M. S. LEACH is an aide to a U.S. Senator.

in the twelfth century that the ideal of syneisactism came under serious attack: "By mid-century, clerical observers had already begun to attack the syneisactism that joined religious men and women in a common enterprise and that defied the carefully nurtured fear of women at the base of clerical reform. By the thir-

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teenth century, the forces of separation had successfully equated syneisactism with heresy."

While McNamara recounts a history of repeated efforts on the part of the Church hierarchy to cloister women both from the world and male clerics, thus preventing any participation in sacramental or authoritative roles, her account also tells the story of countless women religious who endured, thrived, and often achieved renown despite such restrictive efforts.

Syneisactism, as the author characterizes it, really represents much more than the comingling of men and women and the abandonment of gender roles. Syneisactism characterized male and female monastic orders at a time when the Church took a deinstitutionalized and decentralized approach to the development and daily life of such orders. In other words, when men and women religious were allowed by historical necessity, political crisis, or neglect to exist as small autonomous communities bound by a particularly tailored "rule," syneisactism revealed itself. When the Church chose to assert a centralized authority, syneisactism died.

The reader can easily see where the recurring theme of syneisactism and the attendant characterizations of the Catholic hierarchy eventually will lead as the account reaches the modern era and today's Church. The author clearly hopes that the ideal of male and female religious who move beyond gender roles to form small faith communities liberated from a centrally organized clergy is something we can finally realize. Such communities would recall, McNamara believes, the true, pure Christian communities of the earliest Church before women were denied equal leadership. And it is these kinds of religious vocations which, not surprisingly, she believes would best serve the modern Church. And, of course, the all-male clergy is a nearly two-thousand-year deviation from the spirit and intentions of the early Church.

To her credit, Ms. McNamara does not allow these reflections a disproportionate share of the book, does not

reduce her study to a polemic advocating for a female clergy, and does not marshal her research and analysis in the service of a single political theme. Her sympathies and prejudices are merely undisguised. And while they influence her account, they do not, I think, entirely overtake her scholarship.

Indeed, it is not in her scholarly skills that the author seems to reveal a rare lapse, but in her sense of irony and incongruity. Ms. McNamara invokes syneisactism and an "ungendered" population of religious as the apparent ideal, but she does it against her own well-rendered backdrop of passion, intensity, devotion, transcendence, and spiritual and physical heroism of every kind. Against such a backdrop, the image of a dutiful, passionless monastic population of muted gender seems almost boring. It seems not to have occurred to the author that docile men and women willing to renounce the claims and privileges of gender might not be the kind of men and women drawn to the demands and drama of religious life—and the life she depicts was demanding and dramatic. They also might not be the kind of men and women equipped to defend religious life, often a heroic defense. Further, it has always been tacitly understood in the Church that the achievements of religious life were, and are, often the result of a romantic passion rechanneled, not renounced. The image of syneisactism is, in fact, inadequate to the very history that McNamara has so diligently uncovered and so intelligently documented.

BRIEFLY NOTED

RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND NATURALISM. By WILLEM DREES. *Cambridge University Press.* 314 pp. \$59.95.

Among philosophical naturalists, there are what one might call the mean ones and the nice ones. Mean ones, like Tufts professor Daniel Dennett, sternly inform us that natu-

ral causes explain everything and that religions are thus either dangerous falsehoods or quaint residues of earlier evolutionary stages that belong in "cultural zoos." Nice ones likewise insist on the sufficiency of natural causes but they brightly reassure us that religion is still a wonderful thing—a tapestry of symbol and metaphor that enriches our lives, as long as we're not naive enough to think it is actually true. Willem Drees is a nice naturalist. A philosophy professor at the University of Twente in the Netherlands, Drees argues that naturalism does not require us to deny the existence of a transcendent God. But it does require us to deny that God has acted in the world or that we can know much about Him. "Such a philosophical concept of God is fairly empty," Drees admits, reducible to a vague sense of "gratitude and wonder." We're welcome to fill in the details from our own particular religious tradition, but we must understand that, like all traditions, it arose through "a long evolutionary process" for strictly functional reasons. The concept of God is a human construction, a regulative idea giving force to our values. Drees is to be commended for his clear-sighted grasp of the drastic stripping-down of religion required to fit the naturalistic grid. But his book also reveals the contradiction at the heart of naturalism—for naturalism cuts both ways: it implies that science, too, is a product of evolution and hence not true but merely functional. As Drees writes, "Our epistemic capacities arose because they were advantageous to our hominid ancestors." But in that case it is not clear why religious believers should feel compelled to redefine their beliefs to conform to what naturalistic scientists decree.

— Nancy Pearcey

THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM: AN AGENDA FOR CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE. By JEFFREY C. SOBOSAN. *Pilgrim Press*. 264 pp. \$16.95.

This book is an example of something we're sure to see often as the

year 2000 approaches: a book with the word millennium in its title that has nothing to do with the millennium. The title seems strictly a sales pitch, since the content is little more than a manifesto for Jeffrey Sobosan's environmentalist version of process theology. A Catholic theologian and follower of Whitehead, Sobosan teaches a radical redefinition of Christian doctrine. The "old tradition that Jesus was ransomed for our sins" he rejects as "theologically repugnant." He suggests replacing it with "the idea that plants and animals are always being ransomed to our well-being"—which inspires "a eucharistic (thanksgiving) ethics." And he calls for repentance for the sin of "species-centrism." Well, what did you expect from someone whose last book was titled *Bless the Beasts*? Sobosan's prose is weighed down with brooding, self-indulgent introspection. One section concludes by apologizing that the issues discussed are perhaps "not what any other reader might consider the most important or intriguing in the book; that is quite possible." "But they are what come to my mind as of this writing, and in offering them I too am not just the writer but a reader of the book." Reading this kitsch is like dipping into a teenager's diary.

— NP

IN DEFENSE OF MIRACLES: A COMPREHENSIVE CASE FOR GOD'S ACTION IN HISTORY. Edited by R. DOUGLAS GEIVETT and GARY R. HABERMAS. *InterVarsity*. 330 pp. \$17.99 paper.

In this well-constructed collection, many of the leading evangelical philosophers undertake the arduous task of philosophically justifying rational belief in miracles. The book first presents philosophy's case against miracles, with famous selections from David Hume and Anthony Flew arguing the epistemological absurdity of the miraculous. But rather than allow that case to triumph—requiring, for believers, a denunciation of philosophy—these evangelicals undertake in fourteen articles a systematic apology for be-

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lief in miracles. Standout chapters include J. P. Moreland's case for "theistic science," in which he points out the flaws in "methodological naturalism," the contention that science requires events explicable only by natural laws. Stephen Davis contributes a marvelous essay on the intellectual respectability of the idea of a timeless and immaterial God acting in a timebound and material world. Altogether, this useful volume is an impressive display of the best sort of intellectual work now emerging in the evangelical world.

—Brad Stetson

THE DEATH OF DEATH: RESURRECTION AND IMMORTALITY IN JEWISH THOUGHT. By NEIL GILLMAN. *Jewish Lights*. 336 pp. \$23.95.

In modern times, most Jews—or at least most non-Orthodox Jews—have abandoned any belief in personal immortality and come to sup-

pose that it plays no role in Jewish faith. In *The Death of Death*, however, Neil Gillman argues that the afterlife is an integral and indispensable component of Judaism's worldview. Gillman, a Conservative rabbi and professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary, traces the historical development of the Jewish understanding of death and the hereafter from its primitive state in the Torah, through the first prophetic glimmerings of personal and collective resurrection, all culminating in the rabbinic canonization of "the world to come" (*olam ha-bah*) in the Talmud and the liturgy. Gillman relates the world to come to a host of theological issues, such as exile and return, chaos and order. There are the two competing views of the hereafter: the philosophically conceived immortality of a discarnate soul, and a theologically conceived immortality of a personal soul in a resurrected body.

Gillman makes a strong case that some form of bodily resurrection provides the truer and more authentically biblical account of human destiny. An enormous amount of learning and analysis has been packed into this relatively short study. Though the subject matter is often complex, the exposition is consistently lucid—the mark of a superior teacher. While some traditionalists may be uncomfortable with the author's heavy reliance on the vocabulary and categories of religious naturalism, even this feature of the book may end up serving the cause of bringing nonbelievers into a deeper faith.

FIVE CHALLENGES FOR THE ONCE AND FUTURE CHURCH. By LOREN B. MEAD. *Alban Institute* (Washington, D.C.). 100 pp. \$12.25 (+\$3.90 s/h) paper.

The author, an Episcopalian, recognizes that the mainline/oldline churches are a field of dry bones, but wants to instill confidence that, as with Israel in its Babylonian captivity, these bones can live. One must hope that he is right.

IN THE LION'S DEN. By NINA SHEA. *Broadman & Holman*. 126 pp. \$9.99 paper.

This little book belongs in every parish library. In the churches and in the political arena, the momentum builds to address in a decisive way the persecution and martyrdom of Christians around the world. *In the Lion's Den* is a handy and reliable guide to what is happening right now—and to what can be done about it.

JEWISH POWER: INSIDE THE AMERICAN JEWISH ESTABLISHMENT. J. J. GOLDBERG. *Addison Wesley*. 422 pp. \$25.

An interesting but finally unsatisfying examination of a potentially explosive subject. On the one hand, the author triumphantly exults in the fact that "Jews have really arrived," exercising an influence in American

"Nathan Glazer... understands the present situation... clearly, and with an admirable sensitivity to what certain multiculturalists are trying to achieve... As Mr. Glazer shows in a fascinating chapter, the educational theorists (including John Dewey) who spoke of the American 'melting pot' were thinking almost exclusively of the European immigrants to this country; race, in their vocabulary, meant what we now call ethnicity. European-Americans could and would in time disconnect themselves from their country of origin and cease to be known as 'hyphenated' Americans. African-Americans were never included in this vision and were often treated by the theorists as if they simply were not there."

—Mary Lefkowitz, WALL STREET JOURNAL

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—Jonathan Yardley, WASHINGTON POST BOOK WORLD


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
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life dramatically out of proportion to their small numbers. On the other, he is defensively nervous that non-Jews might think there is something odd about that. Surprisingly, he assumes that Jews have something very much like a dual loyalty between Israel and the U.S., and notes approvingly the dominance of Jews in public offices pertinent to determining U.S.-Israel policy. Goldberg uncritically assumes that abortion, the exclusion of religion from public life, and related issues are "Jewish causes," and is stunningly indifferent to the perception that a little more than 2 percent of the population may be on a collision course with the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of their fellow-citizens. The author has little interest in Orthodox and other religious Jews apart from their role in hindering or augmenting the assertion of "Jewish power." He laments the fact that there are almost no nationally


recognized Jewish leaders today, and concludes on the note that American Jews are "there to be led"—presumably to gain more "Jewish power." Goldberg dismisses contemptuously the Jewish figures associated with *Commentary* and other neoconservative enterprises as little more than anti-liberal reactionaries. Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League says the book "is an informative and provocative must-read for an understanding of the issues, institutions, and individuals that define the community." Perhaps his personal friendship with the author explains the blurb (Mr. Foxman is treated favorably throughout), but one must hope he is wrong. *Jewish Power* intends to be provocative, as the title suggests, but is in the end a superficial and mischievous treatment of a subject deserving the careful and dispassionate attention of Jews and non-Jews alike.

BAYARD RUSTIN: TROUBLES I'VE SEEN. By JERVIS ANDERSON. 418 pp. HarperCollins. \$30.


Bayard Rustin, who died at age seventy-five in 1987, was one of the more colorful figures of the civil rights and other movements for social change in the last half century. Prodigiously articulate, musically gifted, incorrigibly playful, and promiscuously homosexual, Rustin is best remembered as the organizer of the 1963 March on Washington at which Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his justly famous "I Have a Dream" speech. But Rustin's activism goes back decades before that, beginning as a militant pacifist with the Fellowship of Reconciliation. In his last years, Rustin angered the black establishment with his tempered criticisms of affirmative action and, most particularly, his vigorous defense of Israel and opposition to black anti-Semitism. Jervis Anderson worked with Rustin and offers a eulogy that, while repeatedly alluding to his extravagant and sometimes outrageous ways, fails to convey both the exuberance and complexity of the man. *Bayard Rustin* is, nonetheless, a valuable document for the study of the social turmoils of recent American history. Usually in the second tier of leadership, Rustin knew everybody and wielded an influence with King and the civil rights movement far beyond that of black leaders better known to the general public. Religiously, it seems this most unquiet man never abandoned the "quiet way" of his Quaker beginnings in Pennsylvania.

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
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
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RANCHO SANTA FE AND THE CULTURE OF DEATH

No doubt many preachers on Easter Sunday referred to the thirty-nine suicides of Rancho Santa Fe in order to set forth, by way of sharpest contrast, the Christian understanding of body, soul, and life eternal. At least I hope they did. In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, the press and airwaves were clogged with the usual socio-psychobabble, and of course the "cult experts" got another turn in front of the cameras. "Experts on cult behavior," says the editorial in the *New York Times*, will help us understand "the underlying pathology that led such seemingly bright and articulate people to a tragic misjudgment." Misjudgment is an interesting term in this connection. Oops, forget the bit about suicide.

"Some find it shocking that a technically gifted group, earning its keep by designing web sites for businesses, could fall prey to aberrational beliefs that blended far-out science fiction with elements of Christianity," write the editors. "But technical expertise," they go on to note, "is no proof against bizarre beliefs," and they cite as evidence people who have a view of creation that differs from evolutionary dogma despite their "backgrounds in engineering or other technical subjects." Cults differ from "mainstream faiths," we are told, because the latter have ways of controlling such craziness. "Resurrection, the meaninglessness of the flesh, the primacy of the spirit, the conversion from the physical to the heavenly plane are features of several faiths. But the crucial safety brake in most theologies is that the believer himself cannot choose the moment of ascension. Only the central deity can do that."

Christianity and Judaism are supposedly big on "the central deity." In biblical faith, resurrection, far from being linked to "the meaningless of the flesh," is precisely resurrection of the flesh. The editors refer to the "ad hoc mumbo-jumbo" of the cultists even as they display their embarrassing ignorance of biblical basics. As celebrants of multiculturalism, the editors may protest that they cannot limit themselves to biblical faith, since, after all, it has no higher claim on their attention than that it is the religious connection of more than 90 percent of the population and the religio-moral foundation of Western Civilization. Forbid that it should be "privileged" and thus run the risk of violating the "no establishment" clause of the editors' First Commandment. Better to toss Judaism and Christianity into the mish-mash of generalized religion for which "mainstream faiths," fortunately, provide a measure of control.

A piquant touch is the editors' worry about cult figures who "convince the weak and wounded that he or she has acquired the godlike power to set the date and destination of life's last journey." This from an editorial page that leads the pack in calling for doctor-assisted suicide as an essential component of "death with dignity." Were the editors not impressed by the videotaped dignity, calm, and downright cheerfulness of the Santa Fe suicides who were, as the jargon has it, freely choosing to take ultimate charge of their own lives? As to their presuming to set their destination, surely the editors cannot complain about that, since they so strongly agree with the Supreme Court dictum in *Casey* that there is no higher truth than "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."

Why shouldn't people set their own date and destination? It is their constitutional right. A case can be made that, in their rejection of authoritative tradition, in their fascination with novel spiritualities and high-tech expertise, and in the assertion of a right to control their lives and deaths, the suicides of Heaven's Gate exemplify the "mainstream faith" of the *Times*' editorial page.

One notes the coincidence that Santa Fe means "holy faith," and, like gnostics of all centuries including our own, the devotees of Heaven's Gate twisted snatches of Christian faith into a doctrine of contempt for life and for the body, the latter being no

more than a "physical container" that is to be discarded on the way to the "Level Above Human." In Christian doctrine, there is for human beings no level above human. In the Incarnation, God became man, thus investing our humanity with infinite worth. In the words of the second-century Irenaeus, "The glory of God is man fully alive."

Allegedly enlightened folk ridicule the Church's concern for orthodox teaching, ignoring the fact that wrong beliefs lead to deadly consequences. The *Times* refers to the "psychiatric-spiritual saga" of the suicides. Psychiatry is the first and last resort of the mandarins of what Philip Rieff called the therapeutic society. The thirty-nine men and women at Rancho Santa Fe were in fact acting in accord with a not entirely incoherent, although dreadfully false, belief system. As the late mythologist Joseph Campbell would put it, they were "following their bliss."

In its essential assumptions, theirs is the belief system of what John Paul II has aptly called the culture of death. They are assumptions regularly promulgated by the editorial page of the *New York Times*. This is not to say that the editors approve of what was done in Rancho Santa Fe. Clearly, they do not. It deeply offends their sensibilities. They go so far as to call it a tragedy. But they have divested themselves of the language required to say why it was wrong.

FT

THE MOST INTENSE COMPETITION

In the many years of the Dulles Colloquium, there have been few sessions more scintillating and intellectually rewarding than a recent day with René Girard. As regular readers know, Girard is something of a cult figure among a large number of literary critics, philosophers, and theologians (see J. Bottum's "Girard Among the Girardians," March 1996). He insists that he does not have a "system," but all kinds of people persist in trying to systematically fit everything under the sun into his key ideas about "mimetic desire" and "sacred violence." There is even a "journal of violence, mimesis, and culture" that is aptly and strikingly named *Contagion*. The following excerpt is from Girard's essay in a recent issue on "Eating Disorders and Mimetic Desire," in which he contends that anorexia and bulimia are driven by a cultural obsession with being thin.

"Our thinness hysteria is unique, no doubt, because it is inseparable from our unique brand of

radical and radically self-defeating 'individualism,' but some features of our current behavior are duplicated in other cultures, for instance in the famous *potlatch* of the American Northwest. The great American sociologist Thorstein Veblen was already aware of this fact and, in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*, he discussed the potlatch within the context of what he calls conspicuous consumption. Showing off one's wealth has always seemed important to the nouveau riche type everywhere, and in our world there have never been as many nouveaux riches as in America. Being immigrants, or children of immigrants, these people could not pretend they came from old and prestigious families; money was the sole instrument of their snobbery. When the wealthy become accustomed to their own wealth, straight conspicuous consumption loses its appeal and the nouveaux riches turn into *anciens riches*. They perceive this change as the *summum* of cultural refinement and they do their best to make it as conspicuous as the former consumption. They invent a conspicuous nonconsumption, therefore, superficially discontinuous with the attitude it supersedes but, at a deeper level, it is a mimetic escalation of the same process. In our society, conspicuous nonconsumption is present in many areas, in clothes for instance. The torn blue jeans, the ill-fitting jacket, the baggy pants, the refusal to dress up, are forms of conspicuous nonconsumption.

"The politically correct reading of this phenomenon is that the rich young people regard their own superior buying power with a feeling of guilt, and they desire, if not to be poor, at least to look poor. This interpretation is too idealistic. The real purpose is a calculated indifference to clothes, an ostentatious rejection of ostentation. The message is 'I am beyond a certain type of consumption. I cultivate more esoteric pleasures than the crowd.' To abstain voluntarily from something, no matter what, is the ultimate demonstration that one is superior to that something and to those who covet it. The wealthier we are, the more precious the objects must be for which we deign to compete. Very rich people no longer compare themselves through the mediation of clothes, automobiles, or even houses. The more wealthy we are, in other words, the less grossly materialistic we can afford to be in a hierarchy of competitive games that become more and more rarefied as the escalation continues. Ultimately this process may turn into a complete rejection of competition, which is not always but may be the most intense competition of all."

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MATURE ADVERTISING FOR MATURE AUDIENCES

The following story is from *Advertising Age*:

Pontifical Council Sets Guidelines for Making Ads

Vatican values leave
U.S. admen unimpressed

By Carol Krol

Even before they've actually seen the Vatican's new handbook stating what makes good and bad advertising, those who create ads are questioning its relevance.

"I think the Catholic Church has enough problems and they shouldn't be worried about advertising," said Donny Deutsch, CEO Deutsch, New York. "They should stick to religion, and we'll stick to advertising."

"It's all well and good for Roman Catholics, but not for the rest of us. You can't really dictate that sort of thing in a multicultural society like the U.S.," said Diana Loguzzo, U.S. marketing manager for Diesel Clothing.

In the making since 1993 (*AA*, Sept. 6, '93), the Pontifical Council for Social Communications' "Ethics in Advertising" handbook outlines the abuses and potential for harm of some advertising.

'SHOCKING' ADS

The guidelines reportedly acknowledge that advertising can be informative and entertaining but denounce shocking, exploitative ads.

While the handbook hasn't yet been circulated widely in the U.S., the ad community seems unimpressed.

"I think [the handbook] is more of the kind of lecturing authoritarian nonsense that will put people off, particularly young adults and I think that's a shame particularly these days when they need to be careful," said Martin Macdonald, managing partner-executive creative director at Wes-Wayne, Atlanta. "How many more teenage mothers and how much more does the incidence of AIDS have to rise before the boys in the Vatican, and they are all boys, wake up?"

CROSSING THE LINE

Pope John Paul II is "taking the rules that have governed man and applying them to advertising. . . . I think he's crossing over the line a little bit," said Laurence Boschetto, partner and exec VP-director of account services at Adler Boschetto Peebles & Partners, New York, who was a Christian Brother and has an undergraduate degree in theology. "I have one question for the Church: If we

don't abide by these laws that they put out, are we in the ad community doomed forever?"

John Nieman, vice chairman-chief creative officer at D'Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles, said: "Any religious group has a right to communicate their views, but I don't think you can stop the free flow of information."

One adman, Kevin O'Neill, president-chief creative officer of Warwick Baker O'Neill, isn't taking it too seriously.

"As a graduate of Holy Innocents Grammar School in Brooklyn," he said, "I should've guessed that one day I'd be showing my storyboards to the Pope."

With his permission, here is a letter to the editor by Kenneth Woodward, senior writer at *Newsweek*. It is, I think, right on the button:

To the Editors of *Advertising Age*:

I haven't seen the Vatican's "Ethics In Advertising" handbook either, but from your brief summary of it, it sounds like common sense to me. Not so the puerile comments you collected from industry executives, all of whom strike me as folks who could use whatever ethical guidelines they can find.

Donny Deutsch's notion that the Church should stick to religion and leave advertising to the likes of him might make sense if advertising—or any business—were free of ethical choices and moral effects. His view is a straight-faced echo of the old bombastic line, "The business of America is business." Back to school, Donny.

Diana Loguzzo, a marketing manager, presumes the Church is trying to "dictate" what a "multicultural society" should do. But guidelines by definition don't "dictate," Diana, and last I looked the Roman Catholic Church was the most "multicultural" society in the world—more so, certainly, than the American advertising community. Watch clichés masquerading as thoughts, Diana.

Martin McDonald's jibes at the Church's sexual ethics are adolescent and beside the point—as if the Church were somehow more responsible for "teenage mothers" and "AIDS" than those who use sex to sell everything from cars to jeans. McDonald would be out of a job if advertising began to preach any form of self-restraint.

Laurence Boschetto proves that an undergraduate in theology is still an undergraduate. Yes, Laurence, you just may someday be held morally accountable for the work you do, like everyone else. No wonder you're a *former* Christian Brother.

John Nieman labors under the illusion that advertising provides "information." Tell me,

John, just what is the message of Calvin Klein's exploitative underwear ads?

Kevin O'Neill demonstrates he is still a Holy Innocent. I doubt the Pope would be interested in your storyboards, Kevin. He is asking that you consider more than the client and the bottom line when you do your "creative" work.

As for *Advertising Age*, what sort of jejune journalism is it to solicit comments on a document that neither the interviewers or the interviewees have seen? Your age (adolescence) is showing.

Kenneth L. Woodward
Senior Writer
Newsweek

FT

HOLLYWOOD NOTWITHSTANDING, FREE TIBET

The actor Richard Gere has been the key player in lining up Hollywood to back the Dalai Lama and the cause of freeing Tibet from China's oppression. Four movies on the subject are in the works, and benefits for Tibet feature such glitterati as Harrison Ford, Sharon Stone, Steven Seagal, and Shirley MacLaine. China scholar Orville Schell says, "Tibet is going to enter Western popular culture as something can only when Hollywood does the entertainment injection into the world system. Hollywood is the most powerful force in the world, besides the U.S. military." That is surely among the more dismal thoughts of the decade.

In the late 1970s Tibet was not a fashionable cause, for it was suspected of being associated with that most unfashionable of causes, anticommunism. I was connected with what was then called the Council on Religion and International Affairs and became interested in Tibet. I was for a time the Dalai Lama's man in New York, introducing him and his cause to people who might be helpful. A highlight was arranging an evening for Tibet at St. Patrick's Cathedral. Prior to the event, calls were going back and forth with Rome to make sure that what was said did not compromise Catholic doctrine by religious syncretism. The cathedral was packed, and the next day the *New York Times* had a big picture of the Dalai Lama and Terence Cardinal Cooke sitting side by side in the chancel and holding hands. The hand-holding was the Dalai Lama's idea, and a somewhat embarrassed Cardinal Cooke did not want

to appear unfriendly.

After the Dalai Lama won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, and the likes of Shirley MacLaine turned him into a New-Ageish celebrity, I have had moments of ambivalence about my small part in all this. Says Melissa Mathison, wife of Harrison Ford and screenwriter of one of the movies, "The fascination is the search for the third eye. Americans are hoping for some sort of magical door into the mystical, thinking that there's some mysterious reason for things, a cosmic explanation." That's how Americans in Hollywood talk. "Tibet offers the most extravagant expression of the mystical," she says, and when people meet the Dalai Lama "you can see on their faces that they're hoping to get this hit that will transcend their lives, take them someplace else." Cocaine or Tibetan mysticism, it's the hit that counts.

My experience with the Dalai Lama suggests that he is more than a little amused by such spiritualistic gibberish and sensation-mongering, but he is masterful in garnering support where he can get it. Which is to his credit, for his cause is just. So I swallow hard and, Hollywood glitzmeisters notwithstanding, am pleased to be counted in the cause of a free Tibet.

FT

DEEP, CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE EDUCATION FRONT

"Character education" programs in public schools come in for a drubbing by Allie Kohn, writing in *Phi Delta Kappan*, a publication for professional educators. It seems these programs are "designed to make children work harder and do what they're told." "Even when other values are also promoted—caring or fairness, say—the preferred method of instruction is tantamount to indoctrination. The point is to drill students in specific behaviors rather than to engage them in deep, critical reflection about certain ways of being." No wonder Mr. Kohn is upset. There are few things more creative than a fourth grader engaged in deep, critical reflection about ways of being.

Character educators also encourage competition and give out awards for achievement. As Mr. Kohn complains: "When some children are singled out as 'winners,' the central message that every child learns is this: 'Other people are potential obstacles to my success.'" Even worse, character education fosters self-restraint. "This is noteworthy," Kohn writes, "because the virtue of self-restraint—or at least the decision to give special emphasis to it—has

historically been preached by those, from St. Augustine to the present, who see people as basically sinful." I think he got the character educators there. The texts on character education, says Kohn, "describe religious dogma, not scientific fact." Scientific fact "supports the idea that it is as 'natural' for children to help as to hurt." Ask any parent.

Then Mr. Kohn gets to the heart of the matter: "Character education rests on three ideological legs: behaviorism, conservatism, and religion. Of these, the third raises the most delicate issues for a critic; it is here that the charge of ad hominem argument is most likely to be raised. So let us be clear: it is of no relevance that almost all of the leading proponents of character education are devout Catholics. But it is entirely relevant that, in the shadows of their writings, there lurks the assumption that only religion can serve as the foundation for good character. (William Bennett, for example, has flatly asserted that the difference between right and wrong cannot be taught 'without reference to religion.') It is appropriate to consider the personal beliefs of these individuals if those beliefs are ensconced in the movement they have defined and directed. What they do on Sundays is their own business, but if they are trying to turn our public schools into Sunday schools, that becomes everybody's business." The fact that leading proponents of character education (e.g., Kevin Ryan and William Kilpatrick) are Catholics "is of no relevance," but Mr. Kohn thought he would mention it just the same because "it is appropriate to consider the personal beliefs of these individuals." Now if only somebody somewhere along the line had "indoctrinated" Mr. Kohn and the editors of *Phi Delta Kappan* in the basics of clear thinking rather than letting them muddle toward adulthood in their befuddled engagement with deep, critical reflection about ways of being.

FT

SCHINDLER'S COMPLAINT

It's hard to know how best to respond to David Schindler's new book. It's a real grab-bag of arguments and complaints, as is suggested by the title, *Heart of the World, Center of the Church: Communio Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation*. Schindler, a professor at the John Paul II Institute in Washington, D.C., tackles what has gone wrong with Catholic higher education, technical disputes over Thomist understandings of "person," and the necessarily feminine-marian disposition of society to God's grace, among other subjects. But the gravamen of the book is a renewed attack on

"Catholic liberals," "conservative liberals," and "neoconservatives," which terms are used interchangeably to refer to Michael Novak, George Weigel, and your scribe, all of whom are, according to Schindler, following in the mistaken path charted by the late Father John Courtney Murray. Our fatal error, says Schindler, is to try to make Catholic teaching compatible with the American liberal regime that claims to be neutral toward religion but is in fact fraught with anthropological and even theological presuppositions that inevitably produce secularist decadence and, finally, what John Paul II calls "the culture of death."

Although the indictment is of many parts and typically expressed in arcane philosophical and theological terminology, the upshot is a sweeping charge that the Neuhaus-Weigel-Novak gang (sometimes Novak-Weigel-Neuhaus), while perceived as championing Catholic teaching and this pontificate in particular, is in fact selling out the store to liberalism. I say it's hard to know how to respond, in part because Mr. Schindler is a personable fellow and, as I said in an article last month, every time we discuss these matters personally he declares himself reassured that we have no substantive disagreements, but then he returns to the attack, as in the present book.

"The burden of the present book," he writes, "is to suggest that liberalism cannot so easily claim the moral authority of Catholicism, and, at the same time, to indicate why an increasing liberal hegemony throughout the world should be viewed not altogether with favor but, on the contrary, with a certain alarm." Well, yes, if, like Schindler, one puts the worst possible construction on liberalism—meaning the American founding, liberal democracy, and market economics. And that is what Schindler tends to do. Liberalism is condemned tout court as a dogmatic system premised upon radical individualism, the autonomous self, calculated self-interest, and human creativity as opposed to receptivity to God's grace. In sum, Schindler starts out by agreeing with those who construe the liberal tradition—and its chief historical instantiation, the American experiment—along rigorously secularist and un-Christian (maybe anti-Christian) lines. Those of us who defend the "Murray Project" might easily turn around and charge Schindler with selling out the American store to the enemies of the faith. I am not about to join him in giving up the argument and letting Lorraine Tribe or the ACLU define the meaning of liberal democracy.

But some of the questions raised are too important to be content with exchanges of tu quoque. For instance, the 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus* says that the Church does not offer a "third way" between socialism (what Schindler calls liberationism) and democratic capitalism (what he calls neoconservative liberalism), and Schindler says he

agrees. The Church, he writes, does not offer a third way as a specific social-political system, but: "My argument is that the Church nonetheless does offer such a third way *as an ecclesiology*; and that this ecclesiology, *of its very essence as an ecclesiology*, is destined to transform both socialism and democratic capitalism."

This new ecclesiology, or doctrine of the Church, goes by the name of *communio*, which is also the name of an international theological journal founded by such as Joseph Ratzinger and Hans Urs von Balthasar. (Schindler is editor of the English edition.) The neoconservatives, he charges, are engaged in a "con game" of reconciling liberalism with Catholicism in which they utilize a defective understanding of the Church, and also of the world, "because they have failed to understand the persons of Mary, Christ, and the Trinity *as they are analogously revealed in spousal union, eucharist, and communio*." In their writings the neocons, Schindler believes, water down Catholic truth in order to gain public acceptance, thus failing to offer a "unified Gospel spirituality." There is, writes Schindler, "a single *basic* spirituality for all Christians, and Mary is the model of that spirituality. Or, as Balthasar puts it: the marian *fiat* is the *Urakt*: the primary or originating act that serves as the ground of all Christian life and action." Any argument that fails to make that explicit is, in his view, less than authentically Catholic.

Schindler says the NWN gang, following Murray, claim that they are engaged in *public* discourse and therefore must make their arguments accessible to all reasonable persons, irrespective of their theological convictions or lack thereof. That, according to Schindler, is just the problem. A full-bore, undiluted presentation of Catholic truth is unapologetically aimed at converting people to that truth. He asks, "Would not an ethic that held less demand for conversion have a greater chance for widespread success?" He does not deny that, but simply responds by quoting Balthasar that "success is not a Gospel category."

So much for the task of trying to construct a comprehensive public discourse based upon reason and moral law. Attempting that is a liberal delusion, according to Schindler. It is worse than futile; it inevitably results in a betrayal of the fullness of the truth. Schindler's position is in key respects a Catholic version of the position of R. J. Rushdoony and the theonomists among Calvinists and of Stanley Hauerwas in his more intemperate moments. In their view, a genuinely *public discourse* is an oxymoron. Although they may use the same words, between Christian and non-Christian (maybe, for Schindler, between Catholic and non-Catholic) there is no commensurable discourse. The Catholic intellectual should simply bear witness to the fullness of truth in the hope of converting others to it. Although he

denies it, Schindler is, like the theonomists, disposed toward a monism that cannot abide the pluralism that is history before the End Time.

With David Schindler, I am a great admirer of Balthasar, and of his other theological heroes, such as Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II), Ratzinger, and de Lubac. We have no disagreement that the entirety of all that is must be understood in terms of the *communio* of the Church and, ultimately, in terms of human destiny in the *communio* of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—so that, in the words of St. Paul, it may become manifest that in Christ "all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross." (Colossians 1)

Have all my writings and public statements—or those of Murray, Novak, and Weigel—communicated as effectively as they might have these core Christological and ecclesiological truths? It would be ridiculous to claim there is no room for criticism. That said, however, Schindler fails to recognize the ways in which Christian truth can be spoken in an American idiom that respects the sensibilities of our cultural context. Such is his animus against what he calls Anglo-American liberalism—and against the popular religion that attends it—that anything short of a direct assault upon it is a betrayal of Catholic truth.

I also confess to being a mite irritated when informed that I do not understand that the alleged neutrality of liberalism is typically not neutral toward religion. I wrote a book on that which received some little attention. It was called *The Naked Public Square*. And no one can fairly claim that that argument has been neglected over the years by this journal. There is, as well, a certain piquancy in being accused of uncritically baptizing American democracy while others are accusing me of "anti-Americanism" and subversion for raising the question of the legitimacy of judge-made law that violates the moral law and reflects contempt for the consent of the governed.

As John Paul II has repeatedly asserted, Catholic theology must be like St. Paul in the Areopagus, constantly teasing out and bringing to fulfillment the truths and half-truths present in the culture. That is what John Courtney Murray and many others have tried to do with Anglo-American liberalism and, more particularly, the American social and political experiment. Schindler will have none of it. Rather than, like St. Paul, declaring the true God to whom the "altar to an unknown god" is implicitly directed (Acts 17), Schindler demands that we join him in railing against the idolaters. As a consequence, he ends up undercutting the comprehensive (catholic and Catholic) nature of the Gospel he espouses. Positioned in such antithesis to culture, Catholicism begins to look very much like a sect, which I am sure is not what Schindler intends.

Moreover, he fails to see that direct evangelization through the reiteration of his favored theological formulas is not the only form of service to God and neighbor. Christians also serve who work at establishing a public moral discourse, knowing that all truth is ultimately one, and knowing also that many people will not be converted to the fullness of that truth in *communio* with Christ and his Church. Maybe Schindler is right and I should be editing a journal of Catholic apologetics and evangelization rather than “a journal of religion and public life.” But that is not what God (I believe) and my bishop (I know) want me to do. While one should always receive intelligent and well-intended reproaches with gratitude, *Heart of the World, Center of the Church* could do with more respect for the integrity of diverse vocations.

A blurb on the dust jacket announces that the book “establishes David Schindler as the American Balthasar.” Well, not quite. He is a serious student of Balthasar and, despite his abstruse and technical language, he provides useful insights to Balthasar’s thought. For a more accessible introduction to Balthasar, however, I recommend Edward Oakes’ splendid book *The Pattern of Redemption*, which has received extended attention in these pages. Strikingly unlike Schindler, Balthasar was very much an ecumenical theologian, as witness his magnificent interpretation of Karl Barth. Also, and again very much unlike Schindler, Balthasar was sympathetically and imaginatively engaged with his culture, illuminating with loving care the theological significance of the literature, music, philosophy, and social experience of Europe. That is what, if there is ever to be one, an “American Balthasar” will do in this cultural context. Meanwhile, we have David Schindler, who is no little gift. I look forward to our next amicable discussion, and brace myself for his next attack. (Readers interested in pursuing further these agreements and disagreements can obtain a videotape of a series of television dialogues between Dr. Schindler and myself that might serve as a provocative topic for study groups. \$19.95 plus \$3 s/h from The Christopher Shop, St. Charles Seminary, 100 East Wynnewood Road, Wynnewood, PA 19096; Phone: 610-667-9112.)

FT

A JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION?

With a fair degree of regularity we refer to the “Judeo-Christian tradition” in these pages, and just

as regularly we receive letters questioning the appropriateness of the phrase. One response is that we are referring to a common *moral* tradition rather than a common religious tradition, although that is not entirely satisfactory since morality and religion cannot be so neatly separated. Matthew Parris takes up the question in the *Spectator* of London, provoked by a book by Britain’s Chief Rabbi, Dr. Jonathan Sacks, who regularly refers to “Judeo-Christian” values. “Dr. Sacks is not just off-target, he is 180 degrees out,” says Parris. “The Judeo-Christian tradition is secular and draws its courage from the skepticism of Jews towards their old religion, and of Christians toward theirs.” The proper name for the tradition in question, says Parris, is liberalism.

Parris goes further. He thinks a case can be made for a Judeo-Islamic tradition, since, among other similarities, both are unitarian rather than trinitarian, both believe in the ideal of a theocracy, and both are iconoclastic and opposed to the veneration of sacred objects. In the same way, he says, a case can be made for a Christian-Islamic tradition, since, unlike Judaism, they are not tied to “racial self-consciousness or blood-inheritance,” and therefore try to convert the nations. “Finally,” writes Parris, “though Judaism has its mystics it is by instinct suspicious of persons claiming divine inspiration. But Christianity and Islam were born in ‘witness’ (by Christ and Muhammad) and are impressed by new instances. Both are (in the polite sense) hysterical religions, where Judaism can sound like an immensely wise highway code. Both (unlike Judaism) have been attended by alleged miracles. Both (especially, in Islam, the Shi’ites) have a central place for passion. Though Islam and Christianity have often fought, they are fighting for similar ground. Judaism is in many ways, the odd one out.”

In sum, the talk about Judeo-Christian values is the language of secular liberalism. “Properly understood, the two religions and their values are so very different. Yet the two peoples—if peoples we be—are no longer very different. It is easy to explain why. In Europe, most modern Christians and most modern Jews no longer take their religions very seriously. It is in our escape from our respective faiths, not in our adherence to them, that European Jews and European Christians find shared values and can speak of a common tradition. We come from two utterly different places but we are now traveling together. We are both traveling away from our ancient faiths.”

Mr. Parris is no doubt right in thinking that some who speak about a Judeo-Christian tradition are in flight from both Judaism and Christianity. But this does not explain the fact that there are intellectually astute and religiously serious Jews and Christians who also speak of a Judeo-Christian tradition. The usage reflects the degree, commonly slighted by

secularists, to which Western culture has been shaped by biblical religion. Admittedly, the influence was and is overwhelmingly Christian, but in this century, and especially in the last fifty years, there has been a genuine discovery by Christians of the irrevocably Jewish character of Jesus and the faith of his followers. In terms of substantive belief, historical experience, and present cultural reality, the Christian connection with Islam is in no way comparable, and is in most respects antithetical. In Romans 9 through 11, for example, it is true that St. Paul does not speak of the Judeo-Christian tradition, but only because it would have been inconceivable to him that Jesus the Christ could be separated from the Jewish story of salvation.

Mr. Parris suspects that the phrase Judeo-Christian began in America "as a way of saying 'Christian values' without leaving Jewish people out." It is a matter of manners. There is no doubt truth in that as well. I hear a good many Christians speak of "Judeo-Christian values" who have in no way internalized the theological and historical bonds between Judaism and Christianity. On the other hand, good manners—as in civility—are not to be despised. At a much deeper level, however, the unprecedented development in this century is that many committed Jews and Christians have come to understand that they share one story. For many reasons, this could happen only in America. Neither in Europe nor in Israel has the relationship between Jews and Christians made possible the kind of dialogue we know here.

There are many disagreements between Jews and Christians, most notably the disagreement over the identity of Jesus as the promised Messiah. The fact remains, however, that, while talk about a Judeo-Christian tradition may in some cases be no more than Christian politesse or secularist fudging, it most importantly reflects a discovery of the continuing significance of what St. Paul meant when he said that Gentile Christians are the branch grafted on to the root of God's covenant with Abraham. The truth is that when Christians view Judaism as "the odd one out," they remove themselves from the story of redemption. But those who, like Mr. Parris, have "escaped" from their Christianity cannot be expected to understand that.

FT

WHILE WE'RE AT IT

■ What do these people have in common? Mary Ann Glendon, Robert Bork, Clarence Thomas, Irving Kristol, Peggy Steinfels, Elizabeth Fox-

Genovese, William Jefferson Clinton. Nah, I'm just kidding about President Clinton. He's the one who doesn't read FT, or at least nothing he has said or done suggests that he does. But the others do, along with many thousands of subscribers, many of whom were alerted to the journal by someone like you. Send us your list of family members, friends, and associates who should be reading FT and we'll send them a sample issue in your name. Feel free to include President Clinton, if you think your recommendation might move him to subscribe.

■ Human Life International (HLI), as the name suggests, is a pro-life organization working in countries around the world. They set their annual conference for Minneapolis and Archbishop Harry Flynn of Saint Paul and Minneapolis had agreed to preside at the opening Mass. He wrote a letter of welcome to Father Paul Marx, founder of HLI, welcoming the group to the archdiocese and echoing Pope John Paul II's tribute to Fr. Marx as an "apostle of life." Then the uproar commenced. A number of Jewish organizations, joined by "lesbigay" and various pro-abortion groups, unleashed a vitriolic attack on HLI for being anti-Semitic, homophobic, and sundry other very bad things. The message was unmistakable: if the Archbishop did not withdraw his support for HLI, it would have dire consequences for Jewish-Catholic relations in the Twin Cities. That threat was reinforced by public statements from the Archbishop's own staff. The problem is that some years ago Fr. Marx wrote a book in which he deplored the prominence of Jewish leadership in support for abortion on demand. Jews of all people, Fr. Marx contended, should understand what happens when human life is devalued. I have read Fr. Marx's statements with care. He was not politic in his manner of expression, but substantively he said nothing that has not been said also by numerous Jewish thinkers, writing both critically and approvingly, about Jews and the abortion question. In recent years, HLI has worked hard to mend fences with the Jewish community, but to no avail. On April 2, Archbishop Flynn issued a statement announcing that he would not participate in the opening Mass for the HLI meeting. He went much further than that, explicitly accusing HLI of bigotry and implicitly accusing it of anti-Semitism. His action has disappointed and outraged many faithful Catholics and pro-life activists. It will, it seems almost certain, reinforce the stereotype of Jewish intolerance and hostility to the protection of the unborn. And it does nothing to remedy the stereotype of the faintheartedness of Christian leadership in the face of moral intimidation. According to HLI leaders, the Archbishop did not even give them the courtesy of meeting with them before issuing his public condemnation, although they had repeatedly pleaded for such a meeting. "I

cannot support any organization which tolerates bigotry," the Archbishop declared. There was bigotry in the Twin Cities brouhaha, but it was not on the part of HLI. Fr. Marx and his organization have no doubt made mistakes, but they have done nothing to warrant such shabby treatment from a prelate of their own church. Nor does this incident do anything to put Jewish-Catholic relations on a firmer foundation of honesty, trust, and mutual respect.

■ For a long time, or at least since the *Brown* decision of 1954, everyone has wanted to teach constitutional, as distinct from "nuts and bolts" or "black letter," law, says Steven D. Smith of the University of Colorado Law School in a forthcoming book, *The Constitution and the Pride of Reason* (Oxford University Press). He thinks that's changing now, as law professors recognize the growing legal incoherence of Supreme Court decisions. It's not just radical students in Critical Legal Studies who have concluded that "It's all just politics." One of Smith's students wrote on an exam paper, "The principal skill needed to understand why the Supreme Court rules the way it does on any particular constitutional issue is the ability to count to five." Oops, there we go again, raising that controversial "legitimacy question" about the rule of our robed masters.

■ Commenting on a BBC film of a play by John Paul II, Mark Lawson writes in the *Tablet*: "Clearly, the urge to write is still there. Two years ago, John Paul II became the first serving Pope to have published a mass-market book written while in office, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*." The suggestion is that most popes wait until after they have left office.

■ This journal has reviewed Roger Shattuck's *Forbidden Knowledge* (February 1997), but Robert Alter has further comment of interest. Writing in the *Times Literary Supplement*, he addresses himself to Shattuck's criticism of academics who want to make the Marquis de Sade a "transgressive hero": "Shattuck ponders the possibly ghastly consequences in the real world of violent pornography, quoting Ivan Karamazov's 'What price will we pay to prevent the torture of one helpless child?' not as a literary parable but as a question that, alas, sometimes is literally applicable to crimes perpetrated. This is not a plea for censorship but an argument that we need to balance the imperative of free speech and the potential dangers of human damage, that we have 'a double duty'—'to be faithful to our traditions and our knowledge, to our community and our history' and 'to be able to respond with guarded flexibility and understanding to challenges to those traditions and that knowledge.' In the end, this is not a defense of taboos on knowledge but an exposure of the

treason of the intellectuals, who have imbued *transgression* with the aura of sanctity that *learning* has in traditional Jewish communities and *faith* among many Protestants. Thus, the critique of the cult of Sade is not a brief for burning Sade but a reminder that truth in labeling is as serious an obligation for intellectuals as for manufacturers. The concluding words of the Sade chapter are a perfect illustration of the judiciousness and moral clarity that make *Forbidden Knowledge* a necessary book for our cultural moment: "The divine marquis represents forbidden knowledge that we may not forbid. Consequently, we should label his writings carefully: potential poison, polluting to our moral and intellectual environment." Nicely said, indeed, but are we not caving when we allow that the forbidden cannot be forbidden? If the analogy with manufacturers is taken seriously, there are numerous forbidden products, or products subject to careful prescription, as in your local pharmacy. Shattuck dances away from the C-word, but one may wonder whether a culture in which censorship is forbidden can publicly distinguish between good and evil. It could even end up with, for instance, a popular movie celebrating a pornographer as the champion of its virtuous devotion to freedom. But perhaps I go too far.

■ This is from the early nineteenth century, when pundits and politicians were decrying the role of evangelical Protestants (then the religious establishment) in the politics of Cherokee Indian removal, the delivery of Sunday mail, dueling, and other practices the evangelicals deemed contrary to the moral order. Their critics did not use the term "religious right," but the gist of their complaint was the same: Believers were trying to impose their morality on others, religion should be confined to the private sphere, religiously motivated reasons must be excluded from public discourse, and so forth. In response, the Reverend F. Freeman and others seized the constitutional high ground, accusing their accusers of fanning the flames of intolerance with their demagoguery about "priestcraft" and "persecution." Said Freeman, "This cry of persecution is itself the bitterest persecution. This charge of intolerance is the very hand of intolerance itself, stretched forth with unrelenting grasp." Then he said this: "We are authorized to maltreat no one for the honest expression of his views. He is none the less our fellow-citizen and neighbor, possessing equal rights with ourselves and entitled to the same urbane and respectful treatment, whether he be a Christian or a Jew, a Turk or a Pagan—whether a Catholic, an Episcopalian, a Baptist, a Methodist, a Universalist, a Presbyterian, an Independent, or Unitarian, or Nothingarian. And all disrespectful treatment arising from such a cause, whatever that treatment be, whether simply hard looks, or public or private

slights, menaces, scoffs, ridicule, misrepresentation, impeachment of motives without cause, or whatever else that is discourteous, is the expression of a feeling which is diametrically opposed to true religious liberty, and is the offspring of a little, a very contracted mind." The above is from *The Politics of Revelation and Reason: Religion and Civic Life in the New Nation* by John G. West of Seattle Pacific University and is published by University Press of Kansas. Our friend Mark Noll gives the book high praise, and he is right once again.

■ Dennis Prager says children should talk to strangers. Parents who tell their children never to talk to strangers, he writes in the *Prager Perspective*, are projecting their own fears on to their children. If parents are calculating real risk, they should, more realistically, never let their children ride in a car. "The chances of a child being kidnapped by a stranger are virtually nil. In fact, in terms of risk, we would do better to tell our children to avoid adult relatives and acquaintances, and talk *only* to strangers." Prager has been asking high school students whether they would first save their drowning dog or cat or a drowning stranger. Only one in three votes to save the stranger. "I have always attributed this to the secular culture's reduction of human worth to that of animals, and to personal feelings ('I love my dog') replacing moral values (human life is sacred). I now realize there is a third reason—the fear of strangers that their parents have bequeathed to them."

■ "Universal Pastor: President Bill Clinton's Civil Religion" is an essay in *Journal of Church and State* by Robert D. Linder, an insightful student of the role of the presidency in our national ethos. Citing numerous statements by Clinton before and after he became President, Linder is struck by the way in which Clinton thinks of the presidency as a pastoral office not just for the nation but for the entire world. Possibly he thinks that he is fulfilling in a grand way a call to the ministry that many people thought was the young Billy Clinton's destiny. Of course, as Linder does not neglect to note, there is another side to Clinton that hardly fits the ministerial office. In his conclusion, Linder reminds us of G. K. Chesterton's famous observation that America "is a nation with the soul of a church." Asked about that aphorism many years later, British-born journalist Alistair Cooke commented: "That's true, but it also has the soul of a whorehouse." Linder suggests that both observations be kept in mind when contemplating the civil religion of President Clinton.

■ Pity the publicists of the pro-abortion cause whose job is to dramatize the allegedly noble and idealistic struggle to help women by securing "reproductive rights." In 1995, they suffered a severe

setback when Norma McCorvey, the "Jane Roe" of *Roe v. Wade*, was baptized and became a pro-life activist. Less publicized, although equally problematic to them, is Sandra Cano. She was the "Jane Doe" of *Doe v. Bolton*, the companion decision to *Roe* handed down from on high the same day of infamy, January 22, 1973. "It is like blood on my hands," says Mrs. Cano, "I don't want to be a participant." "Both women," says the *Washington Times*, "now say their status as poor, uneducated Southern women in their early twenties who married abusive men while still in their teens made them malleable plaintiffs for lawyers anxious to bring an abortion rights case to the Supreme Court." Abused women abused by lawyers who exploited them for their own purposes. Some idealism. Mrs. Cano says she thought the papers she signed without reading them were to help her get a divorce. Her lawyer, Margie Pitts Hames, said nothing about abortion. "I never wanted an abortion," says Mrs. Cano. "God gives life and God is the only one who should take life. Margie knew I was stupid. I didn't ask questions. I was mentally unstable." In 1989 she briefly made the national news by stating that *Doe v. Bolton* had misrepresented her, but two drive-by shooting incidents at her home shortly thereafter persuaded her to say no more about the case. The shootings are not on Planned Parenthood's list of incidents of "abortion-related violence."

■ The Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue (ARCIC) has fallen on hard times, according to *New Directions*, a publication of the "Forward in Faith" movement in the UK. ARCIC flourished, writes Andrew Burnham, when the Anglo-Catholics still held a strong hand in the Church of England, but those days are past. "Whilst the meeting in Rome of the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury in December 1996 was cordial, the homilies in San Gregorio al Celio revealed different agendas. ARCIC will indeed continue its task but the homilies set out some of the new understanding. The Pope once more reminded Dr. Carey of the essential role the Petrine ministry has to play in matters of faith and morals and of the difficulties caused by the Anglicans' priestly ordination of women. Dr. Carey in turn reminded the Pope that the Reformation was not so much a tragedy as a rediscovery. The Pope's message was clear: ARCIC will succeed ultimately only if it solves the problem of central authority versus provincial autonomy (or, in the words of Bishop Mark Santer, co-chairman of ARCIC, 'the impossible takes longer'). Dr. Carey's message was more nuanced. In reminding the Pope of the Reformation he was alluding to the Pope's own recognition of Martin Luther as a 'reformer.' Nevertheless he might as well have said: 'Watch out, Pope! The evangelicals are in charge now. Much as I myself like and admire pick-and-mix catholic

spirituality, there's a whole bunch out there who aren't convinced that Roman Catholics are even Christians."

■ Demographic projections are always an iffy business, as dramatically demonstrated by all the nonsense promulgated over the last thirty years about a "population explosion." Bill McGurn of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* has written on this in our pages, and now sends a somewhat alarming story on a report by the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. The report says: "The current forecast envisages a Japanese society that is aging much faster than predicted five years ago. . . . Steps should be taken immediately to stem the falling birthright. This is not only because a lower birthrate erodes the foundation of the social-welfare system and depresses economic activity, but also because it is not a sound society that discourages women from having children." The Japanese government projects that the population will peak at 128 million in the year 2007, fall to 100 million in 1050, and to 67 million by 2100. The remedy, according to this report, is to encourage people to marry earlier and to create an "environment in which women can bring up children more comfortably." We have to hope that reversing the population decline is not contingent upon making child-rearing easy, which it will never be, but the government's concern would seem to be thoroughly warranted. Of course Japan's situation is different from ours in that they have almost zero immigration. Here all the projections suggest, to the worry of some and the satisfaction of others, that the population will continue to grow but will be dramatically changed in its ethnic makeup by 2050 and will be overwhelmingly "Third World" by 2100. In both countries, of course, abortion produces a difference of many millions between the number of children conceived and the number of children born.

■ Socialists, Christian and otherwise, have gotten an awful lot of mileage out of Cain's response in Genesis 4:9, "Am I my brother's keeper?" The collectivist's assumption is that the answer is yes. Frank Johnson of the London *Spectator* suggests another reading. "The question could well be the insolent response of a confident, cocky murder suspect to the police, or to even higher authority, as in, 'I don't know where he is. I'm not his keeper, y'know.' In which case God's response to Cain was: 'I know perfectly well you're not his keeper. But I also know that you know where he is because you've murdered him.'" Johnson continues: "But what if socialists are right and the answer really is 'yes'? If so, it would create the sort of problem which only socialism could solve, but not in a way which would be pleasing to anyone other than the socialists states' officials. If each of us is our brother's and sister's keeper, it means that our brothers and sisters are our keepers too. Disputes would soon arise as to who is

to keep whom, and how we are kept. Who is to decide those disputes? A Britain whose population went around being its siblings' keepers would either be a Britain whose citizens were constantly in dispute with one another, or in which we had to leave it to Whitehall, plus various devolved legislatures, to decide how we were all to be kept. Also, we can only be our brother's and sister's keeper if we are in charge of our brother and sister. That is how parents are their children's keepers. The Keeper Society would therefore be, for adults, a stiflingly paternalistic one at best. It would not just be a society which looks after the needy, or helps thee love thy neighbour. For adults to love one another is for them to treat one another as equals—free people who do not need to be kept. There is a difference between a kept woman and a loved woman or a kept man and a loved man. Paternalism—in practice, the parenthood over us of officials nominally in the charge of politicians—was what Old Labour wanted. The relish with which New Labour hears sympathetic bishops quoting Genesis 4:9 suggests that, at heart, it is what New Labour wants too, once it is elected."

■ On the far edges of traditionalism is Gary Potter's column in the *Remnant*. We must, he says, face the fact that Christendom is dead. "If it is ever to be reborn, the idea of it must be kept alive today. Helping keep it alive is something every Catholic can do. Every Catholic can dedicate himself to keeping burning the fire of the Catholic thing at the back of the cave. One way we could live as Catholics is by learning and speaking among ourselves the Catholic language, Latin." Mr. Potter does not claim it is a truth of magisterial doctrine that Jesus spoke Latin, but he thinks it almost certain. How else could he have conversed with the centurion who had the sick servant, or with Pontius Pilate. Through a translator? "To me, it is very doubtful," says Mr. Potter. He offers a "cursus" of texts and cassettes for learning Latin. "It would be fitting and right (dignum et justum est) to speak a language spoken by Our Lord Himself." Not very persuasive, I'm afraid, but I do like that bit about keeping the fire of the Catholic thing burning at the back of the cave. We all have moments like that.

■ I'm not sure what it means, but almost nothing means nothing. Here, from the newsletter *Insight*, is the religious-affiliation lineup for the new Congress. "Roman Catholics number 151 (+3 from the prior Congress). Then follow 67 Baptists (-1), 59 Methodists (-4), 53 Presbyterians (-6), 46 unspecified Protestants (+23), 42 Episcopalians (-7), 35 Jews (+1), 22 Lutherans (+1), 15 Mormons (+2), 10 United Church of Christ (-2), 5 Christian Science (same), 5 Eastern Orthodox (same), 4 African Methodist Episcopal (+1), 4 Pentecostal (+1), 3 Seventh Day Adventists (-1), 3 Unitarians (-2), 2 Christian Reformed (same), 1 Christian Church (-1), and 1

Disciples of Christ (-1). Only 7 were unspecified (+2)."

■ Some years ago my friend Peter Berger came up with the idea that in the modern world everybody has to have an "identity kit." When personal identity is not ascribed or a "given" that comes with one's place in a traditional community, it must be constructed, with all the chatter about "identity crisis" that that entails. Since the reunification of Germany in 1990, it seems that East Germans are left with almost nothing in their identity kits. According to a survey conducted by *Der Spiegel* magazine, half the adults in the western regions claim to be religious, compared to only one in five in the former East Germany. Young people are especially prominent among those who say that God has "no meaning" for them. Berlin sociologist Klaus-Peter Jorns says that atheism may be one of the few surviving features of former East German life and therefore is "an important element of eastern German identity." Berger is fond of saying that any identity is better than none. One may be permitted to wonder.

■ For the last thirty years in law and medical practice, the concept of "brain death" has largely determined when organs can be taken for transplant purposes. An article in the influential *Hastings Center Report* asks whether it is time to abandon the brain-death criterion. The author, Robert D. Truog, proposes "turning back the clock" to the older cardiorespiratory definition of when someone is dead. The argument is very technical and I will not even try to summarize it. The concluding paragraph, however, is worth more than a moment's thought. "The most difficult challenge for this proposal would be to gain acceptance of the view that killing [people who are not quite dead] may sometimes be a justifiable necessity for procuring transplantable organs. Careful attention to the principles of consent and nonmaleficence should provide an adequate bulwark against slippery slope concerns that this practice would be extended in unforeseen and unacceptable ways. Just as the euthanasia debate often seems to turn less upon abstract theoretical concerns and more upon the empirical question of whether guidelines for assisted dying would be abused, so the success of the proposal could also rest upon factual questions of societal acceptance and whether this approach would erode respect for human life and the integrity of clinicians. While the answers to these questions are not known, the potential benefits of this proposal make it worthy of continued discussion and debate." Killing somebody who is not dead is serious business. We should not let the decision about doing that get bogged down in "abstract theoretical concerns" such as, presumably, right and wrong. Rather, "factual questions" should be

determinative. Such as "societal acceptance." How much acceptance, and by whom? Or the "factual" question of "whether this approach would erode respect for human life and the integrity of clinicians." But the only way to determine that is to go ahead and do it and then see what happens, isn't it? And then how would it be determined, factually speaking, that respect for human life had not been eroded? Into what incoherence we fall when we abandon "abstract theoretical concerns" such as morality.

■ This is simply for the record. It is unfortunate that some people in the media persist in citing Frances Kissling, president of Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC), as a credible source on matters Catholic. A few years ago the bishops conference finally thought it necessary to issue a statement making clear that she is not. CFFC is little more than a letterhead organization that has over the years received millions of dollars from Ford and other foundations to publicly agitate against the Church's position on abortion and population control. Before setting up CFFC, Ms. Kissling was deeply involved in sundry pro-abortion activities. On television and elsewhere, she is usually rather coy about her relationship to the Church, or even whether she is a Catholic. Her letter in response to a critic in the *National Catholic Register* is therefore of interest. She writes: "I have never said that I never attend Mass. Like most Catholics, I do not go every Sunday, but I do frequently attend and appreciate Mass and the Eucharist. I have the utmost respect for the magisterium—and for *sensus fidelium*. I deeply believe in the right of Catholics to dissent and in the primacy of conscience as the magisterium teaches. The National Right to Life Committee has no individual members. Instead, individuals join state Right to Life committees. It is therefore inaccurate to say that CFFC 'is not a membership organization in the sense of the National Right to Life organization.' Approximately five thousand individual supporters of CFFC—called associates—donate from \$1 to \$50 each year. To say that CFFC has 'virtually no members' is therefore misleading." The editors of the *Register* point out that, according to the *Code of Canon Law* (no. 1398), anyone who abets or procures an abortion incurs automatic excommunication. It is a matter of public record that Ms. Kissling has been encouraging and abetting abortions for years. As for what the magisterium teaches about conscience, the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (no. 1791) notes that an erring conscience "can often be imputed to personal responsibility." "This is the case when a man 'takes little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the habit of committing sin.' In such cases the person is culpable for the evil he commits." Not to put too fine a point on it, it would appear that Ms.

Kissling is excommunicate, her “appreciation” of the Mass notwithstanding. One is reminded of Flannery O’Connor’s response upon hearing the fallen-away Mary McCarthy say that she still thought the Mass was an impressive symbol. “If it’s just a symbol,” muttered the formidable O’Connor, “I say to hell with it.” CFFC is a lavishly funded (and not by \$1 to \$50 contributions) front for the promotion of the culture of death, and to friends in the media I say, well, forget it.

■ “Study Disputes Abortion Trauma.” Under that heading Jane E. Brody reports in the *New York Times* on a report by Dr. Nancy Felipe Russo, a psychologist at Arizona State University. Dr. Russo says she found no evidence of what is called post-abortion syndrome among women who have had abortions. Dr. David C. Reardon, a pioneer in the study of post-abortion syndrome, takes sharp issue, noting that Russo used data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY). It is generally agreed, even by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, that, based on expected abortion rates, 60 percent of the women interviewed by NLSY conceal the fact that they have had abortions. Moreover, says Reardon, Russo measured “well-being” by how people rate on a self-esteem scale and found, not so incidentally, that Catholic women have a lower level of well-being. Reardon notes that, according to this measure, a pedophile, for instance, would rate high on well-being if his actions do not impinge upon his self-esteem. In addition, he points out, Catholics and Christians in general are taught that humility is a virtue, and therefore may be more humble or at least answer questions in a way that suggests they are as humble as they think they should be. “The self-esteem scale does not at all measure the constellation of symptoms [associated with] post-abortion syndrome.” Russo’s report “is like taking the temperature of AIDS patients and declaring, based on a finding that the temperature is normal, that there is no AIDS.” Never mind. Keep your eye out for the next news story that cites Dr. Russo and the *New York Times* in claiming that “scientific research” shows there is no such thing as post-abortion syndrome.

■ In the early eighties quite a number of churches, towns, and cities declared themselves “nuclear-free zones.” Despite the wrongheaded politics involved, I generally thought that a good idea since most of the people agitating for such declarations were definitely not to be trusted with nuclear weapons. Now I see that the city council of Highland, Illinois, a town of 7,000, has declared itself an “abortion-free zone.” That sounds like an unqualifiedly good idea, and I hope it catches on.

■ Randall Balmer of Columbia University on President Clinton in an American Jewish

Committee booklet on pluralism: “He may be our first chief executive to take the issue of pluralism seriously, and on his best days one can detect him groping toward some language of moral discourse.” Well, there was that spot of national divisiveness that Lincoln had to cope with. In the same collection, William A. Galston, former domestic policy aide to President Clinton: “Today, the basis of American unity can be neither religion nor culture, but rather (and only) the basic framework of our political system. Our shared beliefs must be (in Sanford Levinson’s phrase) a ‘constitutional faith.’ This is what President Clinton meant when he said repeatedly in the 1996 campaign that if you believe in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, that is all you need to be a member of the American family.” Despite the parenthesis, it is the “only” that leaps out. An odd statement of radical proceduralism to come from an erstwhile champion of the “communitarian” movement.

■ *After Christianity* is published by Trinity (as in Holy Trinity) Press International. Here is the catalogue description: “Daphne Hampson argues that Christianity is neither true nor ethical and that we can no longer credit the particular intervention in history which Christian revelation requires. Moreover, she says, by referring to past history Christianity distorts human relationships in the present. Professor Hampson suggests that feminism propounds a radically new paradigm for the human self-in-relation. This has led to a rereading of the thought forms of many disciplines. Christian theology in particular shows itself to be a masculinist construction, reflecting the needs and desires of man. Its *raison d’être* may, in fact, be the legitimization of a patriarchal order.” Oh dear. One shakes his head in wonder that such feminist vapidity of yesteryear could still find a publisher in 1997. But then remembers that old platitudes never die, they just fade away into the afterglow of what was once revered as the academy.

■ While lecturing in Rome at the end of February, I was impressed by the number of people who have been following on the Internet the controversy stirred by FT’s initiative on the judicial usurpation of politics. Especially striking was a young priest who has championed civil disobedience in protest against the abortion license. In discussions of moral theology he has used to advantage Gertrude Himmelfarb’s fine book, *On Looking Into the Abyss*, particularly her reflections on what gives “conviction and authority to a moral code that is distinct from, and perhaps in contradiction to, the legal code.” Himmelfarb writes: “It takes a great effort of will and intellect for the individual to decide for himself that something is immoral, and to act on that belief, when the law and the institutions of the

state deem it to be permissible and legal. It takes an even greater effort for parents to inculcate that belief in their children, and persuade them to act on it, when public schools and official authorities contravene that belief and authorize behavior in violation of it." Himmelfarb is writing against the liberalism of John Stuart Mill and his followers today who would divorce positive law from moral law, arguing that any connection between law and morality is a form of "social tyranny." The young priest correctly observes that Himmelfarb's position on the possibility of morally illegitimate law gives the lie to those who have, in the present controversy, tried to drive a wedge between Jewish "neocons" and Christian "theocons." Reflective people of whatever faith know that, when law is untethered from morality, we are indeed "looking into the abyss."

■ At the end of February, the ABC News program *20/20* rendered the great public service of instructing the world that there are some members and ex-members of the Amish community who have had unhappy experiences in that world. After months of conscientious search for discontents, ABC reports that incest, physical abuse, rape, and other unpleasantnesses are not unknown among the Amish. As an ABC producer explained, "Someone has to tell the negative side of the Amish story." Really? William Bentley Ball, the great champion of religious freedom and friend of many Amish families, suggests that ABC might next want to take on Orthodox Jews, who are also "a secretive, sexually discriminatory bunch of child-controllers who are deeply undemocratic and un-ABC." That is not likely to happen, of course. The Amish, on the other hand, are a risk-free target. According to a spokesman for the Committee for Amish Religious Freedom, ABC News paid expenses in a child custody case so they could ambush and photograph the gut-wrenching screams of little Amish children being taken from their mother's arms in her horse-drawn buggy on a lonely country road. This is the same ABC News that recently lost five legal cases in connection with their news gathering methods, including the \$5.5 million award in favor of Food Lion stores. "The Dark Side of Amish Life" alleges that many Amish are leaving the community, but the Amish say their population has doubled in recent years. Protest against ABC's unethical practices is in order but, at the same time, the Amish should wear the hatchet job as a badge of honor. There are all too few religious communities today that offend the sensibilities of secularist bigots.

■ Liguori Publications puts out "Our Church Week," a bulletin service used by many parishes, including Immaculate Conception, Norfolk, Connecticut, where a reader encountered the issue that calls the faithful to Lenten preparation. The cover meditation is written by Sister Mary Ann

McGivern, S.L., who writes: "My income is below a taxable level because I oppose military spending and resist taxes. I clip coupons and spend carefully. I manage the Social Security income of a woman in a nursing home and run a small long-term Catholic Worker house, dealing with rents, subsidies, roof repairs, and the like. As director of the Economic Conversion Project, I oversee our annual budget of one hundred thousand dollars. I help track and challenge the billions of dollars in military sales. I actively oppose the two-hundred-sixty-five-billion-dollar Pentagon budget." How admirably penitential. I thank thee, Lord, that I am not like that sinful publican. Lest it be thought that Liguori neglects the great "life" questions, the back cover has a special department called "Choose Life." There we find Sr. Mary Ann again: "We need jobs, schools, health care, housing. We need to repair our bridges and water systems, and build more mass transit. We need to share our wealth with the destitute nations of the Southern Hemisphere. These are the simple demands of Natural Law. But, gripped as we are in the thrall of a violent society, we turn our backs on the poor and on the choice for life. We choose death." Mass transit, why of course. And there are all those silly people out there who think choosing death has to do with killing the unborn and the expendable aged, when it is really about driving your private car to work.

■ Paul Gigot, regular Washington columnist of the *Wall Street Journal*, notes that judicial activism is now "at the top of the GOP agenda." By the end of his second term, President Clinton could replace 50 percent of the federal judiciary and so far he has been getting almost a free ride in the Senate confirmation process. That may now be changing, writes Gigot. He cites a new Project on the Judiciary sponsored by the Ethics and Public Policy Center (EPPC) in Washington as one indication that nominations will be coming under much closer scrutiny, with the help also of Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah. "Judge Robert Bork has suggested limiting judicial review," says Gigot, "an idea being picked up by Republicans around the country. One such idea is already moving through the Washington state House." All of this is encouraging. As a member of the board of EPPC, I am confident its Project on the Judiciary will not be limited to the confirmation process, as important as that undoubtedly is. Also my conversations with state legislators, such as Kathy Lambert of Washington State, indicate that a real rebellion is abuilding, and it holds the promise of returning to "first things" in rethinking the limited role of the judiciary in a democratic polity. Of utmost importance at both the federal and state levels is maintaining, and increasing, the pressure for genuine judicial reform.

■ So what's to worry about? Alta Charo, a member

of President Clinton's National Bioethics Advisory Panel, discussing the cloning of human beings on *Nightline*: "I think that the fears about playing God began the first time we realized we didn't have to have children every time we had sex. This [cloning] is really a last step in what has been a series of steps in planning the way in which our families will emerge and appear."

■ There was a memorial service for avowed atheist and scourge of religion, Carl Sagan. It was held at the Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine (Episcopal), not surprisingly, and Vice President Al Gore was there to pay tribute, not surprisingly. Gore had worked with Sagan in sundry ecological crusades, and he said that, when fundamental differences in belief became apparent, it was Sagan who soothed the tension. "We do not have to agree on when and why the Earth was created in order to work to save it," the Vice President quoted Dr. Sagan as saying. Very soothing indeed, when the conflict between faith and atheism is subordinated to the higher cause of environmentalism. Of course Christians can work with non-Christians and anti-Christians on many worldly tasks, but the venue of the memorial and the rhetoric left no doubt that in this instance the worldly task assumed the garb of a higher religion.

■ I read in *Commonweal* that the editors there call this section not "The Public Square" but "The Public Scold." I'm sorry to hear that, for when I mention *Commonweal* from time to time it is more in a tone of curiosity than criticism. In fact, some conservatives have complained that I'm altogether too kind to *Commonweal*, going so far as to suggest that there is some kind conspiracy on the part of FT to define "responsible" Catholic opinion in a way that includes *Commonweal* and excludes anything to the right of FT. Nonsense. Were any such thing afoot here, I'm sure I'd be the first to know about it. In any event, here's this cover of *Commonweal* featuring an interview with Mary Robinson, President of Ireland, and again my curiosity is tweaked. President Robinson boldly declares herself for an Ireland that is "open, tolerant, inclusive." The interview is conducted by that venerable patriarch of Catholic leftisms, Gary MacEoin, who poses soft-ball questions such as what Mrs. Robinson sees for the "expanded role of Irish women." She thinks that joining the European Community "is an opportunity with special potential for women." And so it goes for three pages, with nary a mention of how Robinson squares Catholic faith with her support of, for instance, abortion and divorce. Attached to the interview is an admiring profile by Mary Pat Kelly, a frequent *Commonweal* contributor, who notes approvingly that Robinson "opposed the Catholic hierarchy on a number of issues. 'In the campaign [for president]," Kelly

writes, "Robinson presented an image of elegance, yet one that did not contradict her commitment to social change." Ah yes. Noblesse oblige, it used to be called. Robinson tells MacEoin that her purpose "is to help the small, the marginalized, the vulnerable," and concludes with the observation that "So, I suppose, there's plenty to do." The next week she announced that she was not running for reelection as president. The interesting thing, though, is why *Commonweal* would devote so much space to such utter vapidness and puffery. Can it be the editors think Mary Robinson is the very model of the publicly engaged Catholic? What other conclusion might a reader reasonably draw? Believe me, I'm not scolding. I'm just asking. It seems like a pertinent question about a magazine so closely associated with a Common Ground Initiative that is supposedly intended to bring Catholics together in fidelity to the Church's teaching.

■ Demonstrating again a famous evenhandedness, I note in the same issue of *Commonweal* a fine review of six books issuing from Eerdmans' *Ressourcement* series, edited by David Schindler. The books are by Balthasar and Ratzinger, with golden oldies by Guardini, Danielou, and Blondel. Michael O. Garvey comments: "A few days after the excommunication of the Sri Lankan theologian Tissa Balasuriya, a justifiably troubled editorialist writing in the London *Tablet* asked rhetorically, 'Are we back to the methods and content of pre-conciliar theology?' One need not believe that Father Balasuriya is a heretic, nor applaud all the operations and tactics of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, nor long for the restoration of the Papal States and the Tridentine Mass and the churching of women and the starching of wimples to reply, 'I sure hope so.' I don't for a single minute doubt that pre-conciliar Church administration was every bit as clumsy and occasionally uncharitable as post-conciliar Church administration has been. But these works certainly indicate that pre-conciliar theology, whatever all those censorious Church administrators might have thought about it, was not bad at all, and was at the very least capable of producing arguments worth having." Which is also true of *Commonweal*, when the editors put their mind to it.

■ "I know that this statement may distress some," said Archbishop George Carey of Canterbury. "For all I know, some of you may be wrestling with this issue personally." Speaking at Virginia Theological Seminary, he declared, "I do not find any justification from the Bible or the entire Christian tradition for sexual activity outside marriage." That may seem unexceptionable, but a few weeks earlier the seminary's board of trustees voted 31-3 to allow cohabitation by seminarians, homosexual and heterosexual, if their sponsoring bishops accepted

their "life style." Although the Archbishop of Canterbury has no judicial or disciplinary authority in the Episcopal Church here, his statement was deemed "controversial" by those who thought he might be suggesting, however gently, that the Bible and Christian tradition proposed a sexual morality that may still be pertinent today.

■ It turns out not to be so bad after all. Recall the two New Jersey teenagers who put their newborn baby boy in a plastic bag and left it to die in a trash bin. This happened in Delaware and the state charged them with murder, but now the medical examiner reports that the baby suffered from a rare cerebral abnormality called schizencephaly. The *New York Times* reports that "the announcement is likely to be cited by defense lawyers who have said from the start that the baby was not healthy at birth." That puts an entirely different light on the case. The baby might have turned out to be handicapped.

■ In a recent comment we had described Mary McGrory of the *Washington Post* as "a staunch advocate of the abortion license." Not so, said some friends of hers. So we asked her how she would describe her own position, and received this response: "I more or less went along in the Mario Cuomo way—I knew it was wrong but did not think it should be denied to people who had no religious scruples. The partial-birth abortion controversy has so appalled me, I'm thinking it over right now." Ms. McGrory has spoken out very effectively against partial-birth abortion, and we wish her well in her rethinking of the abortion license itself.

■ Writing in *Crisis*, A. J. Bacevich of the Foreign Policy Institute in Washington thinks there may be something to Jacob Heilbrunn's muddled attack on FT in *The New Republic* in which he distinguishes between the "neocons" and "theocons." The latter refuse to let religion be taken captive to any party line, and that, says Bacevich, has implications also for foreign policy. "In short, examined from the perspective of religious conservatism, the moral content of American foreign policy is not all that moral. Claims, continuously reasserted by President Bill Clinton and members of his Administration, that present-day U.S. policies represent a continuation of the defense of moral values that was central to the Cold War are simply not true. Precisely what values are served in expanding U.S. trade with an authoritarian China? In maintaining embargoes against Iraq and Cuba, punishing innocents while tyrants go untouched? In converting the Persian Gulf into an American military protectorate? In annually peddling billions of dollars of American weapons abroad? The theocon premise may oblige religious conservatives to view such policies in a new light—even if doing so invites conclusions about the uses of American power that

bear an uncomfortable resemblance to conclusions once touted by the left." The easy thing is to call this resurgent "isolationism." More accurately, Bacevich is making the case—a case he has also made in these pages—that domestic corruption is contagious, and the currently popular globalism may be a sign of the disease's spread.

■ Oops Department: The late U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, who is reported to have urged Arabs and Jews to settle their differences "like Christian gentlemen," was in the Truman, not the Eisenhower, Administration.

■ "Delegates representing more than forty million constituents," according to this press release, will attend a tribute in Washington to Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Later it is stated that "seventy million Christians and Jews support a secure Israel and a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty." The event, scheduled for April 7, was supported by the Rev. Jerry Falwell, who said: "We must not be passive. We must give our support to Israel based on biblical principals [sic] outlined in the Abrahamic Covenant and elsewhere. Now is the time to make a major statement to Israel and America of our solidarity and support for Israel as a people and a sovereign nation. It is also time for President Bill Clinton to follow the recommendation of the U.S. Congress and move our U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to the true capitol [sic] of Israel, Jerusalem." Jews may be uneasy about being embraced by people whose scenario of the End Time entails their conversion to Christianity. To that concern Irving Kristol has memorably observed, "It's their theology. It's our Israel." Christians who favor the security of Israel may wonder, however, whether support for Likud should be turned into an article of biblical faith. To that the answer is an unequivocal No.

■ Bestiality, child molestation, and incest were supposedly the last taboos. One down, two to go. Kathryn Harrison's best selling and allegedly autobiographical book, *The Kiss*, plus the movies *Lone Star* and *The House of Yes* boldly venture, as they say, into forbidden territory. Columnist Linda Chavez notes that incest is not new to drama. There is, for example, *Oedipus Rex*. The difference is that, "while the audience is moved to pity Oedipus, Sophocles does not ask us to understand, much less approve, of what he has done." Today, by way of contrast, "Incest becomes a mere passage, a stage in life that drives its practitioners not to roam the world blinded and in rags but to grace the pages of *Vanity Fair*. This fawning acceptance of these incestuous heroes and heroines is the real tragedy of today's incest tales." And the tragedy of the arts, both high and low, that equate creativity with transgression. A friend says she's weary of people who go on at length with "Ain't it awful?" I am, too. But isn't it?

■ I've known Ed Koch, our former mayor, for many years and I'm pleased that we consider one another friends. I was therefore a bit surprised when he used his column in the *New York Post* to attack me for "lending [my] good name to the gay-bashers." In 1981, when he was mayor, Koch launched a New York Holocaust museum which is now the Museum of Jewish Heritage being built at Battery Park. The director of the project had publicly declared that the museum will also honor gays and lesbians persecuted in the Holocaust. Some Jewish citizens asked me to join in their public protest of this plan, and I chose to write a respectful letter to the director expressing my concern that people might conclude that the museum "has compromised its integrity by becoming an instrument of interest-group propaganda rather than fulfilling its mandate to honor the victims of the Holocaust and provide the public with an honest account of a horror that must never be allowed to happen again." I noted "the very real danger of trivializing the tragedy of the millions of Jewish victims of the Holocaust by suggesting, however indirectly, that it is comparable to the persecution of homosexuals." I also noted, with what I thought to be excruciating understatement, that "the role of homosexuals and homosexuality in the Nazi party and regime is riddled with ambiguity." This, I submit, is not gay-bashing. It is an expression of concern for historical honesty, and of puzzlement that something called a Museum of Jewish Heritage should be highlighting homosexuality. Ed Koch and I have agreed that we will continue to be friends despite this contretemps, which, unfortunately, is no little matter in the politics of a city such as New York.

■ The disparity in giving between Protestants and Catholics comes in for regular comment. Writing in *America*, Joseph Claude Harris says that the disparity should not be surprising. While non-Catholics give more than Catholics, both give what is necessary to support their programs and structures. The average number of households in a local Protestant church is 201. The average for Catholic parishes is 959. The average giving per Protestant household is \$863. The average per Catholic household is \$343. Harris provides a table demonstrating a remarkably precise correlation between size of parish and the amount given per household. Where Catholics are relatively few, as in the deep South, the average parish has 450 households that, on average, give \$496. Where the Catholic population is dense, as in the Northeast, the average parish has 1,089 households giving, on average, \$175. A major difference, of course, is that the small Protestant congregation typically must support a pastor and his or her family, while the small Catholic parish has a celibate priest on a modest stipend and is frequently responsible for only part of his support. The upshot is that the disparity

in giving to the local church is not surprising. The probably unanswerable question is whether there is a Protestant/Catholic disparity in giving to other charitable causes.

■ Please mark Sunday, November 16, as a Day of Prayer for Persecuted Christians. Yes, I know, we've got special days for this and that coming out of our ears, but this is not just one issue among others. A very impressive group of Christian leaders, mobilized by the indomitable Michael Horowitz of the Hudson Institute, is building up a head of steam to develop a national concern for persecuted Christians comparable to the campaign for Soviet Jewry some years ago. Nobody misses the significance of Horowitz being a Jew who is set upon getting Christians to care about fellow Christians. Steve Haas, former director of international ministries for the Willow Creek Community Church, has come aboard as full-time coordinator for the Day of Prayer. A. M. (Abe) Rosenthal of the *New York Times*, another Jew, has been effectively using his column to, in effect, shame Christians into addressing religious persecution, especially with respect to China. Other papers around the country are picking up the cause. Also on religious persecution, the Clinton Administration has been playing footsy with the Chinese regime. The State Department's Committee on Religious Persecution, recently established, has been doing next to nothing. The Administration, including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, offers tough-sounding sound bites about "human rights" but says nothing about the thousands of Chinese priests, pastors, bishops, and laypeople who are in fact now jailed and tortured for the faith. More encouraging, a very broad coalition of Senators and Representatives is offering legislation that will put teeth into the professed concern for religious persecution in China and elsewhere. For more information, write Michael Horowitz at Hudson Institute, 1015 18th Street, NW, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20036. Not so incidentally, Prison Fellowship has given Horowitz its 1997 William Wilberforce Award, an award amply deserved. Do make a note of Sunday, November 16.

■ With the newly aroused interest in judicial usurpation provoked by the FT symposium of last November, the question is more earnestly asked, "But what then is to be done?" It is a question that we have addressed in these pages and will be addressing in forthcoming issues. Meanwhile Andrew Ferguson, in his wisely hilarious *Fools' Names, Fools' Faces* (Atlantic Monthly Press), has some thoughts on what might be done about the Supreme Court. "One modest proposal suggests removing them from the Washington swamp altogether, by transplanting the Court—Justices and clerks, law books and Xerox machines, the works—to Kansas City, say, or Billings, Montana, where they might

reestablish contact with the public whose desires they routinely second-guess or override. The Supreme Court building itself could stand empty for a while, as a kind of monument to the perils of overweening government, and then be handed over to a local high school for basketball games. But this proposal, while sound, is probably unworkable. The only antidote to a power-hungry Supreme Court, if there is one, will come from a different kind of Justice—secure enough in his beliefs to resist the lure of Washington elitism, respectful enough of democratic process to keep her hands to herself. Such Justices would be even more nondescript than the ones we have, and the Supreme Court, having relinquished its self-imposed role as policy maker, would become even more boring than it is. It would risk forgoing its status as ‘one of the best tourist sights in Washington,’ but no great loss: If the tourists wanted to see where policy is made, they could cross the street and watch Congressmen bellow on the floor of the House—undignified and earthy, lacking robes and brocade, a spectacle, for better or worse, of democracy revived.”

■ Enough already. It is not surprising that from such an alert readership there comes a raft of letters pointing out that, by strict chronological reckoning, the Third Millennium begins with January 2001, not January of the year 2000. Exactly. In terms of cultural consciousness, however, it begins with the year 2000. The best approach to this, I think, is to take a leaf from John Paul II’s *Tertio Millennio Adveniente* and see the observance in the year 2000 precisely as a *preparation* for the Third Millennium.

■ I have already commented on *The Godless Constitution* by Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore. I have to say that, even though they are most respectful in their disagreements with me, it is a terribly wrongheaded book, really just a polemical tract against that awful “religious right.” David Carlin of Community College of Rhode Island writes me that he was at first taken with the book. “I’m a lifelong Rhode Islander; therefore I quite naturally venerate Roger Williams, who founded our colony/state in 1636. In Kramnick and Moore’s book I discovered that Williams was not just a champion of religious freedom (all Rhode Islanders know that) but a believer, like them, in a ‘godless’ constitution; hence a forerunner of today’s secular liberals; hence too an opponent of the religious right. Given my lifelong reverence for our founding father, this discovery enabled me to resolve all doubts about the religious right. If Roger Williams wouldn’t like Pat Robertson, Ralph Reed, et al., neither could I.” But then Mr. Carlin went to the library to check out the records of the colonial legislature of 1647, in which Roger Williams played a key role. “If ever I am to find the spirit of godless politics at work (I said to myself), it will be in these 1647 records. With Roger

Williams physically present, only eleven years after he founded the colony, only three after he obtained the parliamentary charter, the assembled freemen would be sure to observe the strict proprieties of church-state separation. They would certainly not attempt (à la Ralph Reed) to impose their religious or moral-religious views on others.” The prologue to the laws adopted by the freemen did indeed lift up Williams’ famous freedom of conscience, although framing it rather oddly in terms of “our different consciences, touching the truth as it is in Jesus.” The exclusivist Christian bias was not lost on Carlin, but worse was to come. Obviously, Kramnick and Moore’s liberal Rhode Islanders would have understood that they could not impose their religious views with respect to, say, homosexuality. But then Carlin found this: “Touching Whoremongers. First of Sodomie, which is forbidden by this present Assemblée throwout the whole Colonie, and by Sundry Statutes of England. 25 Hen. viii. 6; 5 Eliz. xviii. It is a vile affection, whereby men given up thereto, leave the natural use of woman, and burne in their lusts, one toward another; and so men with men worke that which is unseemly, as that Doctor of the Gentiles in his letter to the Romans once spake, I.27; The Penaltie concluded by that State [England] under whose authoritie we are, is Felonie of death, without remedye. See 5 Eliz. 17.” The death penalty yet. The legislators were hardly more respectful of alternative lifestyles when it came to “Adulterie and Fornication.” Carlin was becoming disillusioned. “At the conclusion of my day’s research I had grown more than a little doubtful that our beloved Roger Williams had a proper understanding—i.e., a godless understanding—of the separation of religion and politics. He and his fellow colonists sounded like the most extreme and intolerant wing of the religious right.” Carlin doesn’t think this means that the religious right has Roger Williams on its side, but he does think this: “If the authors of *The Godless Constitution* wish to prove that the religious right is religiously and politically wrong, let them go ahead and try. But leave my friend Roger Williams out of it.”

■ When Colin Welch died a few months ago, he was not famous in England and was almost completely unknown here. ‘Tis a shame, for he was one of the truly elegant writers of our time. In his honor the *Spectator* republishes some random pieces, such as his reflection on revisiting Normandy forty years after the great invasion: “All schools have their particular smell, a whiff of which, carbolic, polish, or sweat, will bring back days long past. The smell of Normandy was death. . . . It isn’t a military country; let loose a full-blast war in it, and the result is a gigantic abattoir, bodies everywhere, human, animals, theirs, ours, French, no chance to bury them, all stiff and hideously swollen, covered with white dust or mud, faces blown away, or dreadfully

distorted, crawling with flies, rotting, giving off that terrible sweet-sour stench which, once smelt, is not forgotten." Then this comment on Glazunov, one of his favorite composers: "I think that both the music and life of this man do have messages for all of us. . . . They are perhaps: hold fast to what is good and true; guard what is beautiful; help the unfortunate; stoop not to malice, back-biting, and denunciation; defend

precious standards and traditions and institutions; honor the masters, master your craft; respect the past; be loyal to your art and to fellow artists; guide and cherish the young; forget yourself, remember others." Such are the messages in the life and work of Colin Welch. *Requiescat in pace.*

■ Are you still keeping FT to yourself? What about that list of potential subscribers?

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
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
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
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
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
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